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This thesis examines European Union (‘EU’) biofuels sustainability criteria in the 
context of the law of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’). The criteria were 
introduced as part of the 2009 EU Renewable Energy and Fuel Quality Directives. 
There has been no dispute; however, uncertainty about the criteria’s WTO-
compatibility has inspired a number of legal analyses concluding that they are not 
compliant. Whether or not there is the political will for a dispute, it is interesting to 
consider sources of potential non-compliance. As they pursue ‘sustainability,’ the EU 
criteria are well positioned to prompt larger questions regarding the relationship 
between international trade rules and sustainable development, described by the WTO 
Secretariat as a central WTO principle. 
 The thesis identifies a core challenge: dispute settlement mechanisms to 
identify de facto discrimination risk including regulations that exhibit particular 
characteristics. EU criteria exemplify these characteristics, which also seem likely to 
apply to sustainability regulation more broadly. These include breadth, complexity 
and process-orientation, and response to emerging environmental problems. Thus, the 
criteria may be perceived as protectionist even though this is not their intent. The 
larger implication is that, despite its centrality in principle, applying sustainable 
development through national regulation raises particular challenges of WTO law. 
 The Appellate Body must strike a balance between achieving the WTO’s 
primary mandate of trade liberalization and showing appropriate deference toward 
trade-restrictive regulations, particularly those, like EU criteria, that pursue climate 
change mitigation and other important social and environmental objectives. While this 
case study suggests a potential imbalance in favour of trade liberalization, the 
Appellate Body may redress this without major structural reform, as relevant WTO 
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To help prevent climate change, governments worldwide have passed a raft of 
national regulations to encourage or mandate increased use of biofuels as a substitute 
for petrol for transport. Yet biofuels occupy the unique role of being seen as both an 
environmental solution and an environmental problem. Thus, for governments who 
have encouraged increased production, ensuring that this benefits environmental goals 
is a complex challenge. As a response to this challenge, the European Union (‘EU’) 
has developed criteria for sustainable biofuels as part of the same regulations that 
encourage biofuels use: primarily the Renewable Energy Directive (‘RED’) and also 
the Fuel Quality Directive (‘FQD’).1 These criteria, still being implemented by EU 
Member States, entered into force in December 2010. They aim to capture biofuels’ 
potential benefits, such as lessening carbon emissions and revitalizing agricultural 
markets. At the same time, they attempt to minimize potential harms associated with 
biofuels production, principally biodiversity loss, and to ensure that biofuels have low 
greenhouse gas emissions, so that they do not contribute to the problem they aim to 
address. Crucially, these sustainability criteria apply to both domestic and also 
imported biofuels. 
This thesis examines EU biofuels sustainability criteria in the context of the 
law of the World Trade Organization (‘WTO’). With growing biofuels markets, 
international trade is also increasing.2 To facilitate market access, trade liberalization 
of biofuels has become a key objective of the current Doha Development Agenda 
(‘DDA’) negotiations for countries such as Brazil, who have the potential to supply 
                                                
1 European Council Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
2 P Spackman, ‘Massive increase in global biofuel production’, Farmer’s Weekly, 12 October 2009, 
http://www.fwi.co.uk/Articles/2009/10/12/118291/Massive-increase-in-global-biofuel-production.htm 
(visited 1 August 2012); ‘Biofuels, trade and sustainability’, EurActive, 28 April 2008, updated 29 July 
2009, http://www.euractiv.com/trade/biofuels-trade-sustainability-linksdossier-188459 (visited 14 
September 2012).  
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much of the world with cheaper, more energy efficient biofuels.3 Some exporters have 
indicated that EU sustainability criteria, rather than a conservation strategy, may 
constitute ‘green protectionism’: a market access barrier erected to restrict imports 
and drive up their costs. For example, in 2006 it was estimated that complying with 
some of the EU proposed sustainability criteria would increase ethanol production 
costs in Brazil by 36-88 per cent.4  
The criteria have led to informal complaints due to their trade-restrictiveness. 
In 2007, a report on WTO negotiations stated that ‘Brazilian trade diplomats have 
warned their EU counterparts that they would reject any standards placed by buyers 
on bioethanol and biodiesel, and would bring such attempts to the WTO for dispute 
settlement due to their trade impacts’.5 More recently, Malaysian and Indonesian 
government ministers promised to investigate the possibility of a WTO dispute 
against the EU as the criteria unfairly excludes their palm oil from the EU market.6 
The American Soybean Association has also pressured the United States Trade 
Representative to challenge the WTO-legality of the criteria.7 In June 2012 the 
government of Argentina argued that Spain’s implementation of sustainability 
requirements for biodiesel violates WTO law.8 
Whether a WTO dispute will arise is an open question, particularly as 
sustainability criteria remain a work-in-progress, and the European Commission 
(‘EC’) have saved some of the most controversial elements for last. They are still 
formulating regulation to respond to indirect land use change, defined later in the 
introduction.9 Also, they are debating the introduction of additional criteria on air, soil 
or water protection.10 Finally, they have yet to clarify the definition of biodiverse 
                                                
3 See Section 2(d).  
4 E Smeets, et al., ‘The Sustainability of Brazilian Ethanol – An Assessment of the Possibilities for 
Certified Production’ (2006) Copernicus Institute at Universiteit Utrecht and Universidade Estadual de 
Campinas. 
5 ‘Biofuels: The New Trade Frontier?’ 11(2) Bridges, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (‘ICTSD’), 2 April 2007, 1. 
6 ‘Malaysia seems possible WTO case against EU palm oil limits’, 14(18) Bridges, ICTSD, 19 May 
2010; P Harrison, ‘Malaysia, Indonesia warn EU hampers palm oil trade’, Reuters, 16 November 2010, 
http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFLDE6AF14C20101116 (visited 13 June 2012).   
7 ‘ASA Expresses Concerns about EU Renewable Energy Directive to USDA and USTR’, Press 
Release, American Soybean Association, 9 March 2011, 
http://www.soygrowers.com/newsroom/releases/2011_releases/r030911.htm (visited 15 November 
2011). 
8 ‘Argentina raises a specific trade concern at the WTO regarding Spain’s biodiesel measure’, Trade 
Perspectives, Frantini Vergano, European Lawyers, Issue no. 12, 15 June 2012.  
9 RED, above n. 1, at Art. 18(9); see Chapter 4 of this thesis for an in-depth analysis.  
10 Ibid at Art. 18(9b). 
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grasslands. 11 Their responses to these unresolved issues will also influence the 
likelihood of a dispute.  
 With respect to existing criteria, uncertainty about their legality has inspired 
analyses from trade policy experts.12 For the most part, these have determined that 
some areas of the criteria fall into a WTO gray area, and may not be WTO-compliant. 
One particularly critical report, for example, has concluded regarding sustainability 
criteria that ‘even a cautious analysis suggests the RED would not stand up to 
examination by the standards required by WTO rules’.13 
Whether or not there is the political will to bring a dispute, it is instructive to 
consider potential sources of illegality. The European Commission (‘EC’) has made 
historic claims for their criteria, describing them as ‘the most comprehensive and 
advanced binding sustainability scheme of its kind anywhere in the world’.14 These 
criteria are an ambitious and unprecedented attempt to legislate sustainability at the 
national level. For its part, the WTO has stated that sustainable development is a 
central WTO principle.15 The WTO-compatibility of the criteria thus has implications 
for the mutual supportiveness between WTO rules and national sustainability 
regulation more broadly.  
It is these larger trade questions, rather than the criteria per se, that form the 
focus of this thesis. For example, what does this case study demonstrate about the role 
of the WTO in shaping, and responding to, EU environmental regulation? From the 
perspective of dispute settlement, how should the WTO strike the balance between 
enforcement of trade liberalization commitments of its Member States and deference 
                                                
11 Ibid at Preamble para. 69. See Section 2(E) for further discussion of this issue.  
12 See, eg, F Erixon, ‘The Rising Trend of Green Protectionism: Biofuels and the European Union’, 
European Centre for International Political Economy, Occasional Paper No. 2, 2012, 
http://www.ecipe.org/publications/rising-trend-green-protectionism-biofuels-and-european-union/ 
(visited 13 July 2012); R Howse, et al. ‘WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints 
in the Creation of a Global Marketplace’ (2006) IPC Discussion Paper, International Food and 
Agricultural Trade Policy Council; A Lendle and M Schaus, ‘Sustainability Criteria in the EU 
Renewable Energy Directive: Consistent with WTO Rules?’ (2010) ICTSD Information Note No. 2, 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/86798/ (visited 1 August 2012); A Swinback, ‘EU Support for Biofuels 
and Bioenergy, Environmental Sustainability Criteria, and Trade Policy’, ICTSD, Programme on 
Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue paper no. 17, June 2009; A Swinbank, 
‘Presidential Address: EU Policies on Bioenergy and the Potential Clash with the WTO’ (2009) 60(3) 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 485 – 503; S Switzer and J McMahon, ‘EU Biofuels Policy – 
Raising the Question of WTO Compatibility’ (2010) UCD Working Papers in Law, Criminology and 
Socio-Legal Studies Research Paper No. 26/2010, University College Dublin.  
13 Erixon, ibid at 27.  
14 Communication from the Commission on the practical implementation of the EU biofuels and 
bioliquids sustainability scheme and on counting rules for biofuels, OJ 19.6.2010 C 160/8, Section 1. 
15 Available on the WTO website at http://www.wto.org-english-tratop_e-envir_e-sust_dev_e (visited 1 
August 2012). 
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to their trade-restrictive policy objectives? What kind of challenges do the particular 
characteristics of sustainability regulation pose with respect to WTO law? These are 
the central questions this thesis considers. 
This investigation is timely as the EU’s renewable energy directives that 
include sustainability criteria are at the vanguard of national regulations aimed at 
preventing climate change. While some criticize these climate-change-related 
regulations as a rise in green protectionism,16 they may also be seen as essential for no 
less than saving humanity, particularly if a strong international regulatory framework 
cannot be successfully negotiated. This debate will continue to be one of the most 
interesting in defining the relationship between trade liberalization and climate 
change regulation.  
Determining whether sustainability criteria protect EU markets or imperiled 
environmental resources is also significant with respect to the global standoff 
regarding the liberalization of agriculture in the DDA. Developing countries in the 
global South have a comparative advantage in biofuels production, while wealthy 
Northern countries, such as those of the EU, protect their biofuels industries. WTO 
developments regarding biofuels sustainability criteria thus play into this central 
controversy of current WTO negotiations. 
Biofuels are a complex topic, in part because their role in the public 
imagination, policies for their production and use, and even the technologies to 
produce them are all in flux. To help orient the reader in the short but complex history 
of the ambivalent public embrace of biofuels, Section 2 of this introduction provides a 
general introduction, including an overview of the sustainability controversy 
surrounding biofuels production and the specific problems to which the EU criteria 
respond. Section 3 focuses on the potential for trade conflict. It argues that biofuels 
sustainability criteria themselves do not constitute green protectionism, but rather the 
EU’s attempt to respond to political backlash to their biofuels targets. Section 4 
provides a summary of the criteria. It then outlines the thesis’ main themes, structure 
and scope.  
 
2. Biofuels sustainability criteria and international trade law 
 
                                                
16 See, eg, Erixon, above n. 12, at 3 – 5. 
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A. Biofuels: definitions 
First generation biofuels come from feedstocks that have either high sugar/starch 
content (bioethanol), or high oil content (biodiesel). Bioethanol, known simply as 
ethanol, is fuel alcohol. It is created by fermentation; thus, the more sugar a crop has, 
the more efficiently it can be converted. Main crops from which ethanol is produced 
include sugarcane and sugar beets, as well as grains such as corn, cassava and wheat. 
To create blends of more than 10 per cent, it is necessary to use a flex-fuel engine, 
which can run on any combination of ethanol and petrol. 
 Biodiesel is a vegetable oil- or fat-based diesel fuel, which requires the use of 
engines that run on diesel fuel. Production is often sourced from rapeseed, sunflower 
seed, soybean, palm or jatropha oil. Biodiesel can also be blended with conventional 
diesel fuel; up to 20 per cent blends require no engine conversion. 
Second generation biofuels promise to provide an environmentally superior 
option. Rather than being derived from sugar- or oil- rich crops, they are made from 
cellulose or lignin, which comes from the woody parts of plants. They can thus be 
made from the entire plant, or even agricultural waste products. The development of 
these biofuels relies upon advanced enzymatic fermentation technologies. While they 
are too expensive to be commercially viable, some estimates suggest that they may 
become available as early as 2015.17 Other highly energy-efficient options such as 
biofuels derived from algae18 and even human waste,19 are also currently in the 
research and development stage.  
The imminent availability of second generation biofuels has been 
acknowledged within climate-change related agreements. EU biofuels targets, for 
example, will be revised to higher numbers once cleaner biofuels become available.20 
The timing of the introduction of second-generation biofuels adds greatly to the 
uncertainty of biofuels’ long-term sustainability impacts. Given the low production 
levels of second generation biofuels, this thesis focuses on the first generation 
biofuels currently being produced to fulfil EU biofuels targets. 
 
                                                
17 ‘Sustainable Bioenergy: A Framework for Decision Makers’, UN-Energy (April 2007) 14. 
18 See, eg, ‘Algae for production of biofuels’, European Bioenergy Platform, 
http://www.biofuelstp.eu/algae.html (visited 16 July 2012). 
19 M Sapp, ‘Ghana launches human waste to biofuels project’, Biofuels Digest, 30 May 2012, 
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2012/05/30/ghana-launches-solid-waste-to-biofuels-project/ 
(visited 16 July 2012). 
20 RED, above n. 1, at Article 23(8a). 
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B. Panacea or peril? 
Biofuels burst onto the public policy stage in a blaze of optimism. The potential of 
biofuels to provide a major source for fuel for transportation generated tremendous 
commitments worldwide. The private and public sectors in major economies such as 
Europe, India, China and the United States have united in their advocacy of ambitious 
biofuels use targets, ranging between 5 per cent and 25 per cent of total domestic fuel 
use by 2020.21 To meet this demand, between 2000 and 2008, global biofuels 
production multiplied fourfold; it is projected to almost double between 2012 and 
2021.22 In 2009, it was estimated that only one tenth of biofuels produced were 
traded.23 However, with global markets growing, international trade is increasing. 
The EU Renewable Energy Directive (‘RED’) requires, as a binding 
commitment, that 10 per cent fuel for transport should consist of renewable energy. 
The EU changed the wording of its target to ‘renewable energy’ from ‘biofuels’, 
which it used in earlier legislation. However it is estimated that 5.6 – 8.8 per cent of 
this target will consist of biofuels.24 Producing these biofuels will require between 4.5 
– 7.9 million additional hectares of land to come into production.25 The conservative 
estimate corresponds to a land-area the size of Denmark.26  
The EU’s Renewable Energy Directive also specifies that imports will play a 
role in supplying biofuel, in particular ethanol.27 Private sector activity confirms this 
                                                
21 T Harmer, ‘Biofuels Subsidies and International Trade Law, Annex 1: Selected Biofuels Measures in 
Major Producing Countries’, ICTSD Global Platform on Climate Change, Trade Policies and 
Sustainable Energy, June 2009, 17.  
22 ‘Position Paper on Biofuels for the ACP-EU Energy Facility’, EuropeAid (2009) 2; Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) and UN Food and Agriculture Organization 
(‘FAO’), ‘Agricultural Outlook Summary 2012 – 2021’, http://www.oecd.org/site/oecd-
faoagriculturaloutlook/ (visited 1 August 2012). 
23 Harmer, above n. 21, at 2.  
24 P Al-Riffai, et al., ‘Global Trade and Environmental Impact Study of the EU Biofuels Mandate’, 
International Food Policy Institute for the Directorate General for Trade for the European Commission, 
Final Report, March 2010, 11 (5.6 per cent estimate); C Bowyer, ‘ Anticipated Indirect Land Use 
Change Associated with Expanded Use of Biofuels and Bioliquids in the EU – An Analysis of the 
National Renewable Energy Action Plans’, Institute for European Environmental Policy, March 2011, 
2. (8.8 per cent estimate). 
25 There is some discrepancy about the amount of land conversion required to meet the EU’s targets. 
The larger estimates are from Bowyer, ibid at 2; the smaller are from ‘EU finds biofuels and politics 
don’t mix’, Reuters, 5 July 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/05/uk-biofuels-europe-
idUKTRE6641G020100705 (visited 1 August 2012).  
26 Reuters (ibid) averaged the estimates of fifteen different reports, including those commissioned by 
the European Commission, to arrive at the figure of 4.5 million hectares, an area approximately the size 
of Denmark; K Richter, ‘Scrap Biofuels Targets and focus on improved public transport,’ Guardian, 10 
February 2010, www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/10/biofuels-travel-and-transport (visited 1 
August 2012).  
27 RED, above n. 1, at Article 16. 
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commitment. For example, in 2010, Royal Dutch Shell, Europe’s second biggest 
energy company, formed an £8.19 billion Memorandum of Understanding with 
COSAN, a Brazilian ethanol company, to double existing production.28  
Yet this massive private sector investment and public sector support coexist 
with a parallel dialogue calling for biofuels targets to be scrapped entirely. Biofuels 
have proven to be perhaps the most controversial and divisive of proposed climate 
change measures. Is producing more biofuels essential to stopping climate change? Or 
is their production more likely to harm than help?  
The case for biofuels states that their production revitalizes agricultural 
markets worldwide. Biofuels rely upon simple, well-established technologies, and 
already form a fuel component in many countries. Thus, they can be incorporated 
cheaply and easily into existing infrastructure, and present an immediate strategy to 
fighting global warming. At the same time, biofuels provide jobs and investment 
opportunities, and increase domestic fuel security. 
Some initially presented biofuels as a panacea. Ted Turner, Chairman of the 
United Nations Foundation, proclaimed in 2006 that biofuels produced from food 
crops have the potential not only to embody the goal of sustainability, but also to 
solve the current stalemate in international trade negotiations. This argument rests on 
the logic that governments could redirect their subsidies from agriculture to biofuels. 
Biofuels provide more global markets for agricultural production, thus alleviating any 
surplus.29 
Other advocates included Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Atlantic 
airlines, who stated that Brazil alone can grow enough ethanol to power the world’s 
commercial aircraft, thus resolving concerns about the climate cost of rising levels of 
air travel.30 Robert Birgeneau, the Chancellor of University of California at Berkeley, 
which received US $500 million toward biofuels research in 2007, pinned 
                                                
28 N Mathiason, ‘Shell to do deal with Brazilian biofuel producer Cosan to secure future’, Guardian, 2 
February 2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2010/feb/01/shell-cosan-brazil-biofuel-deal 
(visited 1 August 2012).  
29 M Sell, et al. ‘Linking Trade, Climate Change and Energy,’ ICTSD, Issue briefs: November 2006, 
16; DA Motaal, ‘The Biofuels Landscape: Is There a Role for the WTO?’ (2008) 42(1) Journal of 
World Trade 83, 61 – 86. 
30 EF Vencat, ‘Developing Alternatives: Interview with Virgin CEO Richard Branson’, Newsweek 
International, 16 July 2007. 
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humankind’s hope for the future on the ability of biofuels to combat global warming, 
stating that it is our generation’s ‘moon shot’.31  
Yet the growing case against biofuels cites negative effects of the expansion 
of intensive agriculture: environmental problems such as deforestation and wetland 
degradation (themselves drivers of climate change), excessive water use, and 
polluting runoff. Biofuel crops, many of which are themselves important food staples, 
displace other agricultural crops, or compete with food crops, and drive up prices, 
with the potential to increase world hunger and deforestation of threatened 
ecosystems. Further, biofuels producers have been criticized for purchasing large 
amounts of land in developing countries, displacing indigenous people and 
threatening national sovereignty in a practice commonly known as land grabbing. 
Biofuels have also been critiqued for other human rights abuses such as poor labour 
standards. 
For these reasons, a global army of nongovernmental organizations and 
advocacy groups has called for a ban on biofuels use targets. A call to action on the 
Climate Change News Digest website reads ‘If we want to save forests, prevent 
catastrophic global warming, and stop food prices rising beyond the reach of poor 
people, then we need to stop biofuels from large-scale monocultures’.32  
Rising prices of agricultural commodities in 2008 attracted broad-based 
criticism of biofuels. A leaked World Bank study reported that biofuels were 
responsible for a 75 per cent increase in food prices.33 This ‘food crops versus fuel 
crops’ controversy brought biofuels critique into the mainstream. There is growing 
consensus that biofuels do not represent a straightforward answer to mitigating global 
warming. Rather, they pose another problem: how to eliminate negative impacts of 
increased production.  
More moderate critics suggest, rather than scrapping biofuels targets 
altogether, that these negative environmental and social impacts, grouped under the 
umbrella of ‘sustainability’, must be well regulated. These critics have included 
international organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme and 
                                                
31 Eds, ‘The Tree of Wisdom: Nobel Laureates of the University of California at Berkeley’, Vanity Fair 
Green Issue, 4 April 2007.  
32 See: Climate Change News Digest, http://www.climatechangenews.org/action.html (visited 1 August 
2012); Biofuel Watch, http://www.biofuelwatch.org.uk/ (visited 1 August 2012).  
33 A Chakrabortty, ‘Secret report: biofuel caused food crisis’, Guardian, 3 July 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jul/03/biofuels.renewableenergy (visited 1 August 2012).  
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the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, 34  the interdisciplinary, international 
Global Bioenergy Partnership, 35  and NGOs that represent negatively impacted 
stakeholders and ecosystems, such as Conservation International, the Worldwide 
Fund for Nature (WWF), the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and Oxfam 
International. 36  These organizations have focused on the need to foreground 
sustainability concerns in the establishment of biofuels as a global energy strategy.   
 
C. Shades of green 
Understanding sustainability impacts of biofuels is complex, for several reasons. First, 
they seem to bring into conflict separate environmental goals: biodiversity loss versus 
climate change mitigation, for instance. Second, though we know that biofuels 
provide an overall impetus for increasing farmland in production, the specific 
circumstances of this production differ greatly. In fact, a more relevant question than 
whether biofuels should be produced is how they should be produced. Corn-based 
ethanol has faced more criticism, for example, than sugarcane-based ethanol, due to 
its higher emissions levels. Second generation biofuels, though not yet commercially 
available, promise to be much ‘greener’ than these. Regional differences in growing 
areas, and the quantity of production, also determine the sustainability of biofuels.  
Third, from a scientific perspective, research on sustainability is complicated 
not only by the diversity of production circumstances, but also the recent scale 
increase in production and a high degree of uncertainty in the variables required to 
produce quantitative analysis. Also, in demarcating particular areas for conservation, 
the EU must rely upon definitions that may be politicized or controversial. Defining 
wetlands, for example, or quantifying high biodiversity levels, is notoriously 
difficult.37  
Finally, the amount of increased production will also depend upon changing 
technologies and market fluctuations. A 2006 Science article concluded that ‘many 
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important environmental effects of biofuel production are poorly understood’.38 A 
March 2010 report on the environmental impacts of the EU biofuels mandate, 
commissioned by the EC Directorate General for Trade, also stated that ‘as is 
common in this new field of enquiry the study's findings are subject to uncertainties 
because of gaps in available data and the lack of complete empirical validation’.39  
 
D. Specific sustainability impacts 
This is not to say that sustainability concerns are unverifiable. In spite of these gaps in 
knowledge, it is certain that the use of first generation biofuels as a primary source for 
the world’s fuel would have a dramatic impact on the global agricultural landscape, 
simply because of the quantity of land required.40 The next section provides a brief 
overview of one specific environmental problem associated with biofuels production: 
biodiversity loss, which EU sustainability criteria attempt to address. This overview 
focuses on two places already infamous for biodiversity loss from deforestation: 
Brazil and Borneo, the latter an island divided among Indonesia, Malaysia and 
Brunei. These countries are world leaders in the production of ethanol and biodiesel, 
respectively, and have embraced ambitious production targets.  
The issue of deforestation-driven biodiversity loss is important not just as an 
end in itself, but also because, as some scientists have cautioned, biofuels production 
may actually increase greenhouse gas emissions, due to land conversion. It has been 
estimated that converting rainforest, peat lands or savannah to produce biofuels based 
upon food crops will result in 17 – 240 times more carbon dioxide emissions than 
would be the case if these biofuels simply displaced fossil fuels.41   
When examining biofuels and deforestation, Brazil is a good place to start. 
Already the ‘Saudi Arabia of biofuels’,42 Brazil is positioning itself to supply much of 
the world with its sugarcane-derived ethanol. Brazilian exports of ethanol for 2007 
were just over 3 billion litres. A 2007 study commissioned by the Brazilian Ministry 
of Science and Technology put export estimates for 2025 as high as 200 billion 
                                                
38 A Farrell, et al., ‘Ethanol Can Contribute to Energy and Environmental Goals’ (2006) 311 Science 
506. 
39 Al-Riffai, et al., above n. 24. For quote, see: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=542 
(visited 1 August 2012).  
40 S Pacala and R Socolow, ‘Stabilization Wedges: Solving the climate problem for the next 50 years 
with current technologies’ (2004) 305 Science 968. 
41 J Fargione, et al., ‘Land Clearing and the Biofuel Carbon Debt’ (2008) 319 Science 1235.   
42 ‘Food price swing prompt calls for biofuels reform; Brazilian ethanol imports surge’, 15(7) Bridges, 
ICTSD, 11 May 2011, http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/106219/ (visited 16 June 2012).  
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litres.43 This is an over 60-fold increase in exports in fewer than twenty years. Such 
dramatic estimates have proven unrealistic; a combination of poor harvests, high 
sugar prices and the rising value of the Brazilian currency has meant that Brazil has 
been importing ethanol from the United States. 44  Nonetheless, this figure is 
impressive for what it reveals about the extent of national ambition regarding the 
growth of domestic and global demand. The longer-term forecast is for an increase in 
Brazil’s production and export of ethanol, though not at the ambitious rates originally 
forecast.45  
Brazilian ethanol is often represented as one of the greenest possible first-
generation biofuels. The Economist went so far as to describe sugar-derived Brazilian 
ethanol as ‘good,’ and corn-derived US ethanol as ‘bad’.46 This distinction results 
from the fact that it is estimated that sugarcane-based ethanol is around 7-8 times 
more efficient than corn-based in its production of greenhouse gas emissions.47 Thus 
it resolves one of the most recognized controversies about ethanol: its fuel efficiency.  
While some analysts have questioned whether any comparative advantage in fuel 
efficiency arises for corn-derived ethanol, no such controversy has arisen for sugar-
derived ethanol, as it is clearly superior to petrol.   
Yet there are concerns about the ecological cost of all this production. Brazil 
is also a world leader in agriculture-driven deforestation. It is possible that biofuels 
will lead to an increase in deforestation in important areas for absorbing carbon 
dioxide which have suffered huge biodiversity loss, such as the Amazon rainforest.  
 
E. The cerrado: hinterland or biodiversity hotspot? 
The Amazon is the epicenter of concern about biodiversity in Brazil. It is also a 
region in which sugarcane does not grow particularly well. Instead, much expansion 
of sugarcane for ethanol is occurring in the cerrado, a grassland ecosystem which 
occupies about a quarter of Brazil, more than 1.2 million square miles. It spans the 
centre of the country, and has the highest level of plant diversity of any savannah 
                                                
43 E Winfield, ‘Briefing No. 6: Ethanol on Brazil’, University of Iowa Center for International Finance 
and Development, May 2008, http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/briefings/docs/brazil.shtml (visited 3 
March 2010).  
44 ICTSD, above n. 42.  
45 OECD and FAO, above n. 22.  
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March 2007. 
47 A Farrell, et al., above n. 38, 506. 
 20 
ecosystem in the world, including many endangered species.48 Following the system 
of designation developed by Conservation International, it is considered a biodiversity 
hotspot. Conservation International also states that this region is being deforested 
faster than the Amazon, with ethanol as a major driver.49   
The cerrado is an ethanol frontier. Consortiums of North American investors, 
such as Brazil Agrilogic, focus on the productive potential of the cerrado areas in the 
state of Mato Grosso do Sul to attract international interest.50 The American financial 
speculator George Soros, for example, has invested a billion US dollars in three large 
ethanol factories in this state.51 A presentation by the president of Datagro, a top 
ethanol consulting firm, at the International Symposium on Alcohol Fuels in Brazil in 
2006, clearly identified ecosystems considered too valuable for expansion: the 
Amazon, the highly endangered Atlantic Rainforest along the Southeast and central 
coast, and the Pantanal, the largest wetlands ecosystem in the world. Datagro’s 
presentation emphasized that intensification, as well as expansion into non-valuable 
ecosystems, would easily meet the growing demand for ethanol consumption. It 
provided an overview of the 100+ new mills, being built in areas which are not 
included within the three specific areas that should be protected.52 This presentation 
allowed for large increases in production in the cerrado, a prime non-valuable 
ecosystem.   
Other advocates echo this approach of dividing productive from ecologically 
valuable areas.  Checkbiotech, a website devoted to biotechnology, notes that ‘of 
Brazil’s 851 million hectares of land, 405 million (48 per cent) correspond to the 
Amazon forest or legal natural forest reserves….’ After analysing the remaining 
components, the website asserts that ‘the remaining 90 million hectares are cerrado 
(savannah), which is available to increase sugarcane planting’.53 Similarly, an article 
in the Economist stated: ‘For the past three decades, sugarcane plantations have been 
spreading north and west across Brazil’s hinterlands, replacing coffee, citrus and 
                                                
48 EA Castro and JB Castro, ‘Ecosystem Structure in the Brazilian Cerrado: a vegetatation gradient of 
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Washington Post, 31 July 2007. 
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52 P Nastari, ‘Brazil’s Capacity to Meet Future Ethanol Demands’, Power Point Presentation, 
International Symposium on Alcohol Fuels XVI (2006) Brazil.   
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pasture….Ultimately, Brazil would like to see ethanol traded as freely and widely as 
oil’.54 The ‘hinterland’ described is the cerrado; the term makes clear that there is no 
ecological cost for this ambitious vision. In this framework, it is possible to manage 
expansion of ethanol by drawing boundaries which separate valuable from nonvaluble 
ecosystems.   
Brazil’s cerrado is either a hinterland well suited to solving the world’s energy 
crisis or a crucial ecosystem teeming with species imperiled by this very activity, 
depending on the source. Within the global imagination, a pro-conservation 
imperative clearly has emerged for the Amazon, but has not been established in the 
cerrado.  
For this reason, the EU’s as-yet undetermined definition of biodiverse 
grasslands in its sustainability criteria is crucial and controversial. If the cerrado is 
included in this definition, it will have a detrimental impact upon Brazilian exports to 
the EU. This may increase the likelihood of a WTO dispute.  
There is also the problem of indirect land-use change. Even if the Amazon 
rainforest is established as a no-go zone, it will still be impacted by ethanol 
production elsewhere in the country. A boom in sugar production means that other 
agricultural activities, such as soy farming and cattle ranching, are being displaced. 
These are prime drivers of Amazonian deforestation. Soy can also be converted to 
biodiesel, another expanding market in Brazil, adding more incentive to expand 
soybean production. Due to the combination of these factors, growing agricultural 
production for biofuels increases the incentive to farm in the Amazon.  
 
F. Borneo: Further deforestation in an already threatened ecosystem 
Biodiesel production in Borneo presents similar problems. Due to its high oil content, 
palm oil is amongst the best sources of biodiesel from the perspective of greenhouse 
gas emissions savings. Nonetheless, deforestation in Borneo, to make way for palm 
oil plantations, has been one of the most high-profile sustainability controversies 
associated with biofuels production (moreso than in Brazil, a situation which, as 
documented above, divides commentators).  
Borneo, an island divided among Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei, consists 
mainly of an Indonesian region known as Kalimantan. It has been claimed that 
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Borneo is being deforested at a rate unparalleled in human history.55 The forest is 
being cleared both legally and illegally, to sell timber and make way for agricultural 
land, including palm oil plantations. The cheapest vegetable oil on the market, palm 
oil is found in many common household items in Europe, such as biscuits, soap, 
margarine and crisps. The majority of EU imports of vegetable oil consist of palm oil; 
90 per cent of this came from Indonesia and Malaysia.56 Palm oil is also a prime 
source for biodiesel.  
Even before the introduction of international targets to increase biofuels use, 
deforestation to make way for palm oil plantations had prompted international 
concern. Palm oil plantations support far fewer species than native forest. The 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature estimates that the numbers of 
orangutan have decreased by 50 per cent in the last few decades, due to habitat loss 
from deforestation.57 Further, the draining of peat bogs to make way for palm oil, and 
the burning of virgin forest, has led to vast amounts of trapped methane and carbon 
emissions being released into the environment. As a result, Indonesia is now the third 
largest emitter of greenhouse gases, behind America and China.58  
Despite its contribution to climate change, the Indonesian government has 
developed ambitious plans for biodiesel development in Borneo, requiring vast 
additional areas of cultivation. It is estimated that 12 million acres of land, in Borneo 
and elsewhere, will be dedicated to companies growing biofuel crops, such as palm 
oil, cassava or sugar cane. As in Brazil, the financial potential of this biofuels 
cultivation is attracting major international investment. For example, the Chinese 
state-owned offshore oil corporation has invested in a new deal to develop biofuels 
plantations, estimated to be worth US $5.5 billion.59  
To respond to concerns about rampant deforestation, as well as human rights 
abuses, a consortium of stakeholders, such as NGOs, palm oil producers, and 
government representatives, have formed the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil 
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(‘RSPO’), a certification scheme that forms a precedent for the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Biofuels, discussed later in the thesis. However, it is estimated that only 3 
per cent of palm oil is currently certified as sustainable.60 Indonesia is also the first 
country to implement a legal framework for the REDD, a UN scheme which aims to 
provide incentives to developing countries to maintain forests for the sake of carbon 
capture.61  
The Indonesian Biofuels Development Board claims that new plantations will 
expand only onto unproductive land, which has been deforested and then abandoned. 
However, this policy may be difficult to enforce. Companies have a built-in incentive 
to deforest land, as they receive more money from selling the timber. According to 
the BBC, the Duta Palma group, one of the biggest corporations producing palm oil, 
is itself logging illegally on high conservation lands and deep peat lands.62 Thus, 
illegal logging does not just happen at the fringes of the industry, but at its very 
centre. 
 
G. EU Sustainability Criteria 
Due to these and other sustainability concerns, biofuels have formed a source of 
controversy within the EU. There are those who support biofuels, and argue against 
sustainability criteria. Biofuels provide a significant boost to EU agricultural markets, 
and create rural development. French sugarbeet ethanol producers and EU automobile 
manufacturers, for example, both exerted influence to establish and maintain targets 
and incentives for biofuels production, the latter in order to counterbalance some of 
the other, more punitive aspects of the RED.63 Yet, while there may be industry 
support for biofuels production, there is also industry pressure to avoid cumbersome 
regulations. Also, due in part to WTO rules, formulating and adopting sustainability 
standards is risky and complex: a political headache.  
On the other side, some high-level ministers in EU governments, even those 
that also embraced biofuels targets, have expressed strong reservations. In 2006, for 
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example, the then Danish Minister for transport and energy stated that first generation 
biofuels from food crops were not ethical. 64  Other governments, such as the 
Netherlands, Germany and the UK, independently established sustainability criteria 
before official EU criteria existed. Nor has the sustainability criteria ended the 
controversy. In early 2010, a leaked document between senior agriculture and energy 
officials in the EC stated that, if the full carbon footprint was taken into account, it 
could ‘kill’ biofuels’ role in the EU.65  
Sustainability criteria have evolved through several versions, more and less 
stringent, with input from different EU bodies. These criteria represent the EU’s 
attempt to respond to controversies about negative impacts of biofuels by establishing 
a framework for discrimination.  
 
H. The criteria 
a) Overview 
Biofuels sustainability criteria were introduced in two Directives released on 23 April 
2009. The first, the RED, stipulates that by 2020, 20 per cent of energy overall will 
come from renewable sources, including 10 per cent of energy for transport, the main 
source of which will be biofuels. Article 17 provides sustainability criteria to govern 
how these biofuels must be produced.66  
The second, the FQD, specifies that greenhouse gas emissions for transport 
fuels must be reduced by 6 per cent by 2020, and provides sustainability criteria in its 
Article 7. The overall purpose of the FQD is to reduce pollution and cut down on 
greenhouse gas emissions in the transport sector. It requires that fuel suppliers must 
reduce emissions through use of biofuels or other alternative fuels, or through a 
reduction of flaring and venting at production sites.67 
Both RED and FQD criteria apply equally to domestically produced and 
imported biofuels. Following them is voluntary. However, compliance is necessary in 
order for biofuels to count toward the renewable energy target of the RED or 
emissions reduction target of the FQD. To reach alternative energy targets, the RED 
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encourages the introduction of domestic support, such as investment, tax exemption 
and direct price supports. It also specifies that biofuels must comply with 
sustainability criteria to qualify for these domestic support schemes.68 This thesis 
focuses primarily on the RED, as its ambitious binding targets met through national 
incentives make the likelihood for trade conflict regarding sustainability criteria 
greater. The FQD also uses the RED criteria as its reference point.69 As the provisions 
are equivalent, the summary below uses the RED as a reference. 
The criteria set thresholds with regard to both overall efficiency of biofuels, 
and also what type of land can be used in their production. The latter includes 
restrictions on land with high biodiversity value or high carbon stock. The specific 
requirement of the EU regarding greenhouse gas is as follows: biofuels must represent 
an emissions savings of 35 per cent, rising to 50 per cent in January 2017, and 60 per 
cent in January 2018 for installations in which production started from 2017 
onwards.70 (There is a grace period, until 2013, for installations in operation before 23 
January 2008.) The RED specifies that these savings should be calculated as the sum 
of: emissions from extraction and cultivation of raw materials, land-use change, 
processing, and transport and distribution. Emissions that result from the end use of 
biofuels, however, are not included, as these are considered to be equivalent to the 
carbon captured by biofuels crops. The RED provides default emissions values for 
various biofuels, which can take the place of case-by-case calculations.  
The RED identifies categories of land with high biodiversity value, as well as 
high carbon stocks, from which raw materials for biofuels should not be taken, based 
upon the land’s status in January 2008.71 Regarding biodiversity, this includes primary 
forest, nature protection areas, and highly biodiverse grassland. Regarding high 
carbon stock, raw material should not be taken from wetland, continuously forested 
areas, areas with 10-30 per cent canopy cover, and peat land. An exception can be 
made if it can be proven that cultivation did not involve drainage of previously 
undrained soil. Evidence can be provided in various forms, including satellite images 
and site surveys.72  
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The EU’s definition of biofuels includes liquid and gaseous fuels for transport, 
derived from biomass.73 This encompasses not only bioethanol and biodiesel but also 
biogas. Gaseous fuels, or biogas, result from anaerobic digestion of animal wastes, 
food wastes and dedicated crops. 74  The RED also includes mechanisms for 
encouraging the use of second-generation biofuels from waste products, which are 
environmentally preferable to biofuels produced from food crops, such as corn, soy 
and palm oil. Such biofuels count double toward the renewable energy target.75 Also, 
the only criteria applicable to waste or recycled fuels is that pertaining to greenhouse 
gas emissions.76 
While social criteria were not included as a factor conditioning imports, the 
RED creates a biennial reporting requirement for the EC, to be monitored by other EU 
bodies. The report will address social impacts of biofuels in countries supplying the 
EU. These will include the relationship between biofuels and food crops; in case of 
negative impacts on food prices or production, ‘corrective action’ can be proposed.77 
The criteria also specify that the Commission will state whether supplying countries 
have ratified certain provisions of the International Labour Organization (it also 
contains this requirement for the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species).   
 
b. Compliance and implementation 
To show compliance, Member States must require major suppliers to provide the 
relevant national authorities with data that show conformity to the EU targets. 
Whatever information they submit must also be independently audited. Alternatively, 
they can use a ‘voluntary scheme’ that the Commission has recognized, or the terms 
of a bilateral or multilateral agreement between the EU and a biofuels exporter. This 
system is based upon conformity assessment; the EU must approve each voluntary 
scheme. While the RED does not contain instructions for verification for compliance 
to sustainability practices, but relies upon ‘existing control mechanisms’ of the 
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Member States, it also clarifies that if there is a breach of the requirements under this 
area, the Member State will need to account for it. 78 
The RED stipulates that criteria must be implemented by December 2010. 
While the majority of Member States have taken measures or are in process of doing 
so, in late November 2011, the EC formally requested France and the Czech Republic 
to bring their national renewable energy legislation in line with EU rules through 
implementing biofuels sustainability criteria.79 
The burden is upon Member States to determine how to meet the binding 
alternative energy targets set out in the RED. To comply with the RED’s targets, 
Member States have adopted diverse approaches to increasing the contribution of 
biofuels toward fuel for transport. These include production incentives such as 
investment or tax rewards and penalties, and consumption incentives such as tax 
measures and use mandates. For example, countries including Ireland, Hungary, 
Poland and Romania have opted to reduce excise tax on biofuels. Countries including 
Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Romania have set blending requirements, so 
that all petrol has a stipulated percentage of added biofuel. Other countries, such as 
Finland, Greece and Sweden are investing in the production of biofuels. Many 
Member States have adopted some combination of these approaches, or are 
undertaking internal political processes to bring them about.80 
  
I. Too much regulation, or not enough? 
Critics of the criteria seem to be divided into two camps: those who think it goes too 
far and those who think it does not go far enough. In the former camp are exporting 
countries and some trade law analysts, who argue that the regulation creates obstacles 
to trade and represents EU protectionism. These concerns will be examined in detail 
in the following sections. Yet many NGOs have complained that the criteria will do 
nothing to prevent some of the major harms of biofuels. In the words of formerly 
quoted Climate Change News Digest: ‘The EU are now consulting on ‘sustainability 
standards’. We believe that what they propose will offer no protection to rainforests, 
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the climate, nor people.’81 
One major critique is that they don’t contain strong social criteria. Perhaps the 
most infamous result of biofuels production is the rise in prices for food crops. 
However, food security is not a binding criterion. The criteria do not address other 
human rights issues for which biofuels production has been criticized, such as their 
role in ‘land grabs’, in which private companies from wealthy developed countries 
buy vast quantities of agricultural land in developing countries.82 
Further, there are concerns that the criteria will not achieve what they do 
intend: prevention of biodiversity loss and mitigation of climate change. One problem 
is that they do not address what may be its biggest source: indirect land-use change. 
As the Brazilian example demonstrated, increasing biofuels production has impacts 
on land use which go beyond the areas in which the biofuels crops are planted. More 
specifically, EU regulation may actually encourage deforestation by contributing to 
the overall land area in production and encouraging other crops, not bound for EU 
markets, to be grown in these areas. To prevent this perverse incentive, the EC is now 
attempting to formulate regulation to respond to indirect land use change.83 However, 
the complexity of the problem means that crafting an effective regulatory response is 
difficult and scientific assessments have been highly contested.84 
Another critique is that criteria miss the main issue: scale of production. It is 
no coincidence that sustainability concerns have arisen with global targets for 
increased use.  It may just not be possible to provide enough (first generation) 
biofuels to supply global targets without negative environmental impacts. Thus the 
criteria are thus unlikely to satisfy biofuels’ more radical critics. These critics insist 
that, given the extensification/intensification that will result from current production 
targets, regulating a sustainability solution, no matter how stringently, will not 
address the core problem. 
  
3. Trade concerns and EU biofuels policies 
 
A. Agricultural market protectionism and biofuels 
                                                
81 See Climate Change News Digest, above n. 32.  
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Briefing Paper, 22 September 2011, 20. 
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84 See Chapter 4, Section 2.  
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Complaints about sustainability criteria echo general admonitions that the EU protects 
its biofuels markets with domestic support measures. The EU applies tariffs to 
imported biofuels and awards subsidies to domestic producers. These support 
measures reflect the fact that the EU is not well positioned for biofuels production. 
The comparative advantage lies in other countries, specifically tropical countries of 
the global South.85  
In the biodiesel sector, the EU currently has the largest global production, with 
Germany, France and Spain in the lead.86 It is predicted that 70 per cent of EU 
biofuels feedstock will be produced domestically, the majority in the form of 
biodiesel.87 However, to respond to export opportunities, not only Malaysia and 
Indonesia, but also Thailand, India, Brazil, Paraguay and Indonesia, among others, are 
investing in increased production. These countries enjoy the advantages of year-round 
production and cheap land and labour. Argentina and South Africa are also significant 
exporters.88 Tropical countries such as Brazil also clearly have the advantage in 
ethanol production. 
Biopact, an initiative of academics and public and private sector, sets out an 
energy platform for the next decade that 20 per cent of the fuel needs of OECD 
countries could be met from the global South, by creating the equivalent of 18 
Brazils. Thus ‘rivers of fuel’ will run from South to North, creating the ‘best trade 
deal in history.’89 The same article quotes Claude Mandil, former Director General of 
the International Energy Agency: ‘If the US and Europe are serious about biofuels, 
they must turn to the South for their supplies.’90  
Supporters of the Biopact, and other advocates of increasing South to North 
trade, have criticized market protections against biofuels. If the free market were to 
dictate, the EU would find itself an importer of biofuels. One economic analysis 
concluded that without import duties, 100 per cent of EU ethanol would consist of 
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imports. This report also estimates that, under a free market model, 50 per cent of 
biodiesel would be supplied by imports.91 
Though the EU has indicated that it will increase trade in biofuels, it would 
still like to maintain a market share. One major political justification for the embrace 
of biofuels was the desire to support domestic agricultural markets, and provide more 
energy independence. Therefore, it seems unlikely that the EU will quickly abandon 
market protections.  
In this sense, biofuels are closely entwined in the fate of the Doha round itself. 
As agricultural products, they promise to revitalize markets and create rural 
development. Biofuels represent a market worth billions of pounds. But who will get 
the benefit: developing countries or market-protected biofuels from the EU?  
 
B. Green offence not economic defence 
The justification of sustainability criteria for biofuels is that they reflect universal, 
rather than domestic, priorities: protection against environmental harm. However, 
market-based objectives may be an important subtext of this seemingly extra-market 
value. Some critics have claimed that their primary purpose is not to help the 
environment, but to block (or at least complicate) imports.92 They provide an excuse 
for Europe to protect domestic agriculture, despite strong international pressure to 
open markets and reduce obstacles to trade.93  
On their face, the RED, the FQD and their sustainability criteria do not 
discriminate between domestic and imported biofuels (de jure discrimination). Yet 
discrimination can also result from the measure being applied in such a way that it 
negatively impacts imported more than domestic products (de facto discrimination). 
Determining the presence of de facto discrimination involves going beyond the text of 
the measure, to determine whether its ‘real’ purpose is protectionism, rather than what 
is written.  
However, if the RED was crafted to benefit domestic producers at the expense 
of foreign ones, it is doing a poor job. In fact, thus far it has had a pronounced 
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detrimental impact on domestic biodiesel. While renewable energy targets have 
increased demand for biofuels, this has led to higher levels of imports of biodiesel 
such as palm oil, cheaper than domestic biodiesel. It is estimated that biodiesel 
imports increased by 21 per cent between 2010 and 2011.94 As a result, EU biodiesel 
plants are operating below capacity and many have closed.95  
It could be argued that, even if the RED’s impact thus far has not been 
protectionist, its intent was. This conclusion is complicated by the fact that the RED 
specifies that the EU needs more imports, particularly of ethanol.96 The rationale is 
explained in a 2010 report on land-use impacts of biofuels trade, commissioned by the 
EC Directorate General of Trade. One of the main findings reads: ‘Trade opening will 
further improve the emission reduction performance of the EU's biofuels policy, 
mainly because we would import considerably more emission-efficient sugarcane-
based ethanol from Brazil.’97  
This does not rule out the possibility that national implementation of targets 
will be discriminatory; for example, a country might try to meet biofuels targets by 
illegally subsidizing domestic producers. Yet in creating a larger EU market for 
biofuels, the RED has thus far benefitted foreign producers.98 An EC communication 
stated that ‘from a trade perspective, the EU maintains significant import protection 
on some types of biofuels….If it would appear that the supply of sustainable biofuels 
to the EU is constrained, the EU should be ready to examine whether further market 
access would be an option to help the development of the market.’99 [Emphasis 
added] While committing to increased levels of imported biofuels, the EU has been 
clear that these should be sustainable. Critics of the criteria’s trade restrictiveness 
would argue that the latter commitment complicates the former. 
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 The fact that the EU has suggested their sustainability criteria are effectively (if 
not technically) a condition of import explains why they have faced such scrutiny as a 
disguised protectionist measure. This thesis will further document aspects of the 
criteria that have been criticized as de facto discriminatory, such as the calculation 
methodology for greenhouse gas emissions savings and the restriction of imports from 
ecosystems more common in foreign countries. Against these criticisms, however, it 
is important to bear in mind that the criteria also have a negative impact on domestic 
producers. EU biofuels are not inherently cleaner with respect to the EU’s own 
requirements. On the contrary, the EU has identified more ethanol imports as a 
‘greener’ strategy. Many EU biodiesel producers will struggle to meet emissions 
savings requirements when they are raised to 50 per cent in 2017, while palm oil 
(produced with methane extraction) will still qualify. In fact, despite being one of the 
crops most heavily regulated by the EU’s land-use criteria, palm oil imports are 
increasing at the expense of domestic biodiesel, as stated above. 
Rather than green protectionism, it seems more likely that the sustainability 
criteria respond to controversy accompanying biofuels targets. With respect to these 
targets, EU bodies have found themselves in a problem of their own devising. 
Alongside industry pressure for biofuels, there has been increasing criticism from 
both the public and the governments of EU Member States regarding environmental 
benefits of biofuels and the motives for incentivizing for their use.100 At the heart of 
this criticism is the fact that the production of biofuels is part of climate change 
prevention strategy. EU consumers are subsidizing biofuels through some domestic 
support measures, due to their environmental benefits. If biofuels are encouraged for 
this reason, they should provide significant emissions savings over petrol, and be 
produced in a manner that does not create environmental collateral damage. However, 
this is not achievable without further guiding the production of biofuels. The criteria 
thus attempt to rectify a poorly thought-out environmental policy. 
This is not to say that the EU does not want to protect its domestic producers. 
Indeed, it has been suggested that it is likely that the EU will introduce additional 
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domestic support measures.101 However, sustainability criteria themselves respond to 
a different set of pressures.  
The thesis analyses in depth the complex question of whether sustainability 
criteria are protectionist. Yet despite the risk of oversimplification it is useful to set 
out in the introduction the general argument that sustainability criteria are not 
protectionist in intent. This has important implications for the thesis as a whole. It 
suggests that trade conflict between the criteria and WTO does not stem from their 
discriminatory nature. Instead, this thesis argues that these challenges result from their 
particular regulatory characteristics and the trade law challenges they pose. As further 
discussed in the next section, these characteristics, which also exemplify the concept 
of ‘sustainability’, include the criteria’s breadth, complexity, extra-territorial impacts 
and emphasis on methods of production.  
 
4. EU biofuels sustainability criteria and WTO law 
 
A. Balancing: the unifying theme 
The central theme of the thesis is the process of balancing. Simply put, in the event of 
a dispute, the WTO Appellate Body (‘AB’) must balance the ability of Member States 
to pursue their regulatory objectives, such as having their biofuels produced 
sustainably, against their WTO commitments to liberalizing trade. This theme is 
important on a conceptual and also a more technical level. The next chapter 
demonstrates how the concept of balancing frames the thesis as a whole. It argues that 
sustainable development in principle consists of a balancing process between its 
components: environmental conservation, social welfare and economic development 
(often equated with trade liberalization in the WTO context). As EU criteria pursue 
sustainability, this concept of balancing is helpful in understanding the challenges that 
they pose with respect to WTO law.  
The rest of the thesis focuses on balancing in a more technical sense. The main 
provisions considered are GATT Articles III and XX (‘Article III’ and ‘Article XX’) 
and the TBT Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2 (‘TBT 2.1’ and ‘TBT 2.2’), due to the 
important role they would likely play in a dispute. The AB Report of US – Clove 
Cigarettes articulated the importance of balancing to these provisions: 
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…the object and purpose of the TBT Agreement is to strike a balance between, 
on the one hand, the objective of trade liberalization and, on the other hand, 
Members' right to regulate….”102 [Emphasis added] 
They clarified that: 
‘[this balance] is not, in principle, different from the balance set out in the 
GATT 1994, where obligations such as national treatment in Article III are 
qualified by the general exceptions provision of Article XX.103 
Balancing is of central importance not only to the concept of sustainable development 
but also the process of determining whether national regulations comply with WTO 
law through these core WTO provisions. The thesis focuses on the judicial 
mechanisms by which the AB strikes this balance. 
Balancing is also a controversial concept. Enabling the AB to determine the 
relative importance of trade and non-trade goals is politically undesirable. They do 
not wish to establish norms, or be empowered unduly to determine the legitimacy of a 
Member State’s regulatory choices. The underlying concern is that, if they are thus 
empowered, the balancing process will not be balanced. Instead there will be a 
hierarchy of values, with trade liberalization on top. Empowering a trade organization 
to determine the legitimacy of non-trade goals is obviously problematic.104  
Thus, the AB has repeatedly made clear that the level of protection a Member 
State desires will be respected, as long as they achieve this goal by the least WTO-
inconsistent means reasonably available. This approach avoids questioning the 
validity of a government’s regulatory goal in itself, but instead focuses on the means 
by which it is achieved. 
To this end, the WTO has also repeatedly affirmed the freedom of Member 
States to pursue established aims of human and environmental welfare. For example, 
the AB stated in US – Gasoline: 
WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own 
policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their 
environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and 
implement.105 
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The Preamble to the TBT Agreement also states:  
No country should be prevented from taking measures necessary…for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for 
the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate.106  
WTO law is deferent to national policy objectives in recognition of the 
diversity of its global membership and its limited mandate. It is characterized as an 
instrument of negative rather than positive integration: instead of harmonizing or 
coordinating policies, its role is limited to removing undue obstacles to free trade. 
While AB has clearly stated the intention of maintaining a country’s desired 
level of protection, its regulation still must conform to WTO law. So, for example, in 
US – Gasoline, after affirming that Member States have autonomy to pursue 
environmental objectives, the AB concluded: ‘So far as concerns the WTO, that 
autonomy is circumscribed only by the need to respect the requirements of the 
General Agreement and the other covered agreements.’ 107  
Through affirming that the same level of protection will be achieved, the AB 
implies that it is possible to have both complete national autonomy (in terms of level 
of protection) and complete WTO conformity. This formulation may seem 
contradictory. This is resolved by the concept of ‘hidden protectionism’, which 
suggests that a regulation may appear to pursue particular regulatory goals but in fact 
its true purpose is to protect domestic producers. Along these lines, the EU has often 
been accused of crafting environmental regulations in order to complicate imports.108  
Distinguishing legitimate and non-legitimate protectionism is not a 
straightforward process; the task of the dispute settlement bodies is difficult and 
subtle, and they have developed mechanisms to distinguish between the two. These 
mechanisms include examining whether a measure’s structure and application are 
designed to discriminate against imported products, determining the appropriateness 
of the means-ends relationship between the regulation and the goal, and assessing the 
reasonable availability of other measures to achieve that goal.   
For the reasons stated in the section above, EU biofuels sustainability criteria 
do not constitute hidden protectionism. Instead, they may struggle to conform to 
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WTO law because of their characteristics; many of these characteristics can be 
generalized to ‘sustainability’. This demonstrates a shortcoming with these AB 
mechanisms. Chapters 3 and 4 document this issue in depth. In brief (and 
oversimplified) summary, in the context of Article XX and TBT 2.2, a measure must 
clearly contribute to the regulatory goal at stake. This is a more difficult requirement 
when regulations contribute to ‘sustainability’ goals which are broadly defined and 
have uncertain legal weight. Sustainability regulation is process-oriented and has 
extra-territorial impacts, both of which are controversial characteristics from a WTO 
perspective. Finally, sustainability criteria, and in particular proposed indirect land 
use change regulation, respond to emerging environmental problems that may lack 
clear recognition through multilateral agreements or international standards. These 
regulatory challenges have already shaped the criteria. The desire to ensure 
compliance with WTO law encouraged the EU to introduce more flexibilities and less 
stringent requirements, to include clauses affirming openness to negotiation and to 
base their regulation carefully on international standards.  
Chapters 5 and 6 also focus on the mechanisms by which the AB determines 
whether a measure is discriminatory. They also conclude that the AB’s interpretations 
have led to an imbalance in favour of trade liberalization. However, rather than the 
regulatory characteristics of sustainability, these chapters focus on the issue of 
competitiveness in the National Treatment Principle (‘NTP’).  
The AB has stated repeatedly that a measure will not be in conformity with the 
NTP if it has a negative impact on conditions of competition to the detriment of 
imported products. The determination of the extent and nature of this competitive 
relationship depends on how they interpret the market evidence. It also depends on 
the importance that they give to factors other than competitiveness, such as the 
legitimacy of the distinctions that underlie differential treatment between two 
products in dispute. These chapters argue that the AB’s interpretation of these issues 
in general has favoured trade liberalization. 
All this suggests that there may be an imbalance in WTO law, so that it plays a 
more invasive role in shaping national regulation than proscribed by its negative 
integration function. Yet WTO-legality is a flexible rather than an absolute concept. 
The AB has a significant amount of discretion in how they interpret WTO 
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provisions.109 Reflecting the unsettled nature of WTO law, AB interpretations should 
be seen as a spectrum. At one end of this spectrum are interpretations more deferent 
to national policy goals; at the other are stricter interpretations of WTO commitments. 
The AB may provide more deference to national policies, such as the central case 
study of this thesis, within the framework of existing provisions. 
This raises the question of what factors influence where on the spectrum the 
AB falls. Another concern of this thesis, which appears throughout its chapters, has to 
do with pure balancing, in other words weighing the importance of the goals a 
measure pursues against its trade restrictiveness. As stated above, the AB has been 
clear that this is not a formal component of dispute settlement. However, pure 
balancing may play an implicit role. This thesis documents this possibility in the 
context of both the NTP of GATT Article III/TBT 2.1 and also GATT Article 
XX/TBT 2.2.  
As argued in Chapters 5 and 6, pure balancing might influence whether a 
measure is in conformity with the NTP. As suggested by the disputes analysed in 
those chapters, if a regulation pursues a particularly important value, the AB might be 
more tempted to conclude that it is conformity with the NTP even if it has a negative 
impact on conditions of competition.  
In GATT Article XX/TBT 2.2, pure balancing may take place in the context of 
established judicial reasoning. When determining whether a measure is necessary, the 
AB might second-guess the level of protection a country wishes to pursue. Further, 
the AB sometimes recommends changing the means (to make them less trade-
restrictive) while maintaining the ends (the desired level of protection).110 However, in 
modifying the means the recommendation might actually weaken the ends, even if 
this is not the stated intent. This may also be read as an implicit form of pure 
balancing; while the stated intent is to maintain the desired level of protection, the 
actual impact is to ‘rebalance’ in favour of trade liberalization due to the uncertain 
importance of the value at stake.111 
 This issue has important implications for a dispute on biofuels sustainability 
criteria. An interpretation of the importance of the value at stake is influenced by 
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underlying social and environmental norms, which continue to evolve.112 Thus the 
case study raises interesting questions about the weight of the values at stake, 
sustainable development, biodiversity and climate change prevention. As compared 
to, for example, human health, it seems difficult to predict the influence of these 
norms. In general, they are emerging and have controversial elements, and may lack 
targeted international standards and agreements. This has larger implications with 
respect to the relationship between WTO law and emerging environmental regulation 
more generally, offering an opportunity to examine how to avoid disciplining 
progressive environmental regulation simply because of these regulatory features.  
 
B. Outline 
Chapter 2 focuses on the relationship between the WTO and sustainable development. 
The WTO has embraced sustainable development as a ‘central principle’. Yet, the 
primary responsibility for achieving sustainable development lies not with the WTO, 
but rather its Members: national governments. Thus, one important aspect of the 
WTO’s institutional support for sustainable development is simply non-interference in 
national sustainable development policies. For this reason, evaluating the 
compatibility of EU sustainability criteria with WTO law is useful to understanding 
the WTO’s pragmatic relationship with sustainable development more generally.  
Such an analysis requires an understanding of what sustainable development 
means, and its relationship with the WTO’s primary goal of liberalizing trade through 
a rule-based framework. In particular, legal texts and informal statements have 
proclaimed repeatedly that the goals of sustainable development and those of trade 
liberalization are ‘mutually supportive’. This chapter critiques this theoretical 
conception. While at times the goals of sustainable development and trade 
liberalization may align, at times they will conflict. Therefore, rather than mutual 
supportiveness, a more useful conceptual structure is that of balancing between these 
goals.  
Chapter 3 focuses on the relationship between EU biofuels sustainability 
criteria and WTO law.  This chapter argues that the desire to accommodate WTO law, 
evident in the wording of the EU’s regulation, resulted in a weaker set of regulations. 
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Even without a dispute, the WTO exerted an institutional influence on this national 
regulation. This suggests an imbalance in favour of trade liberalization at the expense 
of national regulatory autonomy.  
The chapter then focuses on ‘sustainability’ as a regulatory concept, arguing 
that it poses particular challenges for WTO law due to its regulatory characteristics, as 
described above. EU biofuels sustainability criteria embody these regulatory 
characteristics.  
Chapter 4 continues the analysis of the regulatory characteristics of 
sustainability and extends this to indirect land use change, or ‘ILUC’. The EC is 
currently reviewing several options to introduce additional ILUC regulation into 
existing biofuels sustainability criteria. ILUC shares many of the same regulatory 
characteristics as the existing criteria: it is complex, process-oriented and difficult to 
measure. ILUC regulation is necessary to achieve the intent of the EU’s regulation: 
mitigating climate change. However, all of the options the EU proposes pose serious 
risks of violating WTO law. The chapter analyses the proposed options and their trade 
law challenges. It then argues that these challenges result not from the EU’s 
protectionist intent, but rather the regulatory characteristics outlined above.  
Chapter 5 identifies interpretive issues that define the balance between 
national regulatory sovereignty and trade liberalization in the NTP. The first issue is 
the role of market evidence in establishing whether a measure is in compliance. The 
AB has moved away from an evidence-based approach of assessing competition, 
focusing more on the application of the measure. Past disputes demonstrate that this 
interpretation strengthens the NTP at the expense of national sovereignty.  
The second issue is the influence of protectionist intent in determining WTO-
compliance. In some disputes the AB has concluded that a measure violates the NTP 
solely because it results in a negative impact on conditions of competition for the 
imported product in dispute. In others they have decided that the regulation is based 
upon legitimate regulatory distinctions rather than the desire to protect domestic 
products; therefore it is in compliance. The latter approach provides more deference 
to national regulation.  
The chapter then analyses the relationship between EU biofuels sustainability 
criteria and the NTP. This analysis highlights how the AB’s interpretation of these 
two issues would likely influence the outcome of a dispute.  
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Chapter 6 focuses on the role of consumer preferences in the NTP. Consumer 
preference is significant with respect to public policy regulations such as EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria. Assessing compliance with the NTP is based upon evaluating 
the competitive relationship between products; if consumers do not consider products 
competitive, this will shape the outcome of the dispute. Thus how consumer 
preferences are measured and applied is a crucial question.  
In some disputes, the AB has argued that consumer preference might be 
distorted by a measure in dispute, and thus should be dismissed. This chapter argues 
that this reasoning is problematic, particularly with respect to public policy regulation. 
This would imply that the preferences of EU consumers vis-à-vis sustainable versus 
conventional biofuels should be disregarded, as they would be shaped by the EU’s 
regulation. The chapter concludes that one means for ‘rebalancing’ toward a more 
deferent approach to such regulation would be to take these preferences into account 
when evaluating product competitiveness.  
Chapter 7, the Conclusion, further reflects on the major findings and themes of 
the thesis.  
 
C. Scope 
Perhaps the obvious result of this thesis would be a systematic analysis of whether EU 
biofuels sustainability criteria violate WTO law; in other words, a more in-depth 
version of existing legal analyses. However the thesis has instead adopted a non-
comprehensive, thematic structure. This reflects a technical limitation: a dispute may 
rest upon national implementation, particularly strategies for meeting the RED’s 
biofuels targets. Without documenting the implementation strategies of each Member 
State, a vast and complex undertaking, it seems difficult to produce a decisive 
analysis of the criteria’s legality. An investigation of the compatibility of national 
implementation strategies with WTO law will likely attract further attention both from 
academics and biofuels producers, particularly once implementation is better 
established.  
Yet there are also more fundamental reasons for avoiding a decisive answer 
regarding whether the criteria are legal. As stated earlier, the thesis argues that AB 
decisions demonstrate a spectrum of interpretation; thus there is no objectively correct 
way of evaluating whether a regulation violates WTO law. Due to this uncertainty, 
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this thesis’ answer to the question of whether the criteria violate WTO law is: they 
might. Further, whether they do or not would provide important insight into the 
balance the AB has struck between sustainable development and trade liberalization. 
The primary goal is not to assess whether the criteria are WTO-compatible, 
but rather to document what they reveal about the relationship between the WTO and 
national sustainable development regulation more broadly. For this reason, though the 
criteria are a frequent point of reference, they do not form the primary focus of every 
chapter. Instead, the thesis identifies several areas of particular interest with respect to 
this relationship. 
There are many interesting aspects of biofuels regulation that fall beyond the 
scope of this thesis. It should be noted that the thesis does not address all potential 
sources of WTO conflict regarding EU biofuels policies, which include subsidies and 
tariffs. While the EU has suggested it intends to relax these barriers, it has also been 
speculated that they will introduce further subsidies and/or tariffs to protect domestic 
biodiesel producers in the future.113 There could be a trade dispute in this area.  
The thematic approach enables an in-depth analysis of the selected trade law 
questions. However, while the thesis focuses on provisions that would likely be 
central in a dispute, it is also possible that a dispute would involve provisions not 
addressed, eg TBT Article 12 which requires special and differential treatment of 
developing country Members with respect to technical regulations.114 Also, although 
there is a secondary focus on GATT Articles I and XI and TBT Article 2.4, these are 
not treated as comprehensively.  
Finally, the emphasis on WTO law rather than national governance means that 
the thesis does not focus on the implementation of the criteria on the national level, 
either in the EU or internationally. Many important research topics arise in this 
context, such as assessment of the effectiveness of the criteria in achieving their goals 
and the influence of the EU criteria on international biofuels production processes. 
However, to delve into the details of national implementation from either a legal or a 
pragmatic perspective would require study and fieldwork beyond the scope of this 
particular project. 
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Mutual supportiveness versus balancing:  




In the words of the WTO Secretariat, ‘the WTO’s founding agreement recognizes 
sustainable development as a central principle, and it is an objective running through 
all subjects in current Doha negotiations.’ 1  Its stated importance to the WTO 
Secretariat, as well as in the Doha Ministerial Declaration, suggests that the concept 
wields great influence. In fact, it forms only an oblique part of the WTO legal 
framework. Rather than a binding legal rule, it remains a broad principle, and a source 
of conceptual guidance. The Appellate Body (‘AB’) has well characterized this 
influence by stating that the term ‘gives colour, texture and shading to the rights and 
obligations of Members under the WTO Agreement’.2  
To some extent, this role reflects the vague nature of the term itself. This 
vagueness results from its breadth, and resulting disagreement about how it should be 
interpreted. Yet, the potential for disconnection between the term’s stated importance, 
and its real influence, should provoke critical questions. The most significant of these 
has to do with translating the principle into practice: achieving sustainable 
development through national policies. The question is whether the WTO framework 
supports such policies (as would be hoped given its institutional embrace of the term) 
or if it actually serves to hinder them. Though it has not resulted in a dispute, using 
sustainable development as a justification for national policies with potential negative 
trade impacts has already created controversy, in the case of EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria. This particular case study reveals potential incompatibility 
                                                
1 Available on the WTO website at http://www.wto.org-english-tratop_e-envir_e-sust_dev_e (visited 
14 September 2012). 
2 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 15 June 2001, para. 155.  
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between sustainable development as a WTO principle, and as applied by WTO 
Member States in practice.  
To delve further into this relationship, this chapter examines the ordinary 
meaning of sustainable development in the WTO: its definition and interpretation in 
principle. This interpretation shapes the term’s role in legal texts and negotiations. It 
also influences dispute adjudication, and may help determine WTO-compliance of 
specific national policies.  
The WTO does not provide a definition of sustainable development. However, 
its stated interpretations of sustainable development, and its relationship with trade, 
align closely with the principal international law treaties which gave rise to the term’s 
global prevalence. These UN treaties, which also share many of the same signatories, 
thus provide a source for common and conventional definitions. The first of these is 
meeting the needs of the present while allowing future generations to meet their 
needs. The second definition characterizes sustainable development as consisting of 
three component parts, or ‘pillars’: social welfare, environmental conservation, and 
economic development. These interpretations of the term feature frequently in 
international law texts, and there is formal justification for basing the WTO definition 
on them. 
These definitions are also inextricable from controversy. The divisive question 
may be stated (and somewhat oversimplified) as: will the growth of the economy 
serve, or imperil, environmental and social welfare goals? The same broad 
controversy applies to the relationship between sustainable development and trade 
liberalization. Some environmental and social welfare advocates have argued that 
trade liberalization has a negative impact. This is because it creates a race to the 
bottom in terms of standards, by globalizing markets, and encourages more 
exploitation of resources. In other words, there is a lack of mutual supportiveness 
between trade liberalization and sustainable development.  
In contrast, the WTO approach has specifically emphasized that the goals of 
trade liberalization and sustainable development are mutually supportive. The 
underlying assumption is that trade liberalization leads to greater prosperity, which 
creates the resources for better environmental management and social policies.3 The 
                                                
3 Prominent international treaties that address sustainable development, notably the Plan of 
Implementation from the World Summit on Sustainable Development, also support this conclusion. 
Plan of Implementation (2002) United Nations, World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
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gap between these underlying assumptions represents a core ideological divide, and 
helps explain public protest about the impacts of the trade liberalization process that 
the WTO has overseen.  
The concept of mutual supportiveness is not only conceptually, but also 
pragmatically, central: it shapes the WTO approach to sustainable development. The 
Doha Development Agenda (‘DDA’) work, for example, takes the explicit approach 
of finding, and focusing on, areas of mutual supportiveness, or win-win-win 
situations.4  
Any conclusion about the fundamental relationship between sustainable 
development’s three ‘pillars’ is bound to be not only broad-based but also polarizing. 
For this reason, rather than mutual supportiveness (or its converse, mutual 
unsupportiveness) a more productive concept to characterize the relationship between 
sustainable development’s pillars is that of balancing. International law on sustainable 
development includes statements that describe the central importance of both mutual 
supportiveness between the pillars, and also the need to balance the goals they 
represent. Balancing is not a normative concept. It includes the possibility that 
sustainable development’s various goals may harmonize. However, if they do not, it 
may become necessary to prioritize certain objectives at the expense of others.  
WTO Secretariat statements have recognized that sustainable development 
requires balancing. For example, Pascal Lamy, the WTO Director General, stated that 
‘From a policy perspective sustainable development involves careful balancing 
between progress in each of its pillars….’ 5  At times, however, the WTO 
oversimplifies the assertion that trade liberalization inherently harmonizes with the 
concept’s other pillars. It is easy to understand why: sustainable development 
represented by ‘mutual supportiveness’ suggests a soft, nonintrusive role for the 
concept with regard to the WTO mandate of trade liberalization. However, the 
sustainable development represented by ‘balancing’ is harder: it prompts the question 
of which goal is most important, and who is empowered to decide.  
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/POIToc.htm (visited 14 September 
2012). 
4 See, eg, the WTO website on fisheries subsidies: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/win_e.htm; or environmental goods and services: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_serv_e.htm (visited 14 September 2012). 
5 GP Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
2005) vii. The following analysis draws from this book.  
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Apart from the specific context of sustainable development, balancing has 
been theme in the context of WTO dispute settlement. One of the core functions of 
the WTO is to ensure that Member States do not discriminate against imported goods 
and services. The question is: when national regulations are trade-restrictive, how can 
the balance be drawn between a Member State’s right to set regulations to achieve 
their own domestic goals, and their WTO obligation to liberalize trade? The concept 
of sustainable development thus echoes or amplifies some of the most controversial 
challenges facing the WTO as an institution. Perhaps it can be said that committing to 
sustainable development in principle is much easier than in practice: the former can 
mean little, while the latter poses a steep challenge.  
With these broader issues in mind, it is useful to return to the more pragmatic 
question of the role of sustainable development in the WTO. Lamy has emphasized 
the importance of appropriate national policies to achieve mutual supportiveness 
between sustainable development and trade liberalization. More specifically, mutual 
supportiveness does not happen automatically; it must be brought about through 
adequate domestic policies. 6  This means that a crucial area of concern for 
environmental and social welfare activists has to do with national sovereignty to 
establish such regulations.  
Given its institutional embrace of the term, it would be hoped that the WTO 
framework supports its Members in setting policies that aim to achieve sustainable 
development, rather than hindering them. Yet, due to the breadth and vagueness of the 
term’s definition, if accepted carte blanche, sustainable development provides 
tremendous discretion for national governments to set trade-restrictive regulations 
based on broad or vague justifications. Thus, while sustainable development seems a 
principle of compromise, its national application may be quite controversial from the 
perspective of WTO law. The subsequent Chapter 3 will analyse an important test of 
national sovereignty to pursue the goal of sustainability: EU sustainability criteria for 
biofuels. 
To set the stage for this analysis of sustainable development in practice, this 
chapter focuses on the inextricable issues raised by sustainable development as a 
WTO principle. To this end, it will briefly outline the term’s role in international law, 
                                                
6 Ibid at x. 
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its ‘ordinary meaning’, major relevant critiques of the term, the WTO interpretation of 
its meaning, and its legal weight in WTO treaties, negotiations and dispute settlement. 
 
2. Sustainable development as a legal principle 
 
A. Sustainable development at the centre of public international law 
Since its introduction less than twenty-five years ago, the term sustainable 
development has become a building block of many international environmental 
conferences and treaties. The 1987 World Commission on Environment and 
Development, commonly known as the Brundtland Commission, marked the 
introduction of sustainable development to the United Nations lexicon, and provided 
its most frequently utilized and widely embraced definition:7 meeting the needs of the 
present without compromizing the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs.  
In 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de 
Janeiro captured growing global interest in preserving the environment. The 
conference, more commonly known as the Earth Summit, was the most widely 
attended in UN history.8  Sustainable development featured heavily in the resulting 
agreement: the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which included 
‘Agenda 21’ (an agenda for the 21st century), defined as a ‘comprehensive programme 
for action in all areas of sustainable development’.9 It also called for the establishment 
of the Commission on Sustainable Development, which meets biennially. Sustainable 
Development was then included in the Millennium Development Goals.  
In 2002, for the first time, sustainable development became the organizing 
principle of an international conference. The World Summit on Sustainable 
Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg produced a Plan of Implementation, and was 
                                                
7 There is widespread consensus about this; see, eg, A Millington and C Williams, ‘The diverse and 
contested meanings of sustainable development’ (2004) 170(2) The Geographic Journal, 99-104. 
8 United Nations (1992) General Information on Earth Summit, Rio de Janeiro,  
http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html (visited 14 September 2012).  
9 United Nations Division for Sustainable Development (1992) Earth Summit: Agenda 21, 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/agenda21toc.htm (visited 14 September 
2012). 
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heralded by then-UN Director General Kofi Annan as ‘making sustainable 
development a reality’.10  
It has also been included, not only in many of the UN multilateral 
environmental agreements, but in a number of trade and investment agreements, and 
treaties for bilateral or regional cooperation.11 The prominent role of sustainable 
development in international law, resulting from these high-profile treaties and 
conferences, has helped impel its global prevalence and legitimacy as a conceptual 
structure for environmental problem solving. 
 
B. Sustainable development in WTO texts 
The international embrace of the concept of sustainable development also extends to 
the WTO. The term has been included in the Marrakesh Agreement which founded 
the WTO, as well as AB decisions, the DDA, and the terms of reference for the 
Committee on Trade and Environment. In a 2007 address, Lamy remarked that 
‘Sustainable development should be the cornerstone of our approach to globalization 
and to the global governance architecture that we create. If I have come to this forum, 
it is to deliver a message: the WTO stands ready to do its part’.12 Lamy has also 
characterized sustainable development as a ‘formal goal’ of the WTO.13 
 The basis for this recognition is that, even though the WTO is primarily a 
trade organization, the expansion of global trade and the growth in the number of 
WTO members means that its influence has become more pervasive. Following from 
this, the influence of trade liberalization includes impacts on sustainable development; 
the WTO has a responsibility to respond.14 As a trade liberalization organization, its 
response is not to set out positive policies to achieve sustainable development. 
Instead, its approach is based upon identifying areas of overlap between trade and 
sustainable development.  
                                                
10 United Nations, Press Release: ‘Johannesburg Summit 2002’, World Summit on Sustainable 
Development, 
www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/media_info/mtg_summaries/balipressrelease_opening.pdf (visited 
14 September 2012). 
11 A Cosbey, ‘A Sustainable Development Roadmap for the WTO’ (2009) Trade and Investment 
Programme, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 3. 
12 P Lamy, Address to the UNEP Global Ministerial Environment Forum in Nairobi, Kenya, 5 February 
2007, http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl54_e.htm (visited 14 September 2012). 
13 Sampson, above n. 5, at viii. 
14 Ibid at Foreword. 
 48 
WTO covered agreements establish sustainable development’s influence, and 
outline the role it plays in WTO negotiations. Sustainable development is featured in 
the first sentence of the preamble to the Marrakech Agreement, setting the tone for 
this founding agreement of the WTO: 
Recognizing that their [Members’] relations in the field of trade and economic 
endeavour should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, 
ensuring full employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real 
income and effective demand, and expanding the production of and trade in 
goods and services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world’s 
resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable development, 
seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the 
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and 
concerns at different levels of economic development. [Emphasis added]15 
Later in the text, the Agreement cites the preamble as a justification for the 
establishment of the Committee on Trade and Environment, one of whose objectives 
is ‘to identify the relationship between trade measures and environmental measures, 
in order to promote sustainable development.’16  
The 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration furthered the notion that trade 
liberalization should contribute to sustainable development. As well as mandating 
sector-by-sector analysis of sustainable development by the Secretariat, it also 
contains Paragraph 51, which instructs the Committee on Trade and Environment 
(‘CTE’) and the Committee on Trade and Development (‘CTD’) ‘to identify and 
debate developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help 
achieve the objective of having sustainable development appropriately reflected.’17 
 
C. Sustainable development’s legal weight 
The legal weight of sustainable development forms a debate in the context of public 
international law in general. Some have interpreted its role in treaties and 
international commitments as a binding legal requirement; on the other side of the 
spectrum, it has been seen as a source of general conceptual guidance.18  
                                                
15 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Preamble 1(A), 14 April 1994, 
GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal 
Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 4. 
16 Ibid, Decision on Trade and Environment, at 411. 
17 World Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration, Paragraph 51, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 
November 2001, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (visited 14 
September 2012). 
18 M Campins-Eritja and J Gupta, ‘The role of 'sustainability labeling' in the international law of 
sustainable development’ in N Shrivjer and F Weiss (eds), International Law and Sustainable 
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While setting out a focus on sustainable development in WTO negotiations, its 
treaty applications do not make it a legal rule. Instead, it is a general principle. 
Preambular language is non-binding, and so the concept does not carry as much 
weight as it could in the WTO agreement. Sustainable development is not included as 
one of the Article XX general exceptions, which can be cited by a country to justify 
domestic regulations that otherwise violate WTO law. As an exception, its relevance 
would be more clearly defined, as a country would be able to state as a direct defence 
that a regulation seen as violating WTO law had as its objective the goal of 
sustainable development.  
The oblique role of sustainable development in the WTO reflects in part 
widespread resistance among developing countries, who feared that developed 
countries would set national regulations based on the concept of sustainable 
development which would act as disguised barriers to trade. Another concern was that 
sustainable development’s emphasis on intergenerational equity deemphasized 
contemporary problems of inequality. They did not want to be forced to make 
sacrifices to solve problems they did not create. Finally, a common argument against 
giving sustainable development too much influence held that the WTO was originally 
conceived as a trade organization; thus, these problems are outside its mandate.19  
To understand sustainable development’s legal weight as a ‘central WTO 
principle’, an important question has to do with the influence of principles in general 
in the WTO system. Formally, this role is not well defined.20 Erich Vranes usefully 
summarizes the relationship between rules and principles. Though they are both based 
upon the concept of norms, the difference comes from the matter of degree, having to 
do with four basic criteria: the extent of its generality, the immediateness of its link to 
the concept, or idea, of law, its importance for the legal order, and the manner of its 
creation. 21  With this framework, specific factors that contributed to sustainable 
development’s status as a principle, rather than a rule, can be identified. These include 
its general and broad nature, the fact that it is not necessarily primary to the WTO’s 
                                                                                                                                      
Development - principles and practice, Developments in International Law, Vol. 51 (Leiden/Boston: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 2004) 259. 
19 Sampson, above n. 5, at 20-21. 
20 M Hilf, ‘Power, Rules and Principles – Which Orientation for WTO/GATT Law?’ (2001) 4(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law, 111. 
21 E Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law, and 
Legal Theory, International Economic Law Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 110. 
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function of liberalizing and making predictable international trade, and the 
controversy associated with its adoption.  
The role of a principle is to provide general guidance that can be adhered to as 
much as possible. The extent to which it can be adopted, Vranes indicates, is 
determined by ‘opposing rules and principles’. Rules, as opposed to principles, are 
fixed points. 22  Thus, sustainable development is not as formally important or 
influential as binding WTO rules. In the event that they conflict, rules prevail. The 
presence of opposing rules or principles may also limit sustainable development’s 
influence. Non-discrimination, for example, is more integral to the WTO’s legal 
order. Thus, if a sustainable development policy discriminated against imported 
goods, it does seem that the principle would not prevail against WTO rules 
prohibiting such discrimination. In general, however, the role of sustainable 
development as a WTO principle seems broadly open to interpretation.  
This is not to say the term has no formal influence. Its inclusion in the WTO 
Preamble is particularly significant. While preambular language is nonbinding, it can 
be cited in support of dispute settlement bodies’ decisions. When analysing the 
interpretation and application of the WTO Agreement’s Preamble, the WTO 
Secretariat itself recognized this influence. It listed the Preamble’s importance to 
environmental disputes as the first item of consideration.23  
There is precedent for this influence. Important decisions on trade and 
environment, such as the AB Report from United States – Gasoline,24 included 
reference to the Preamble. In this dispute, though sustainable development was not 
mentioned, the AB cited the Preamble in reference to the need to coordinate trade and 
environment policies.25 The Preamble has also been invoked in disputes regarding 
trade and development. In India – Quantitative Restrictions,26 the Panel stated the 
                                                
22 Ibid at 110. 
23 See the WTO website’s analysis of the Preamble, 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/wto_agree_01_e.htm (visited 14 
September 2012). 
24 WTO Panel Report on United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – 
Gasoline), WT/DS2/R, adopted 29 January 1996, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 
29 April 1996. 
25 US – Gasoline, AB Report, ibid. at para. V(c), 30. 
26 WTO Panel Report on India – Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and 
Industrial Products (India – Quantitative Restrictions), WT/DS90/R, adopted 6 April 1999, and 
Appellate Body Report, WT/DS90/AB/R, adopted 23 August 1999. 
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importance of developing countries receiving their share of the benefits of 
international trade, in accordance with the Preamble.27 
The US – Shrimp28 dispute provided the best demonstration of the potential of 
the Preamble’s inclusion of ‘sustainable development’ to influence interpretation of 
the WTO Agreement. The trade-restrictive regulation in dispute was a US 
requirement that its trade partners install a device on fishing nets to exclude, and 
thereby protect, sea turtles. While this regulation was found to violate GATT Article 
XI, the US argued that it should be upheld under XX(g), which addresses measures 
‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.’29 The AB took the 
controversial position that the phrase ‘exhaustible natural resources’ included not just 
inert natural resources, such as minerals, but also living natural resources, in this case 
endangered sea turtles.30Among other justifications,31 the AB strongly emphasized the 
importance of the Preamble statement on sustainable development in illustrating the 
overall approach of WTO Members.32  
 
3. Defining sustainable development 
 
A. The ‘ordinary meaning’ of sustainable development 
WTO legal texts do not include a definition of sustainable development, nor do AB 
Reports provide further clarity. In this sense, sustainable development falls on the 
other end of the spectrum from such pivotal WTO legal terms as ‘like’ products, or 
‘necessary’, the interpretation of which has inspired a great deal of reflection within 
the context of relevant disputes.33 The fact that sustainable development is not a 
legally binding term helps explain this discrepancy. The term’s precise interpretation 
has not determined the outcome of a dispute so directly.  
                                                
27 India – Quantitative Restrictions, Panel Report, ibid at para. 7.2. 
28 WTO Panel Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/R, adopted 15 May 1998, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/AB/R, 
adopted 15 June 2001. 
29 Marrakech Agreement, above n. 15, Article XX(g), at 455. 
30 US – Shrimp, AB Report, above n. 28, at paras. 129-131. 
31 The Appellate Body also justified this interpretation with reference to international treaties and 
agreements. 
32 US – Shrimp, AB Report, above n. 28, at paras. 152, 153, 155. 
33 The proper interpretation of ‘like’ products in the WTO, for example, has a whole book devoted to it: 
WM Choi, ‘Like Products’ in International Trade Law: Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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Nevertheless, if a dispute arose regarding national regulations that aim to 
achieve sustainable development, but in so doing violate WTO law, this might require 
a clarification of the precise nature of a country’s regulatory intent with regard to 
sustainable development. In such a circumstance, the interpretation of the term would 
be important. This possibility will be examined in depth in the following chapter.  
As a WTO treaty term, sustainable development has already had some 
influence in the US – Shrimp dispute documented above. There, sustainable 
development was equated with biodiversity conservation. This leaves open important 
questions, such as whether social welfare policies may be seen as integral to the 
term’s definition.   
WTO jurisprudence reveals that AB scrutiny of treaty terms has not solely 
focused on those that compose legally binding rules. For example, in US-Gambling,34 
defining the term ‘sporting’, which fell in the schedule of an individual Member 
under the GATS agreement, formed a significant component of the dispute, despite 
the fact that the term in question had not been recognized by the WTO Members as a 
whole. Establishing sustainable development’s definition also aids in investigating 
whether it is by nature vague, so that is impossible to conclude its meaning with any 
precision.  
To interpret the meaning of a term, the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Understanding points to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) as a 
source of customary rules of treaty interpretation. VCLT Article 31(1) has frequently 
been cited in WTO dispute settlement as a framework for approaching questions of 
textual interpretation. It states that: ‘a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.’35 [Emphasis added]  
In the past, the AB approach to treaty interpretation has been criticized for 
emphasizing one of these components, ordinary meaning, over the others: context, 
object and purpose.36 The AB’s emphasis on discerning the ordinary meanings of 
                                                
34 WTO Panel Report on United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling 
and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/R, adopted 10 November 2004, and Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2005. 
35 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, done at Vienna, 23 May 1969 in 8 International Legal 
Materials, Article 31(1).   
36 F Ortino, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US – Gambling: A Critique’ 
(2006) 9(1) Journal of International Economic Law, 132; also see H Horn and J Weiler, ‘European 
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words, even through the use of a dictionary, has served the purpose of demonstrating 
that the dispute settlement system is not an activist court. The underlying justification 
is that, the further the WTO strays from textual interpretation, the more likely it is to 
be undertaking judicial activism. On the other hand, if the reasoning is grounded in 
the text, it will reflect more faithfully the intent of the Member States who negotiated 
the Agreement.  
In 2000, Weiler critiqued this approach as ‘the almost obsessive attempts of 
the AB to characterize wherever possible the normal wide-ranging, sophisticated, 
multifaceted and eminently legitimate interpretations of the Agreement as ‘textual’ 
resulting from the ordinary meaning of words….’37 An emphasis on defining words 
tries to mask the fact that interpretation is, and should be, occurring.  
More recently, the AB seems to be moving away from this approach.38 
Nonetheless, it is interesting to note the failure of textualism with regard to 
sustainable development. The term consists of two words, each of which has wider 
independent applications. The Oxford English Dictionary does not contain a 
definition for the term as a whole; only the individual words.39  
The process of constructing a definition where one does not exist explicitly 
requires interpretation. A textualist approach aims to eliminate ambiguities, and 
sustainable development resists such treatment. Yet, a formal recognition that the 
term is ambiguous would certainly highlight any fears of judicial activism. If 
interpretation of sustainable development is based solely on its textual meaning, the 
result would be a conclusion that the term is vague, and reluctance to give it any legal 
weight.  
As compared to text, considering the context is much more useful. Despite its 
historic emphasis on establishing a term’s ‘ordinary meaning’, the AB hardly ever 
                                                                                                                                      
Communities – Trade Description of Sardines: Textualism and its Discontent’ in H Horn and PC 
Mavroidis (eds), The WTO Case Law of 2002 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 253. 
37 JHH Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and 
External legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement’ The Jean Monnet Seminar and Workshop on the 
European Union, NAFTA and the WTO: Advanced Issues in Law and Policy, Harvard Jean Monnet 
Working Paper 9/00, Section 6, The Appellate Body. 
38 See, eg, WTO Appellate Body report on United States – Final Countervailing Duty Determination 
with respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada (US – Softwood Lumber), WT/DS257/AB/R, 
adopted 19 January 2004, para. 159; WTO Appellate Body Report on Canada – Measures Affecting the 
Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada – Aircraft), WT/DS70/AB/R, adopted 2 August 1999, para. 153; 
European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (EC – 
Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, para. 92. 
39 Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989). 
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considers just a dictionary definition as sufficient, and sometimes relies upon cross-
referencing between the treaty as a whole, or with other relevant treaties, to provide 
this context.40 In the case of sustainable development, given that the two words go 
together, and form a well-established concept in the context of UN treaties, these can 
help inform its interpretation. The lack of definition of sustainable development 
points to the importance of established international law definitions.  
Supporting the legitimacy of this approach, in US – Gasoline, its first decision, 
the AB stated that the WTO Agreements are ‘not to be read in clinical isolation from 
public international law.’41 In this spirit, Lamy commented that ‘the WTO is not more 
important than other international organizations and WTO norms do not necessarily 
supersede or trump other international norms….’42 Thus, the subsequent section will 
consider common international law definitions when determining the meaning of 
sustainable development in the WTO. 
Another important source of context comes from interpreting statements by 
the WTO Secretariat itself, as well as throughout the WTO Agreements, to discern 
what they reveal about the WTO interpretation of the term. While no precise 
definition has been given, WTO statements about sustainable development, as well as 
the DDA, help narrow the possible relevant international law definitions to identify 
the WTO’s particular approach, even if it is somewhat implicit. This investigation 
will also form the focus of subsequent sections. 
The final element of the VCLT 31(1) has to do with the treaty’s object and 
purpose. The Preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement itself sets out the object and 
purpose of the WTO. Thus, sustainable development can be seen as a guiding 
principle, which might be applicable to any dispute. Whether or not the concept is 
invoked is a matter of discretion; nevertheless, its applicability is relatively 
unbounded. Affirming this conclusion, the AB in US – Shrimp stated that the 
objective of sustainable development should inform all the WTO covered 
agreements.43  
 
                                                
40 I Van Damme, Treaty Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009) 232. 
41 US – Gasoline, AB Report, above n. 24, at para. 16. 
42 P Lamy, ‘The WTO in the Archipelago of Global Governance’ Speech at the Institute of 
International Studies, Geneva, 14 March 2006, 
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl20_e/htm (visited 14 September 2012). 
43 US – Shrimp, AB Report, above n. 28, at para. 129. 
 55 
B. Public international law definitions  
Strictly speaking, there is no official definition of sustainable development in existing, 
legally binding instruments of international law. This complicates the process of 
clarifying the ‘ordinary meaning’ with reference to the term’s context. However, there 
are two main concepts about sustainable development that emerge from major 
international treaties on sustainable development which are specific, and recurrent, 
enough to act as definitions, though their wording at times differs slightly.  
The first and most conventionally accepted definition of sustainable 
development comes from the Brundtland Report: ‘meeting the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.44 
The second definition describes sustainable development as consisting of three pillars: 
economic development, social welfare and environmental protection. This definition 
first appeared in the World Summit on Sustainable Development Plan of 
Implementation, which focused on practical rather than conceptual elements of 
sustainable development.  
The centrality of these two definitions has been echoed by Lamy, who stated 
that: 
In common usage, the term ‘sustainable development’ means securing a 
growth path that provides for the needs of the present generation without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. From 
a policy perspective, the pursuit of sustainable development requires a careful 
balancing between progress in each of its pillars: policies designed to 
advance economic development, for instance; to conserve the environment, 
and to ensure social progress.45 
While this statement does not a formal WTO definition, it further demonstrates the 
centrality of this conception of sustainable development.  
 
C. Critiques of the two definitions 
One of the most common critiques of sustainable development, in the WTO and 
beyond, is its vagueness.46 ‘Meeting the needs of the present while allowing future 
generations to meet their needs’, identifies a conceptual problem with a vast scope. 
                                                
44 United Nations, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common 
Future ('Brundtland Report'), Annex to General Assembly document A/42/427, Development and 
International Cooperation: Environment, 2 August 1987, http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm 
(visited 14 September 2012). 
45 Sampson, above n. 5, at vii. 
46 Ibid at 4. 
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This scope makes straightforward, pragmatic applications of ‘sustainable 
development’ seem difficult. It also gives the term a wide range of possible 
interpretations. The concept of needs, for example, is based upon subjective norms, 
and continues to change, in part as a reflection of development itself. Also, while 
some may believe that future generations will meet their needs through technology, 
making conservation unnecessary, others will believe that ecosystem degradation is 
irreversible. Thus, there may be disagreements on exactly what should be 
maintained.47 This ambiguity can result in the term demonstrating the beliefs or 
objectives of the practitioner, rather than representing an external, quantifiable goal. 
Also, even if the principle of the need for intergenerational equity is agreed, 
the definition provides no framework for evaluating, or attaining, sustainable 
development. The interpretation will vary vastly from Member State to Member State, 
and seems difficult to translate into specific shared commitments. Thus, this definition 
plays into the recurring critique, both in the WTO and beyond, that sustainable 
development is vague. 
 The three pillars definition, on the other hand, raises the controversial question 
of the relationship between the pillars. The Plan of Implementation sets out the view 
that the pillars are mutually supportive: 
These efforts [proposed in the Plan] will also promote the integration of the 
three components of sustainable development — economic development, 
social development and environmental protection — as interdependent and 
mutually reinforcing pillars. Poverty eradication, changing unsustainable 
patterns of production and consumption and protecting and managing the 
natural resource base of economic and social development are overarching 
objectives of, and essential requirements for, sustainable development. 48 
[Emphasis added] 
The assumption of this statement is that, when economic welfare improves, so will 
environmental conservation and social development, thereby achieving sustainable 
development. This emphasis on the integration of the pillars has been echoed in 
subsequent UN treaties and conferences, such as the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
document of the UN General Assembly, which advocated the ‘integration of the three 
components of sustainable development — economic development, social 
                                                
47 M Kane, ‘Sustainability Concepts: From Theory to Practice’ in J Köhn et al. (eds), Sustainability in 
Question: the Search for a Conceptual Framework (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999) 17-19. 
48 Plan of Implementation, above n. 3, at para. 1. 
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development and environmental protection — as interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing pillars.’49  
As well as the concept of mutually reinforcing, or mutually supportive pillars, 
principal UN agreements on sustainable development also often refer to the 
importance of balancing the pillars. The Plan of Implementation frequently cites this 
need, as in its objective (b): ‘Integration of the economic, social and environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development in a balanced manner.’50  
Mutual reinforcement suggests that the pillars are inherently in agreement, and 
that there is a possibility for finding ways to achieve all three goals simultaneously. If 
this is the case, the integration of the goals represented by each of the three pillars 
should be fairly effortless. On the other hand, the goal of balancing suggests that it 
will be necessary to make tradeoffs, sacrificing one set of goals to obtain the others. 
Complicating the metaphor somewhat, each pillar is not necessarily supporting the 
same goals, and the pillars could even be in opposition.   
More radical critics charge that this is a more accurate conception, as the goals 
sustainable development attempts to reconcile are fundamentally opposed. In 
Deciphering Sustainable Development, C.D. Stone points out sustainable 
development’s contradictions, with a Marxist slant:  
The term sustainable development is not merely vague – a masker of failed 
consensus – the way terms in the U.S. Constitution are vague and require 
case-by-case elaboration.  ‘Sustainable development’ functions to gloss over 
not only failed consensus, but a latent collision course.  The chasm is less a 
failure of language…than a poignant tussle between, roughly, Rich and 
Poor.51 
In this conception, criticizing sustainable development for being vague does not go far 
enough. It is not a goal, however poorly stated, to be attained. This is a social critique: 
fault lines are drawn between Rich and Poor. Yet a similar critique could be made 
along environmental lines: sustainability, with its implication of limited resource 
consumption, is the enemy of development, which requires an ever-accelerating use 
of resources. In this reading, the term itself is simply a convenient fiction. 
 By contrasting sustainable development with the US Constitution, the quote 
also implicitly underlines the difference between hard and soft law, and suggests a 
reason why sustainable development resists acting as the former. Rather than 
                                                
49 World Summit Outcome, United Nations General Assembly, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, 12. 
50 Plan of Implementation, supra note 2 at para. 121(b). 
51 CD Stone, ‘Deciphering Sustainable Development’ (1994) 69 Chicago - Kent Law Review, 977. 
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vagueness, it is the controversy underlying its interpretation that makes it difficult to 
apply coherently as a legal principle.  
 
D. The WTO interpretation: mutual supportiveness 
The WTO consists of Member States whose interpretations inevitably differ; 
however, the consensual version of this interpretation can be discerned through close 
reading of the term’s principal uses, which reveal two salient aspects of this 
interpretation. The first is a general characterization of the relationship between trade 
liberalization and sustainable development as mutually supportive. Therefore, 
although an embrace of sustainable development implies a more prominent role for 
environmental and social goals in the WTO, an analysis of the term’s specific uses 
reveals that it also demonstrates an optimistic reading of the relationship between 
these goals and the WTO’s primary aim of trade liberalization.   
 The WTO, as well as the UN system, have asserted that trade liberalization and 
sustainable development are mutually supportive. To illustrate why, the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration states that: 
It is the potential impact of economic growth and poverty alleviation that 
makes trade a powerful ally of sustainable development. The multilateral 
trading system is an important tool to carry forward international efforts 
aimed at achieving this goal. The purpose of trade liberalisation and the 
WTO’s key principle of non-discrimination is a more efficient allocation of 
resources, which should be positive for the environment.52 
The Decision on Trade and Environment, from the WTO founding agreement, 
confirms that:  
Considering that there should not be, nor need be, any policy contradiction 
between upholding and safeguarding an open, non-discriminatory and 
equitable multilateral trading system on the one hand, and acting for the 
protection of the environment, and the promotion of sustainable development 
on the other…. 53 
Along these lines, the Preamble of the Doha Ministerial Declaration states:  
We strongly reaffirm our commitment to the objective of sustainable 
development….we are convinced that the aims of upholding and safeguarding 
an open and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, and acting for 
the protection of the environment and the promotion of sustainable 
development, can and must be mutually supportive.54 
                                                
52 Doha Declaration, above n. 17, at para. 6. 
53 Marrakesh Agreement, above n. 15. 
54 Doha Declaration, above n. 17, at Preamble. 
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UN treaties on sustainable development echo these conceptions. During the 
1992 Earth Summit, environment ministers suggested that the only contribution 
GATT should make to sustainable development was to conclude the Uruguay Round 
successfully. 55  A similar understanding resulted from the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development. Environmental ministers called ‘to promote open, 
equitable, rules-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral trading and 
financial systems that benefit all countries in pursuit of sustainable development [and] 
support the successful completion of the work programme contained in the Doha 
Ministerial Declaration.’56  
 In the statements quoted above, the Marrakesh Agreement declared that there 
‘should not be, or need not be’ any policy contradiction between trade opening and 
sustainable development. The Doha Ministerial Declaration stated that these goals 
‘can and must be mutually supportive’. Both are interesting constructions, as they 
simultaneously affirm an optimistic reading of the relationship between trade and 
sustainable development and also suggest that there is work to be done.  
 An attempt to reconcile these two sentiments can also be traced through Lamy’s 
forward to Sampson’s book on sustainable development in the WTO.57 Lamy cites the 
support of the WSSD in affirming that the conclusion of the DDA will further the 
achievement of sustainable development. He then states:  
…although the promotion of economic development and the contribution it 
can make to providing the resources necessary to improve environmental and 
social issues have long been recognized, multilateralism is now confronted by 
new issues that the GATT never had to tackle. Many of these come from the 
trade and sustainable development relationship which I outlined above.58  
 Lamy then sets out the means to improve the WTO relationship with sustainable 
development. These are pragmatic, not ideological: the approach is to improve the 
functioning of the WTO overall. This includes objectives such as reinforcing 
efficiency and legitimacy, being ‘more interested in practical questions of 
organization and implementation,’ and ‘assuring better coherence with other 
international institutions.’59 In other words, improvement of WTO functionality will 
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be synonymous with the success of sustainable development. 
There is an important conceptual difference between proclaiming overall 
mutual supportiveness and selecting specific areas. To focus on areas of mutual 
supportiveness is a fair approach, given that the WTO is a trade organization. 
However, too much emphasis on overall mutual supportiveness risks being facile.  
A potential resolution comes from the assertion that it is the responsibility of 
national governments, rather than the WTO, to bring sustainable development into 
being. Lamy wrote: ‘Nonetheless, trade opening is neither natural nor automatically 
beneficial, in and of itself. It needs a system based on rules coupled with adequate 
domestic polices.’60 This statement confirms the importance of not only a ‘system 
based on rules’, in other words, the WTO, but also national governments to help steer 
sustainable development’s course.  
 On this topic, Sampson wrote: 
Those promoting the virtues of trade liberalisation would not deny that trade 
liberalisation and growth can be harmful to the environment, or that trade 
liberalisation per se will not necessarily achieve sustainable development….The 
WTO response is that, for benefits to be realised and for trade-induced growth 
to be sustainable, national environmental, income distribution and social 
policies should be put in place.’61 
 The WTO’s role can never extend to the creation of ‘adequate domestic 
policies’. That is a matter of national sovereignty, and the WTO is a trade 
organization. Yet, crucially, for the logical inconsistency to be resolved, the WTO 
system must respect national sovereignty to set such regulations, provided they do not 
clash with WTO obligations, and are ‘compatible with an open and non-
discriminatory nature of the multilateral trading system.’62  
In this sense, the best role of the WTO is one of non-interference. This brings 
the focus onto the relationship between national sovereignty and WTO law. To 
paraphrase the above statements, national governments must put in place appropriate 
policies for social welfare and environmental conservation. However, these policies 
must also be consistent with WTO rules. This formulation sidesteps the possibility 
that such policies might at times be inconsistent with WTO rules. Indeed, by the 
WTO’s own logic of mutual supportiveness, such a clash would signify inconsistency 
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61 Ibid at 55. 
62 Doha Declaration, above n. 17, at para. 32, qualifying work of CTE. 
 61 
between the principles of trade liberalization and sustainable development 
themselves.  
This leads to the importance of the concept of balancing. Regulations to 
achieve sustainable development may indeed have negative impacts on trade 
liberalization, by restricting market access of other WTO Members. The WTO’s 
employment of ‘mutual supportiveness’ thus contains inherent contradictions. In the 
above situation, the need would arise to balance the regulatory autonomy of Member 
States to achieve non-trade objectives and their trade-related obligations under WTO 
law. 
Thus, balancing provides a useful conceptual framework; more useful than 
mutual supportiveness.  
In the context of dispute settlement, balancing has provoked debate about the 
authority of the WTO, as a trade organization, to rule upon issues outside its 
immediate mandate. Nonetheless, the concept seems unavoidable. Nonetheless, it is 
inevitable that the dispute settlement system will preside over situations in which it is 
necessary to make tradeoffs between trade liberalization and other goals. This 
inevitability is brought about by the overlap between trade liberalization and 
sustainable development, and the fact that this relationship is not mutually supportive 
in every scenario.  
 
E. The WTO interpretation: the three pillars 
The second salient aspect of the WTO’s interpretation of sustainable development is 
that, in contrast to international law definitions that emphasize ‘three pillars’ – 
economic development, social welfare and environmental conservation – the WTO 
emphasizes two: economic development and environmental conservation. Overall, the 
pillar of sustainable development that deals with social welfare has played a smaller 
role in the WTO than environment or development. Unlike these topics, there is no 
tradition of specialized working groups dedicated to social welfare issues. As will be 
documented subsequently, relevant DDA negotiations aim to achieve a triple win of 
trade liberalization, economic development and environmental conservation; social 
welfare is not included.  
One example of a social welfare issue is labour standards. There is no 
provision in the WTO Agreements about labour standards; historic controversy about 
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this topic is further examined in the next chapter. However, in recognition of its 
importance, the issue has been identified by the Secretariat as a core ‘cross-cutting 
issue’.63 Another related topic is human rights. This is not to say that the WTO is not 
relevant: many of its activities have important impacts that fall into this category. 
However, unlike the other conventional pillars of sustainable development, there has 
been no systematic approach. 
This under-emphasis on social welfare is reflected in WTO texts. The 
Marrakesh Agreement demonstrates a slightly stronger identity between sustainable 
development and environment than a broad-based definition that incorporates social 
welfare and economic development as equal pillars. The first sentence of the WTO 
Preamble emphasizes the need for both wealth creation and ‘optimal use of the 
world’s resources’. Sustainable development’s placement in the sentence closely 
associates it with the latter, which reflects the need for sustainability in an 
environmental sense. Its inclusion and usage in the terms of reference of the 
Committee on Trade and Environment, and not the Committee on Trade and 
Development, reinforces the association between sustainable development and 
environment, as does the Decision on Trade and Environment, which grouped 
environment and sustainable development together, juxtaposed with an open trading 
system.  
The Doha Declaration’s Paragraph 51 instructs the CTE and the CTD ‘to 
identify and debate developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in 
order to help achieve the objective of having sustainable development appropriately 
reflected.’64 Thus, again, the social welfare pillar is not reflected here.  
The emphasis on environment is historically consistent. Sustainable 
development was the conceptual link that first justified an official role for the 
environment in the WTO. In 1971, the GATT Council of Representatives established 
a Group on Environmental Measures and International Trade (‘EMIT’ group), open to 
all GATT members. The group was to be convened at the request of its members; it 
was only twenty years later, in 1992, that several European countries finally did so. 
Part of their reasoning was that international acceptance of the concept of sustainable 
development formed a justification for considering environment and trade in the 
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WTO context.65 Thus, the earliest inclusion of sustainable development in the WTO 
focused on environment rather than social welfare.  
The question arises of whether this omission has to do with the WTO 
interpretation of the term, or whether it is an accidental artifact, subject to future 
reversal. Because the WTO definition is based upon international law definitions of 
sustainable development that include a social welfare pillar, it can be argued that this 
omission is erroneous.  
One possibility is that the WTO interpretation of sustainable development 
more closely aligns with the concept of ‘sustainability’ than sustainable development. 
In his introduction to sustainable development, Reid summarizes the difference 
between the terms as follows: 
A review of the literature shows that ‘sustainable development’ and 
‘sustainability’ are used with a range of meanings. ‘Sustainable development’ 
usually refers to the process of ‘developing’ in a sustainable way…and also to 
the ‘goal’ of that process; ‘sustainability’ refers to the concept of sustainable 
development, and also-confusingly-both to a state of sustainable resource use, 
not necessarily the same as sustainable development, as in ‘ecological 
sustainability,’ and to a state in which the goals of sustainable development 
have been achieved.66  
As he notes, ‘sustainability’ can refer to sustainable development or a state in which 
its goals have been achieved. Indeed, the two terms are used interchangeably in many 
contexts. However, he also notes that ‘sustainable development’ can have more to do 
with development (‘developing’ in a sustainable way), while sustainability can place 
more emphasis on ecological considerations, for example the sustainability of species 
and other natural resources.  
These differences are obvious: a priori, sustainable development places more 
emphasis on development than sustainability. The two definitions might be loosely 
correlated with the two definitions outlined previously: intergenerational equity 
versus the three pillars. A conception of sustainability based solely upon the vitality 
of ecosystems would perhaps not be as amenable to a ‘three pillars’ approach, as it 
emphasizes just one: environment.  
Vagueness also arises as a possible explanatory factor. In common usage, and 
for many pragmatic purposes, there is probably not much of a difference between 
                                                
65 See the WTO website, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/hist1_e.htm (visited 14 
September 2012). 
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sustainable development and sustainability. However, the WTO is one context in 
which such vagueness is not satisfactory. From a WTO perspective, the conceptual 
difference between a set of regulations that focus on environment, and one that 
incorporates a social welfare pillars, may be vast, precisely because of historic 
controversy associated with the labour, human rights, and trade relationship. Potential 
implications of the omission of social welfare on EU biofuels sustainability criteria 
are further examined in the next chapter.    
 
F. Sustainable development as an international legal principle 
Though the WTO de-emphasizes social welfare, as compared to public international 
law in general, conceptions of mutual supportiveness between trade liberalization and 
sustainable development are in agreement. A critique of ‘mutual supportiveness’ also 
applies to the international legal treaties which have given legitimacy to the term. 
Analysing the adoption of the term is instructive, as it reveals that the potential 
conflict between environment and development is at its foundation. In fact, it arose in 
response to international law’s need to address this relationship. The Bruntland 
Report states: 
…attempts to defend [the environment] in isolation from human concerns 
have given the very word ‘environment’ a connotation of naivety in some 
political circles….But the ‘environment’ is where we all live; and 
‘development’ is what we all do in attempting to improve our lot within that 
abode.  The two are inseparable.67 
This statement reveals political resistance to foregrounding the environment as an 
international priority, and justifies its importance on the basis of human welfare.  
Even before the Brundtland Commission identified the importance of the 
environment, and proposed ‘sustainable development’ as a construction of the 
relationship between environment and development, this relationship was a topic of 
debate in international law. The website for the Earth Summit reports that ‘The 
relationship between economic development and environmental degradation was first 
placed on the international agenda in 1972, at the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment, held in Stockholm.’ [Emphasis added] 68  UNEP has as its motto 
‘environment for development’.69 This motto, as well as the Conference title, also 
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reveal resistance to embracing the environment as a stand-alone goal. Both make 
plain that the intention of the relevant international law is not to subjugate 
development goals to environmental commitments.  
The concept of sustainable development seems to provide a conceptual tool 
for international negotiators in a realm of potential conflict: trying to identify a role 
for the environment without compromising other priorities, chiefly economic 
development. The term affirms fundamental values, such as the responsibility to 
future generations and dependence on the natural environment, without alienating 
supporters of progress and technology. Thus it strikes a middle ground between 
business as usual and radical environmental approaches.70  
Also, the word itself does not suggest the conflicts, commitments or costs 
associated with achieving the goal. Instead, it works as an ethical guiding principle. 
For this reason, the quality that could be seen as a weakness, its vagueness, may 
actually be a key to its success. In international law, essential to achieving consensus 
is incorporating principles that can be applied to distinct and even conflicting national 
contexts. In this sense, sustainable development excels. The term’s range of 
interpretations and applications has likely contributed to its global prevalence.  
Thus, though sustainable development is accused of vagueness, this quality 
reflects both the depth and complexity of its duty: a positive construction of tensions 
between environmental, development-related, and economic goals. The divisive 
question is whether this positive construction is a given assumption, a goal worth 
striving for, or a fiction. From an international law perspective, it certainly requires 
less political will to conclude that these goals are mutually supportive. 
 
G. Sustainable development and public legitimacy  
As well as international and national applications, sustainable development has also 
emerged as a household word of the environmental movement. As much as the term 
forms a building block of international law, it also belongs to the ethical commons. 
Beyond its formal adoption in treaties, it is in common use among politicians, national 
and local governments, community groups, grassroots organizers, development 
agencies, environmental agencies, academics from many different fields, 
corporations, NGOs, the media, etc. To the extent that the WTO seeks favourable 
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public opinion, this popular embrace of the term is significant. Sustainable 
development should be seen not only as a component of the internal WTO 
framework, but also as a feature of its role as a public institution. 
Public perceptions of the WTO became increasingly important in the wake of 
protest regarding the WTO’s perceived indifference to social justice and 
environmental preservation. In a 2002 article, Esty reflected on protesting and riots 
that continued to contribute to the breakdown of negotiations at Ministerial 
conferences. In response to this, he argued that the organization needed to 
demonstrate sensitivity and responsiveness to non-economic goals such as poverty 
alleviation, environmental protection, and the promotion of public health.71  
While Doha Declaration negotiations commenced before the Battle in Seattle, 
public protest formed a significant backdrop to its 2001 conclusion. The role of 
sustainable development in the Doha Declaration should be seen in this context. It 
reassures the public that the WTO is committed to considering goals besides trade 
liberalization as a central part of its institutional obligations. 
 
4. Sustainable development in the WTO  
 
A. The Committee on Trade and Development 
Paragraph 51 identifies the CTD as the forum to identify and debate development 
issues related to sustainable development. In practice, the CTD work has been 
synonymous with furthering the economic development of developing countries, and 
ensuring that they benefit from trade liberalization and their WTO commitments.72 
Developing countries represent two thirds of WTO Members. The successful 
conclusion of the round relies upon their satisfaction that their strategic goals, such as 
the liberalization of agriculture and textiles, have been met.73  
In the CTD, the objective of appropriately reflecting sustainable development 
reveals a contradiction. By definition, development is one of the objectives of 
sustainable development. However, developing countries have been resistant to the 
inclusion of the concept in the WTO. They fear that empowering sustainable 
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development as a WTO legal principle will interfere with their development. The core 
concern is that developed countries will put in place protectionist regulation in the 
name of the environment. 
The resistance suggests that sustainable development’s environment pillar 
(and its perceived protectionist implications) conflicts with its development pillar 
(and its promise of more market access for developing countries). This demonstrates 
what might be seen as an example of a lack of mutual supportiveness between 
environment and development.  
This suggests that sustainable development can reflect the goals of both 
environment and development only inasmuch as it represents more market access for 
developing countries’ goods and services. This scenario involves developed countries 
removing market distortions, such as subsidies and price supports. This is the goal of 
both the CTD in general and also some of the work of the CTE, summarized below. 
The example of developing countries illustrates why focusing on areas of mutual 
supportiveness is the most pragmatic approach. However, it does not testify to mutual 
supportiveness as an absolute principle: there may be instances in which 
environmental goals would be better served through trade-restrictive regulation.   
 
B. The Committee on Trade and Environment 
Paragraph 51 also identifies the CTE as the forum to identify and debate 
environmental aspects of sustainable development. The Doha Declaration also 
includes paragraphs 31 – 33, negotiated by the CTE, which address the trade and 
environment relationship. The overall approach contains an explicit emphasis on 
triple wins: areas in which market access can be improved while at the same time 
incorporating environment and development goals. Notably, this conception does not 
acknowledge social welfare as a pillar. Paragraph 31(iii) calls for ‘the reduction or, as 
appropriate, elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to environmental goods and 
services’, identified as a triple win. These goods and services contribute to 
environmentally preferable practices; the argument is that the removal of trade 
barriers will increase these practices.74 Paragraph 31 also calls attention to fisheries 
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subsidies (though this negotiation is taking place under the Committee on Rules75). 
The WTO website identifies the removal of fisheries subsidies as an example of a 
triple-win,76 as they lead to overfishing and privilege developed countries over 
developing; therefore the liberalization of fisheries could have positive environment 
and development outcomes.  
Paragraph 32(i) calls for attention to ‘situations in which the elimination or 
reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the environment 
and development’. While it has not led to as active a negotiating process, this 
subparagraph also deals with triple-wins.   
Paragraph 31(i) deals with institutional linkages between the WTO and other 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements. It calls for more examination of the 
relationship between the Multilateral Environmental Agreements and the WTO, with 
‘a view toward enhancing mutual supportiveness….’ This suggests that mutual 
supportiveness exists but must be improved, an ambiguous concept that echoes 
statements previously quoted from the Doha Declaration (there ‘should not be, or 
need not be’ policy contradiction between trade opening and sustainable 
development; these goals ‘can and must be mutually supportive’).  
Overall, the CTE takes a somewhat tautological approach to demonstrating 
mutual supportiveness between trade liberalization and the social welfare and 
environmental goals of sustainable development, by focusing only on areas in which 
the achievement of these goals seems to be a side effect of trade liberalization. This 
limits the institutional influence of the term in the negotiations. Again, as a pragmatic 
approach, given the WTO mandate and resistance from WTO Members, this may well 
be appropriate. However, it also highlights the contradiction at the core of the WTO’s 
relationship with sustainable development in principle: the simultaneous affirmation 
of mutual supportiveness and proclamation that it must be achieved. In practice, the 
analogous behavior in the context of negotiations is to declare that sustainable 
development should be implemented across the board, but only to focus on its 
application in selected areas of least resistance. 
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C. Dispute settlement 
The Doha Round is a single undertaking, meaning that all aspects of the negotiations 
must be concluded for one to move forward. With negotiations stalled, the dispute 
settlement system has taken on increasing importance as a de facto decision-maker.77 
This system has been called ‘in all probability, the most effective area of adjudicative 
dispute settlement in the entire area of public international law.’78  
For this reason, dispute settlement is a particularly important area of 
consideration regarding the WTO’s relationship with sustainable development. 
Dispute settlement also provides clarity regarding the precise applications of WTO 
law. WTO agreements do not provide guidance specific enough to predict the 
outcome of a potential trade conflict.  
With respect to dispute settlement, the concept of mutual supportiveness does 
not have much practical utility. The concept of balancing, on the other hand, has been 
relevant and controversial. It applies to the need to determine the appropriate level of 
regulatory autonomy governments should be afforded, and on what basis regulations 
should be maintained even if they do not conform to WTO law.79  
 Though past WTO disputes have addressed environmental and social issues, 
there has not been a dispute about regulations that took ‘sustainable development’ as 
the explicit and primary goal. Such a dispute would help determine not only the 
definition, but also the legal weight, of the term. An analysis of such regulations 




The term sustainable development has inspired both widespread acceptance and 
widespread skepticism. In the case of the WTO, both coexist: even while agreeing to 
sustainable development as a central WTO principle, Member States have kept it at 
arm’s length. The term has met with criticism across a broad spectrum, from trade 
                                                
77 See, eg, G Shaffer, ‘How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work for Developing 
Countries’ (2003) International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (‘ICTSD’) Issue Paper 
No. 5, 11.  
78 D Palmeter and PC Mavroidis, Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organisation – Practice and 
Procedure, 2nd Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 234. 
79 See, eg, A Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4(3) Journal of International Economic 
Law, 441-480; also J Trachtman, ‘Trade and…Problems: Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Subsidiarity’ (1998) 9 European Journal of International Law, 32 – 85. 
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negotiators to environmental activists. In the case of the former, developing countries 
have complained that sustainable development acts as a justification for developed 
countries to protect their markets, not out of concern for the environment but financial 
and political self-interest. (These same critiques have been directed at environmental 
regulation in general.)  
The charge leveled by activists is that the term seems to resolve the 
contentious relationship between its components too neatly. Sustainable development 
functions as a principle of compromise, which helps explain why it has been 
embraced in the WTO. Yet this compromising nature has itself prompted critique: it 
can be dismissed as an empty public relations gesture.  
These critiques result from the conception of sustainable development as an 
ideological presupposition. However, the term can be partly exonerated if it is viewed 
not as a conclusion about this relationship, but rather as a formulation of the problem 
itself.  
Only an excessively compromise-driven interpretation of sustainable 
development would state that it is simply a by-product of the WTO’s primary 
mandate of trade liberalization. A more robust interpretation must recognize that the 
goals represented by trade liberalization, on the one hand, and environment and social 
welfare regulation, on the other, sometimes clash, necessitating that the validity of the 
norms represented by each be compared, and a determination be made about which 
will prevail. Rather than mutual supportiveness between the pillars, this approach can 
be represented by the conceptual structure of balancing. Balancing does not suggest a 
solution, but merely formulates a problem of central importance to the WTO when 
dealing with the relationship between trade and non-trade priorities.  
In the context of the DDA negotiations, the emphasis on areas of mutual 
supportiveness has, to some extent, ring-fenced the term’s influence. In the event of a 
trade dispute on sustainable development regulations, however, the more unbounded 
challenge of balancing sustainable development with trade liberalization may arise. 
Lamy has pointed to domestic policies as crucial to achieving sustainable 
development, and ensuring its mutually supportive relationship with trade 
liberalization. Thus, a dispute would provide an important test of national sovereignty 
to pursue the goal of sustainable development. From a public relations perspective, 
this would likely put not only the parties in dispute, but also the concept of 
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EU biofuels sustainability criteria:  




The previous chapter argued that balancing is a more coherent conceptual approach to 
envisioning the relationship between sustainable development and trade liberalization 
than mutual supportiveness. Balancing hints at a process that must be undertaken to 
achieve sustainable development. But who is doing the balancing? And how is it 
done? This chapter addresses these questions through examining EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria. As vagueness and complexity are hallmarks of sustainable 
development, a case-by-case approach clarifies and simplifies these problems locally, 
if not globally.  
In the event of a WTO dispute, the dispute settlement bodies would have the 
opportunity to interpret the WTO compatibility of sustainability regulation. EU 
criteria provide a focus for reflection on the relationship between sustainable 
development and the WTO on an institutional level. In this respect, one important 
issue is the role of WTO obligations as an implicit force shaping the regulatory 
process itself. For example, it is interesting to consider what the criteria omit. The EC 
has acknowledged that the desire to avoid a WTO conflict was one motivating factor 
for not including stronger criteria, suggesting that the existence of WTO law had a 
‘chilling’ effect on the regulations.1 Regulatory chill is a difficult force to document, 
as it takes the form of internal decision-making. Despite this limitation, when 
considering the relationship between WTO law and sustainability regulation, this 
issue is important to consider. It reveals WTO influence that has already occurred, 
even barring a dispute.   
                                                
1 See, eg, A Swinback, ‘EU Support for Biofuels and Bioenergy, Environmental Sustainability Criteria, 
and Trade Policy’, Programme on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (‘ICTSD’), Issue paper no. 17, June 2009, 29. 
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Thus, as its first component, the chapter builds a case for regulatory chill. This 
case is based upon analysis of EU Parliament drafts of the criteria, which were much 
more comprehensive in scope; pressures imposed by current, informal complaints 
about the criteria; and comparative evidence from past disputes on environmental 
regulations. 
The conclusion is that international trade law influence resulted in the EU’s 
desire to avoid national discrimination by ensuring that the criteria apply to multiple 
national contexts without seeming to single out any for less favourable treatment. The 
EU developed a number of flexibilities in how the criteria are implemented and 
applied, including through introducing various means to measure the achievement of 
the standard they set, and emphasizing openness to negotiation and international 
voluntary standards. This requirement for flexibility contributed to the weakening of 
the criteria by creating less rigorous regulation and means of implementation. It may 
also have influenced the fact that some negative impacts were included in reporting 
and monitoring requirements, rather than as binding criteria conditioning imports. 
This includes the environmental problems of water and air pollution and soil erosion 
and indirect land use change, though the possibility of including binding criteria on 
these issues is still being debated.  
It also includes criteria related to social welfare impacts, such as the ‘food for 
fuel’ problem of biofuels crops displacing food crops, the dislocation or 
disenfranchisement of local people from corporate ‘land grabs’, and poor labour 
conditions in biofuels production. With these omissions, many of the most 
controversial aspects of biofuels production are beyond the reach of the criteria.  
The second component of the chapter focuses on the criteria as an example of 
‘sustainability’ regulation, focusing on GATT Article XX (‘Article XX’) and TBT 
Article 2.2 (‘TBT 2.2’). There has been some disagreement as to whether the TBT 
Agreement applies to EU biofuels sustainability criteria, and the EU itself believes 
that it does not. Thus, as a preliminary consideration, the chapter sets out the reasons 
why it is very likely that the TBT Agreement would indeed apply, as demonstrated by 
recent jurisprudence.   
The chapter then describes how features of the WTO interpretation of 
sustainable development outlined in the previous chapter translate into legal questions 
of dispute settlement. The first is the lesser role of social welfare in the WTO 
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framework. The EU’s omission of social welfare criteria can be linked to the WTO’s 
lack of institutional support for sustainable development in principle.  
Another issue identified in the previous chapter is the conceptual breadth and 
vagueness of the concept of sustainable development. To illustrate how this may 
weaken sustainable development’s ability to act as a strong legal principle, this 
analysis considers a hypothetical dispute on binding labour standards (included in the 
current criteria, but nonbinding). Labour standards for biofuels were not necessarily 
of central importance to the EU but raise interesting questions about the limits of the 
regulatory concept of sustainable development, in part for this very reason. The 
Article XX/TBT 2.2 necessity test suggests that the closer a sustainability criterion is 
to the EU’s overall intent of reducing emissions, and the more compelling in the 
context of the Article’s subparagraphs, the more likely to be WTO-compliant. In this 
sense, the regulatory goal of sustainability carries little legal weight as an ‘end in 
itself ’ when justifying trade restrictions. This reflects the fact that, if it were applied 
as a legal rule and accepted at face value, it would create a vast territory of national 
regulatory discretion to set trade-restrictive regulations.  
This chapter also analyses additional regulatory characteristics of sustainable 
development that define the existing EU criteria, and may be significant in shaping a 
dispute. This includes breadth, process-orientation and extra-territorial reach, all of 
which might be described as general characteristics of the concept of ‘sustainability.’ 
The criteria assume a large degree of discretion to pursue goals of uncertain 
importance, if negative free trade impacts are their result. Based upon international 
standards, the gravity of the harm of being unsustainable is not well established. 
There is also the question of the coherence of the EU’s intent in applying these 
regulations, considering that they are not being applied to other agricultural products.  
The larger implication is that mutual supportiveness between WTO law and 
national sustainable development policies is not easy to achieve. Thus, sustainable 
development in the WTO has given rise to a somewhat contradictory situation: 
despite the term’s conceptual centrality and wide acceptance in principle, it is 
challenging to apply in practice.  
In the EU, the inclusion of biofuels in renewable energy targets has been 
controversial, as there is widespread concern that they are unsustainable. However, 
these criteria have been criticized as trade protectionism, intending to block imports 
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and favour domestic biofuels. This judicial controversy relates back to the underlying 
issue of balancing: how to draw the line between trade liberalization on the one hand, 
and sustainability on the other, if these goals come into conflict. EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria embody some of the regulatory characteristics of sustainable 
development. They thus crystallize this more theoretical controversy into an 
examination of the legal details of the EU’s interpretation of sustainability and its 
WTO-compatibility. Such an examination provides a better understanding of the 
scope and nature of the task of implementing sustainable development through the 
WTO framework.  
 
2. EU Biofuels sustainability criteria as a ‘sustainable development’ case study: 
Regulatory chill 
 
A.  The process of formulating the criteria 
Sustainability is a broad concept which could be used to justify any number of 
regulations. Therefore, it is interesting to consider the process by which EU bodies 
translated the concept into specific regulations, and why the concept of 
‘sustainability’ was felt to be important in this circumstance. 
In general terms, the criteria respond to a strong cross-cutting EU legal 
mandate articulated in the Lisbon Treaty’s Article 11:  
Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition 
and implementation of the Union’s policies and activities, in particular with a 
view to promoting sustainable development.2  
This statement sets out environmental protection and sustainable development as 
goals applicable to every EU policy. The EU here refer to the importance of 
‘sustainable development’ rather than ‘sustainability’, while the biofuels criteria 
pursue ‘sustainability’. The previous chapter identified differences between the two 
terms. However, they are often used interchangeably. The assumption made in this 
thesis is that the terms are functionally synonymous. This is supported by the fact that 
EU criteria contain social welfare components, even though they are non-binding.  
EU bodies have recognized that their focus on sustainable development will 
not just remain inside Europe, but that they will strive for an international influence 
                                                
2 Article 11, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 30 March 2010, C 83/47 to 
C83/199. 
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on bringing about this goal. The Council of the European Union’s Renewed 
Sustainable Development Strategy, for example, lists four ‘key objectives’: 
environmental protection, social equity and cohesion, economic prosperity, and 
meeting our international responsibilities. The last of these objectives includes the 
following commitment:  
Actively promote sustainable development worldwide and ensure that the 
European Union’s internal and external policies are consistent with global 
sustainable development and its international commitments.3 
The term ‘international commitments’ refers to EU obligations in international 
treaties and conventions, including the WTO. Thus, this expresses in very general 
terms the EU commitment both to sustainable development and also international 
trade agreements. 
The final criteria prioritize emissions savings and biodiversity conservation, 
suggesting that these were seen as the primary components of sustainability vis-à-vis 
biofuels. Yet, a Parliament Draft Report suggested revisions to an early European 
Commission (‘EC’) submission,4 recommending broader and stricter criteria. To the 
EC’s ‘environmental’ sustainability criteria they added throughout ‘environmental 
and social…criteria’.5 They attempted to account for the problem of food scarcity by 
introducing ‘no go’ categories, stating that ‘depending on the world food situation, a 
complete restriction on the use of arable land for energy production or a limitation to 
certain volumes will be requested’.6  
They also called for a set of ‘strict sustainability criteria’ including 
methodologies for incorporating the sustainability impacts of indirect land use change 
and ‘social criteria to protect e.g. small farmers in third world countries’.7 Further, 
they proposed an expanded definition of ‘high conservation value land’, which 
included a consideration of impacts on basic ecosystem services, as well as the land’s 
importance to subsistence of local populations, and their cultural identity. 8 They 
called for the abandonment of the RED requirement that 10 per cent of energy for 
                                                
3 Renewed Sustainable Development Strategy as adopted by the European Council on 15/16 June 2006, 
The Council of the European Union, Brussels 26 June 2006, 10917/06, DG1, WP/pc. 
4 Draft Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources, European Parliament Committee on Industry, 
Research and Energy, 13 May 2008, 2008/0016 (COD).  
5 Ibid at 9, 26. 
6 Ibid at 87. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid at 13. 
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transport be sourced from biofuels, based on the concern that it would not be possible 
to do so sustainably.9 Thus in its draft the Parliament attempts to address the problem 
of food scarcity;10 their suggestions also respond to some of the problems resulting 
from ‘land grabs’. 
Given the high level of publicity garnered by negative social welfare impacts 
of biofuels, it is interesting to consider the causes of these omissions in the final 
criteria. As noted, the EU Renewable Energy Directive does recognize the so-called 
‘food versus fuel’ problem, by stating that the relationship between biofuels and food 
crops will be monitored. However, this is a relatively weak requirement: an intra-EU, 
biennial reporting process. In contrast, the environmental aspects of the criteria 
determine whether biofuels can count toward renewable energy targets or receive 
financial support. 
 
B.  Trade concerns, regulatory chill and the criteria 
As the subject area is relevant to agriculture, environment, transport, energy and 
trade, biofuels sustainability criteria also resulted from dialogue and compromise 
between several EC Directorate Generals. The end result was to counterbalance the 
strong articulation of the EU’s environmental and sustainability commitments that the 
Parliament submission revealed against various constraints. Commentators have noted 
that determining the final version of the criteria, and the extent to which they should 
include social standards, was a controversial process, and that trade impacts were one 
of the main concerns at stake.11 A stated justification for not including more criteria as 
a precondition for import was fear of incompatibility with WTO rules.12 Thus, WTO 
treaty obligations provided a countervailing force to the Lisbon Treaty sustainable 
development obligation.  
                                                
9 Ibid at 18. 
10 A Chakrabortty, ‘Secret report: biofuel caused food crisis’, Guardian, 3 July 2008, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/jul/03/biofuels.renewableenergy (visited 20 June 2012); 
E Rosenthal, ‘Rush to Use Crops as Fuel Raises Food Prices and Hunger Fears’, New York Times, 6 
April 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/science/earth/07cassava.html?_r=1&hp (visited 20 
June 2012). 
11 J Rankin, ‘Split over standards for biofuels imports’, EuropeanVoice.com, 24 July 2008,  
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/split-over-standards-for-biofuels-imports/61820.aspx 
(visited 15 November 2011). 
12 S Charnovitz et al., ‘An Examination of Social Standards in Biofuels Sustainability Criteria’, IPC 
Discussion Paper – Standards Series, International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy Council, 
Washington, DC, December 2008. 
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The WTO influence can be better understood in the context of specific GATT 
Articles that the criteria have the potential to violate. One of these is the National 
Treatment principle (‘NTP’) of GATT Article III(4) and TBT Article 2.1 (‘TBT 2.1’). 
The basic concept of the NTP is that less favourable treatment should not be awarded 
to ‘like’ products, regardless of their origin.  
An examination of the RED text reveals implicit references to 
nondiscrimination through its inclusion of language similar to the WTO Agreements. 
For example, Article 17(1) states that: 
Irrespective of whether the raw materials were cultivated inside or outside the 
territory of the Community, energy from biofuels and bioliquids shall be taken 
into account…only if they fulfil the sustainability criteria…. 13  
Elements of GATT language can also be seen in EC agreements regarding biofuels, 
such as the EC Communication which states that biofuels support measures are 
‘designed to avoid any discrimination between domestic production and imports and 
should not act as a barrier to trade’.14  
Similarly, the criteria could be seen to violate the Most Favoured Nation 
Principle (‘MFN’) of GATT Article I, whose relevant language reads:   
…any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting 
party to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be 
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in 
or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.15  
The basis for a claim of MFN violation would be that the criteria singled out 
biofuels from a certain country for less favourable treatment. The jurisprudence 
demonstrates that an ‘advantage’ under the MFN is defined as something that creates 
‘more favourable competitive opportunities’.16 This is also the basis of the NTP, 
                                                
13 European Council Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC’ OJ [2009] L140/16 (‘RED’) at Art. 17(1), 18(3) and 23(5)a. 
14 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, ‘Renewable 
Energy Road Map, Renewable energies in the 21st Century: building a more sustainable future’, 
Commission of the European Communities, 2007a, 3, 12, http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52006DC0848:EN:NOT (visited 19 September 
2012). 
15 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article I(1), 14 April 1994, 
GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal 
Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) 424.  
16 Panel Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 
Complaint by Guatemala and Honduras (EC – Bananas III, Guatemala and Honduras), 
WT/DS27/R/GTM, WT/DS27/R/HND, adopted 22 May 1997, para. 7.239; WTO Panel Report on 
Colombia – Indicative Prices and Restrictions on Ports of Entry (Colombia – Ports of Entry), 
WT/DS366/R, adopted 27 April 2009, para. 7.341.  
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which focuses on whether a measure has a negative impact upon competitive 
opportunities for imported products.17 
On their face, the criteria do not discriminate between domestic and imported 
biofuels, or single out certain biofuels for discrimination (de jure discrimination). Yet 
discrimination can also result from the measure being applied in such a way that it 
negatively impacts imported more than domestic products (de facto discrimination). 
In other words, de facto discrimination consists of designing and applying the 
measure in such a way as to protect the EU biofuels market by making imports more 
difficult. Thus, the more flexibility built into the regulations, to accommodate 
diverging national circumstances, the lower the likelihood of de facto discrimination. 
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis focus on the NTP and its relationship with the 
EU criteria. However, it is useful to highlight here some of the primary trade concerns 
raised in the context of the NTP/MFN principle, as they reveal the pressure trade 
partners exert on the criteria to be more adaptable in order to avoid singling out 
particular countries for discrimination. For example, in a March 2011 press release, 
the American Soybean Association expressed ‘serious concerns’ to the US 
Department of Agriculture and the US Trade Representative about the criteria. 18 They 
argued they could result in the loss of a $1 billion export market from the US to the 
EU. They critiqued the EU’s methodology and criteria as being too context-specific.  
                                                
17 While this does not form a focus of the thesis, it is also possible that the AB would determine that 
Article XI(1) best applies to the criteria. Article XI(1) specifically has to do with ‘prohibitions and 
restrictions’ applied at the border, while Article III includes ‘all laws, regulations or requirements’ that 
apply to domestic and ‘like’ imported products. The applicability of both Articles has been interpreted 
broadly, and there may be overlap between the two.  
With respect to biofuels sustainability criteria, the key question is whether the measure affects 
the importation of products, regulated by Article XI(1), or ‘imported products’, regulated by Article 
III(4). This is further complicated by the fact that restrictions on importation are not limited to those 
that impact upon the process of importation. Whether applicability is mutually exclusive is somewhat 
of an open question that is not addressed in the measures themselves. The Panel in India – Autos 
suggested that both Articles might apply. In EC – Asbestos, the Panel did not consider whether the 
measure in dispute conformed with Article XI because it had been found to violate Article III(4). 
However, they did not specifically state that this was because Article XI did not apply. To the extent 
that sustainability criteria have a negative impact on the ability of foreign producers to import biofuels 
to the EU, it is possible that Article XI(1) would apply. However, constraints of time and space, and the 
thematic approach of the thesis, prevent a thorough analysis. WTO Panel Report on India – Measures 
Affecting the Automotive Sector (India – Autos), WT/DS146/R; WT/DS175/R, adopted 21 December 
2001, 7.246 – 7.250; WTO Panel Report on EC – Asbestos, WT/DS135/R, adopted 18 September 
2000, para. 8.159. 
18 ‘ASA Expresses Concerns about EU Renewable Energy Directive to USDA and USTR’, Press 
Release, American Soybean Association, 9 March 2011, 
http://www.soygrowers.com/newsroom/releases/2011_releases/r030911.htm (visited 15 November 
2011). 
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This criticism responded to default emissions values the EU included for many 
(but not all) biofuels. These aim to reduce the bureaucratic burden of complying with 
the criteria.19 They can be used by biofuels producers in certain circumstances to gain 
access to the EU market. For the sake of transparency, the EU has included their 
calculation methodology in the RED and clarified that it is based upon independent 
scientific expertise.20 This transparency does not guarantee WTO-compliance; the EC 
itself has acknowledged that there is room for improvement by stating that it will 
update values to accurately reflect progressing scientific knowledge.21  
The USDA noted that the EU calculates soy biodiesel as representing only a 
31 per cent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, which disqualifies soy as a 
feedstock for biodiesel, as the EU cap is 35 per cent. However, they pointed out that 
the figures were calculated using production and transportation data from Brazilian 
soybeans. US calculations of US soybeans, on the other hand, revealed greenhouse 
gas emissions savings of up to 52 per cent.  
If the methodology for calculating default values seems arbitrary or opaque, 
and differs from the calculations of exporters, it may be argued that it was established 
to discriminate against foreign biofuels and to benefit domestic biofuels. The EU 
criteria, however, permit the introduction of emissions levels calculated based upon 
alternate methodologies, as long as they are approved. This is an example of a 
flexibility that the EU introduced which has the impact of decreasing the likeliness of 
a trade dispute. 
The EU’s default calculations also include emissions from transport. This 
could be seen as de jure discrimination: it explicitly singles out imported biofuels for 
less favourable treatment. If soybeans were converted to biodiesel in the country of 
production (eg Brazil or the US), they would qualify, as they would be less bulky to 
transport. This suggests an advantage for feedstocks converted to biofuel in the 
producing country, rather than those who export the feedstock.22  
                                                
19 European Commission, Communication from the Commission on voluntary schemes and default 
values in the EU biofuels and bioliquids sustainability scheme, OJ of the European Union 2010/C 
160/1, 19/6/2010, 1. 
20 RED, above n. 13, at Preamble para. 83. 
21 Ibid. 
22 M Schaus and A Lendle, ‘The EU’s Renewable Energy Directive – Consistent with WTO Rules?’, 
Trade Law Clinic, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, Switzerland, 
at 28.   
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The existence of default values also provides an advantage to some producers 
and a disadvantage to others. For example, US corn ethanol does not have a default 
value, while EU corn ethanol does.23 Therefore US producers must make their own 
calculation and then undergo conformity assessment, an additional regulatory burden. 
Also, some biofuels will have higher emissions values than those proscribed by the 
default values. If they adopt these values, they may have an unfair advantage of 
complying with the criteria when they should not.24 
Trade partners might also challenge the EU’s rationale for setting its particular 
emissions savings requirements. It has been argued that the initial 35 per cent 
threshold was established in order to single out imported biofuels for discrimination, 
as rapeseed biodiesel, the EU’s main domestic source of biofuels, falls just above the 
line at 38 per cent savings, while palm oil (produced without methane capture) and 
soybean oil fall just below. 25 However, when the threshold is raised to 50 per cent in 
2017, these advantages will be eliminated. A number of imported biofuels also fall 
above the line; for example, imported sugarcane ethanol and palm oil produced with 
methane capture will qualify even when the threshold is raised. This seems to argue 
against the conclusion that the emissions savings thresholds are discriminatory.26 
The American Soybean Association also found fault with the EU’s system of 
certification for high-conservation value lands. They argued that US domestic 
environmental regulation may actually provide a standard higher than that of the 
RED, even though it does not conform to the EU’s exact methodology. Similarly, in a 
2008 workshop hosted by the EU Parliament on facilitating biofuels imports from 
tropical countries, an ethanol producer from Sierra Leone characterized EU 
specifications on water content as hidden market protectionism. He asserted that, in 
fact, water quality had nothing to do with fuel quality. Instead, it was a way of 
excluding tropical biofuels from the market. He stated that ‘We don’t believe that 
broad land categories and default values can take into account the variety of 
conditions prevailing in Africa.’27  
                                                
23 RED, above n. 13, at Annex V(a).  
24 Schaus and Lendle, above n. 22, at 28.  
25 F Erixon, ‘The Rising Trend of Green Protectionism: Biofuels and the European Union’, European 
Centre for International Political Economy, Occasional Paper No. 2/2012, 29 - 30. 
26 Schaus and Lendle, above n. 22. 
27 ‘Sustainable Biofuels Development in Tropical and Subtropical Countries’, European Parliament 
Report, 12 June 2008, Policy Department: Economic and Scientific Policy, Workshop Proceedings, 
IP/A/ENVI/ST/2008-13, 14. 
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With regard to land-use criteria, one possibility is that they favour ecosystems 
found within the EU, making compliance more difficult for certain importing 
countries, in particular Indonesia, Malaysia and South Africa.28 These countries might 
argue that they have no choice about their ecosystems, and that the criteria are a 
disguised barrier to trade whose purpose is to benefit domestic biofuels.  
Questions might also arise about the methodological basis for prohibiting 
biofuels from being grown in particular areas. To depoliticize existing criteria, the EU 
also tie them to international agreements and standards. High biodiversity areas, for 
example, are established either through national law or international designation by 
relevant international organizations.29 The RED definition of wetlands will take into 
account the international convention on Wetlands of International Importance (the 
Ramsar Convention).30 With respect to biodiverse grasslands, the EC has not yet 
produced a definition, but the RED states that this will be based upon ‘the best 
available scientific evidence and relevant international standards’.31  
 Despite this reliance on international standards, which seem to eliminate the 
possibility of national discrimination, these definitions may still be unsettled. For 
example, wetlands are liminal zones between water and land whose borders are often 
in flux. A report by the EC’s DG Environment on wetlands conservation in the EU 
stated that ‘it is not easy to define precisely what wetlands are, with different 
international bodies often having slightly different definitions.’32 Perhaps even more 
difficult will be the process of establishing a definition for highly biodiverse 
grasslands, for which there is not a strong international environmental protection 
framework.  
 These definitions draw the boundary between permitted and prohibited 
biofuels exports. As described in the thesis introduction, Brazil is the world’s largest 
producer of ethanol; much of its expansion of ethanol production is occurring in an 
ecosystem of biodiverse grassland.33 If the definition excludes these biofuels it will 
have a significant impact on Brazil’s exports to the EU, and may be more likely to 
prompt a dispute which would cause this definition to come under scrutiny.  
                                                
28 Schaus and Lendle, above n. 22, at 34. 
29 RED, above n. 13, at Article 17(3). 
30 Ibid at Preamble, para. 73. 
31 Ibid at Preamble, para. 69. 
32 ‘Life and Europe’s Wetlands: Restoring a Vital Ecosystem’ (2007), EC DG Environment, 3.  
33 S Valle, ‘Losing forests to fuel cars: Ethanol sugarcane threatens Brazil’s wooded savannahs’, 
Washington Post, 31 July 2007. 
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Similar concerns about the flexibility and unilateral nature of the criteria arise 
in the context of GATT Article XX. In the event of a dispute, if the criteria were 
found to violate Article III(4), the EU would have recourse to Article XX, which lists 
exceptions to the GATT.  
Subparagraphs potentially relevant to biofuels sustainability criteria include 
measures:  
(a) necessary to protect public morals; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(d) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, including those relating 
to…the prevention of deceptive practices; 
(e) relating to the products of prison labour; and 
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.34 
(The RED also invokes an implicit defence under GATT Article XX, stating 
that ‘the consumers in the Community would…find it morally unacceptable that their 
increased use of biofuels…could have the effect of destroying biodiverse lands.’35)  
The Article XX chapeau provides the context for interpreting its 
subparagraphs. It reads: 
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of 
measures….36 
The key concepts of the chapeau are that the measure should not constitute 
‘arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination’ or ‘disguised restriction on international 
trade’ in ‘countries where the same conditions prevail’. It thus provides an additional 
safeguard to strike the balance between WTO obligations and national regulatory 
autonomy.  
Article XX will be analysed extensively in the second part of this chapter; thus 
it is not necessary to go into depth here. However, to highlight key issues, in the 
context of the Article XX chapeau, past disputes also demonstrate the importance of 
flexibility to prevent the claim that the regulation is a form of arbitrary discrimination. 
                                                
34 Marrakesh Agreement, Article XX, above n. 15, at 455. 
35 RED, above n. 13, at Preamble para. 69. 
36 Marrakesh Agreement, Article XX, above n. 15, at 455. 
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In the US – Shrimp 37 dispute, the measure in question was a US requirement that its 
trade partners install a device on fishing nets to exclude, and thereby protect, sea 
turtles. The Appellate Body (‘AB’) agreed that the measure qualified under 
subparagraph (g), which covers measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources’. However, they found that it did not meet the conditions of the 
chapeau, for three main reasons. First, the US had a ‘rigid and unbending standard’, 
as the US required that the measure be applied ‘essentially the same’ way as it was 
domestically, regardless of differing local conditions.38 Second, they had not made 
sufficient efforts to achieve a negotiated agreement with trade partners.39  They 
considered that the US’s attempts to negotiate seriously with some but not other trade 
partners had a discriminatory impact and was unjustifiable. Finally, they found that 
the way that the certification was administered was also unfair, as trade partners were 
not notified of whether they had been certified nor provided with the rationale or 
given the opportunity to respond.  
The AB report is notable for its emphasis on ‘procedural fairness and due 
process’. 40  It seems that the EU took this into account when crafting their 
sustainability criteria. The criteria pre-emptively address some of the grounds upon 
which the US’s regulations were found to be in violation of WTO law, including 
through emphasizing openness to negotiation and acceptance of equivalent voluntary 
schemes. For example, compliance with the criteria can be proven on the basis of 
bilateral or multilateral agreements with the EU, or compliance with voluntary 
standards, thus allowing for both the possibility of negotiation and flexibility in 
implementation. From a trade law perspective a multilateral agreement is a safer route 
for introducing sustainability criteria than a unilateral EU requirement.  
Another example of regulatory flexibility is in the requirements for canopy 
cover. Paragraph 73 of the RED states that ‘Forested areas with a canopy cover of 
between 10 and 30 per cent should also be included, unless there is evidence 
demonstrating that their carbon stock is sufficiently low to justify their conversion in 
                                                
37 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products (US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 15 June 2001. 
38 Ibid at para. 163. 
39 Ibid at paras. 166, 172. 
40 G De Búrca and J Scott, ‘The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-making’, in G De Búrca and J 
Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 20.  
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accordance with the rules laid down in this Directive.’41 The qualifying statement 
allows producers more ways to prove that they meet the criteria, which might be 
useful in the context of any of these provisions.  
Also, rather than national-level certification, the EU applies its sustainability 
criteria on a batch-by-batch basis. If they required that an entire country implement 
the regulations before it could export, this would mean that individual producers 
could not export from uncertified countries even if they complied with the criteria. 
Also, this approach would not preserve the technically voluntary aspect of the criteria. 
The difference between a country-based and batch-by-batch approach was significant 
in the US – Shrimp dispute. In the aftermath of the dispute, the US adapted a number 
of flexibilities to make it easier for exporters to become certified and to increase 
transparency and communication in the application of the measure. 42 One of the WTO 
AB report’s criticisms of the regulation in dispute was that the certification 
requirement was being applied unfairly, so that shrimp caught with the use of TEDs 
were banned from import to the US, if the vessels that caught them came from 
uncertified nations.43 To respond to this problem, the US adopted a batch-by-batch 
approach. Commenting on this dispute, Scott wrote:  
It may be anticipated that measures premised upon a batch-by-batch 
approach, as distinguished from an overall national policy based approach, 
may have a higher chance of success in the years to come.44 
However, Bernazani suggested this weakened the regulation for several 
reasons. First, it encouraged individual producers to export to other markets that did 
not have similarly restrictive regulation. Second, it provided an incentive to introduce 
TED devices solely to vessels that were exporting to the United States, rather than a 
nation’s fleet at large. Third, it created difficulties in enforcement, as there was a 
strong incentive to falsify the certificate stating that a TED had been used, particularly 
                                                
41 RED, above n. 13, at Preamble para 73. 
42 Notice of Proposed Revisions to Guidelines for the Revision of Section 609 of Public Law 101-162 
Relating to the Protection of Sea Turtles in Shrimp Trawl Fishing Operations, 64 US Federal Register 
14,482, 25 March 1999. 
43 US – Shrimp, above n. 37, at para. 165. 
44 J Scott, ‘On Kith and Kine (and Crustaceans): Trade and Environment in the EU and WTO’ in JHH 
Weiler (ed.), The EU, the WTO and NAFTA: Towards a Common Law of International Trade (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) 142. 
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as many exporting countries had endemic corruption. 45  These difficulties are 
potentially applicable to EU biofuels sustainability criteria as well.  
In theory, more flexible criteria can provide equivalent and equally rigorous 
means to achieve a certain standard. In reality, introducing more flexibility likely does 
weaken the standard to some extent. The underlying driver for introducing 
flexibilities is to reduce the cost and burden of complying with the criteria. If a 
criterion is drafted in such a way as to allow for multiple different strategies of 
implementation, or if it is designated as a non-binding requirement, it will be more 
likely to avoid trade conflict. 
As well as producing a definition of biodiverse grasslands, the EU is debating 
the introduction of stricter requirements having to do with soil, water, air, and indirect 
land use change. In both cases, it will be necessary to craft language that takes into 
account the diversity of local conditions. Major financial and political interests may 
be caught up in this process. Given that the EU wants to avoid a dispute, it is easy to 
see in general terms how the concept of flexibility might translate into weakening 
standards to accommodate trade partners.  
 
C. The EU criteria’s risk: NPR PPMs 
In their 2001 analysis of the EU Cosmetics Directive, which restricted ingredients 
permitted in cosmetics and prohibited animal testing, De Búrca and Scott provided an 
analysis of the influence of WTO law on EU legislation.46 The authors documented 
the measures the EU had taken to ensure WTO compliance. These included basing 
regulations on a batch-by-batch rather than country-wide basis. Further, the EC 
emphasized that they were attempting to develop internationally-acceptable 
alternative scientific methods to animal testing and negotiating with OECD members 
to apply these methods more globally.47 These elements parallel the EC’s efforts in 
the RED.  
However, there is an important difference. When crafting the Cosmetics 
Directive, the EC assumed that relying upon a process-based distinction between 
products in order to justify regulatory distinctions would automatically violate WTO 
                                                
45 J Bernazani, ‘The Eagle, The Turtle, The Shrimp and the WTO: Implications for the Future of 
Environmental Trade Measures’ (2000) 15(1 and 2) Connecticut Journal of International Law 207, 
234. 
46 De Búrca and Scott, above n. 40, at 6 – 11.  
47 Ibid at 10. 
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rules. The WTO-legality of trade-restrictive regulations that distinguish products 
based upon their production methods, or PPMs in WTO parlance, is a key question. 
This is a significant controversy as environmental regulations, including biofuels 
sustainability criteria, often focus on how a product is produced.  
PPMs are sometimes split into the categories of product-related and non-
product-related (‘NPR’). The former, while physically invisible, have to do with a 
product’s quality or functionality. It might be argued that the sustainability criteria’s 
emissions savings requirements are product-related PPMs, as they define the biofuels’ 
qualification as a viable alternative fuel source. Also, emissions levels can be linked 
to physical inputs, eg feedstock. However, they take into account the entire life cycle 
of the fuel, including the efficiency of conversion into fuel, how the production plant 
was powered, and the use of by-products in manufacture, which are invisible in the 
final product. Therefore their designation as product or non-product related is a gray 
area.  
On the other hand, land-use requirements such as restrictions on growing 
biofuels in highly biodiverse areas are clearly NPR PPMs. They have to do with the 
ecosystem characteristics where biofuels are grown. These PPMs have been 
especially controversial as they do not define product specifications but instead 
transmit (or impose) the values of the importing country onto foreign producers. Palm 
oil produced in such a way that orangutans lost habitat, for example, will be virtually 
identical to palm oil produced in accordance with the EU criteria’s biodiversity 
criteria.  
The AB has never directly addressed the legality of NPR PPMs based upon 
how a product is produced. The EU assumed in 2001 that different regulatory 
treatment of cosmetics must be based upon physical differences between products. 
Therefore, from a WTO perspective it would be impermissible for the EU to 
distinguish between imported cosmetics tested on animals and domestic cosmetics 
that had not been tested on animals, but were identical in all other respects, as this 
would violate Article III(4), and could probably not be justified under Article XX. 
The authors pointed out that this assumption on the part of the EC was not necessarily 
correct; however, there was no clear guidance in existing disputes and their 
conclusion was supported by unadopted WTO jurisprudence.48  
                                                
48 De Búrca and Scott, above n. 40, at 8 – 9. 
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EU biofuels sustainability criteria, on the other hand, are based upon the 
assumption that such process-based distinctions do not automatically violate WTO 
law. Removing NPR PPMs is an example of a form of regulatory chill that the EU 
adopted in 2001 but resisted in 2009. This evolution is significant. As a result, one of 
the most interesting questions that would arise in a dispute about the sustainability 
criteria has to do with the legal interpretation of legitimacy of process-based 
distinctions.  
 
D.  Regulatory complexity 
i. Food versus fuel 
It is important to stress that WTO law is not the only pressure exerted against 
extensive sustainability regulations. Regulations must be realistic for domestic 
producers to implement, as well. Cumbersome regulation is likely to prompt 
complaint from both domestic and foreign producers.  
Indeed, two of the most serious problems with expansion in biofuels 
production are extremely complex to address through regulation. Perhaps the most 
well-publicized is biofuels displacing food crops.49 The difficulty is that a requirement 
to monitor biofuels’ impacts on food prices introduces a broad economic calculation 
into a set of regulations enforced on a producer-by-producer basis. Further, the 
calculation may involve multiple countries, and this is difficult to reconcile with the 
WTO’s emphasis on national regulation.  
On the other hand, not all regulatory bodies have shied away from this 
problem. One example is the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (‘RSB’), which has 
formulated an international, voluntary set of sustainability standards. As with the EU 
criteria, they are not connected with the production conditions of any specific supply 
chain, but represent broad principles for sustainability. The EU has approved the RSB 
criteria as a recognized voluntary scheme, so that if producers adhere to these criteria, 
they also qualify for the EU criteria.50  
The RSB criteria acknowledge the limitations of the producer-by-producer 
approach to evaluating complex issues like the food versus fuel problem ‘since these 
macro-level impacts are likely to be beyond the control of the individual farmer or 
                                                
49 A Chakrabortty; E Rosenthal, above n. 10. 
50 RSB Press Release, ‘RSB Recognised by the European Union as Proof of Compliance with the 
Renewable Energy Directive!’ 19 July 2011.  
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biofuels producer seeking certification.’ In response, they state that ‘the criteria…aim 
to address only the direct activities that farmers and producers can undertake to 
prevent unintended consequences from biofuel production. The Steering Board 
recognizes that efforts to minimize these risks should also be taken by governments in 
their policies that affect land use, land protection, biofuel promotion, and food 
security, even beyond their national borders.’51  
The RSB acknowledged the problem of individual versus macro effects 
without allowing it to prevent the development of a standard. Specifically, if biofuels 
may impact upon food supply, they must meet Food Security Assessment Guidelines. 
While these requirements do not address all of the problems of food versus fuel, 
notably the impact of biofuels on food prices, they address the problem at the level of 
individual operators.  
RSB standards include guidelines about land rights, to ensure that people are 
not displaced in order to grow biofuels. There are also a number of criteria that deal 
with other social welfare impacts of biofuels, including principles on human and labor 
rights, rural and social development, local food security and land rights. These 
principles make consideration of social welfare impacts essential for biofuels to be 
considered sustainable. While this is a good example of stricter criteria, these are 
applied on a voluntary basis and thus are not subject to WTO law.  
ii. Indirect Land Use Change 
A second complex problem is that of Indirect Land Use Change (‘ILUC’). This issue 
forms the focus of the next chapter. ILUC refers to increased biofuels production 
displacing crops into other areas, including into the ecosystems that the RED sets out 
to protect. This can result in increased carbon dioxide emissions from biofuels 
production, undermining the RED’s fundamental purpose. In the RED, the EC 
committed to submitting a report to the Parliament and to the Council about how to 
incorporate methodologies to measure ILUC, specifying the deadline of 31 December 
2010.52 Though they outlined policy options in a report, EU bodies still have not 
agreed on a solution.  
                                                
51 RSB Principles and Criteria for Sustainable Biofuel Production, Version 2.0,  
 Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne RSB-STD-01-001 
(Version 2.0) RSB Principles and Criteria 05/11/2010, 4. 
52 RED, above n. 13, at para. 19(6); Preamble para 85. 
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The ILUC example reveals the interconnectedness of complexity and 
regulatory chill. Introducing complex burdens heightens the likelihood of a WTO 
dispute. For example, some countries have a higher proportion of high carbon lands. 
Singling out certain biofuels or feedstocks that contribute more to ILUC, one option 
the EU is considering, may be seen to discriminate against these countries. In general, 
trade-restrictive regulation that rests upon complex relationships between multiple 
variables seems more likely to prompt WTO conflict. This is a central theme of the 
next chapter.   
 
3. ‘Sustainability’ as a regulatory concept 
 
A. Sustainability and regulatory chill 
By revising their regulation to make it more WTO-compatible, the EU showed 
implicit deference to its WTO law commitments. This was based on their own 
evaluation of their WTO obligations. Yet, it is also important to consider how the 
WTO dispute settlement bodies would strike the balance if EU criteria came into 
conflict with WTO law. Thus, the previous section focused on the influence of the 
WTO on the development of the criteria. This second section focuses on the concept 
of sustainability, what type of regulation it is likely to inspire, and what issues this 
might raise in the context of dispute settlement.  
In assessing mutual supportiveness between sustainable development and 
trade liberalization, it is particularly significant to highlight legal issues that are 
closely linked to the nature of the concept itself. The question arises of whether 
‘sustainability’ regulation is more likely to violate WTO law, or to give rise to trade 
concerns that lead to regulatory chill. In fact this is likely. Some of sustainability’s 
core characteristics are complexity and conceptual breadth. This breadth makes it 
invasive and also amorphous. Regulating for ‘sustainability’ suggests consideration of 
more than one thematic area; otherwise a more specific term would be used. This is 
certainly true of the EU criteria, which address several subject areas. Even with the 
simplification of the concept of ‘sustainability’ the EU criteria present, they still have 
a deep regulatory reach.  
This is illustrated by comparing the criteria with other environmental and 
public health regulations that the AB has considered in past disputes under Article 
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XX. In US – Shrimp, the regulation in dispute involved one regulatory measure, 
installing devices on fishing nets, which achieved the specific goal of preventing 
bycatch of an endangered species. In EC – Asbestos, the regulation applied only to 
one particular building material: carcinogenic asbestos. Brazil – Tyres also dealt with 
a product ban on one product, retreaded tyres. In contrast, biofuels sustainability 
criteria pursue biodiversity conservation, climate change prevention and 
‘sustainability’, more broadly defined goals. Therefore, the cause and effect 
relationship between the criteria and their goals is more complex. From a trade 
perspective, this poses significant obstacles. It is difficult to establish a rigorous 
justification for such broad-reaching regulation solely based on their contribution to 
the abstract concept of sustainability.  
 
B. A dispute on sustainability regulation 
There has never been a WTO dispute about regulations that have sustainability as 
their specific goal or organizing principle. This is one reason why the self-proclaimed 
‘most comprehensive and advanced binding sustainability scheme of its kind 
anywhere in the world’ forms an important case study.53 As described in the previous 
chapter, arguably the most influential use of the term sustainable development in 
dispute settlement is in the Preamble of the WTO’s founding agreement, which 
provides the undefined potential for influence in this context. In US – Shrimp, the 
Preamble was mentioned specifically in reference to the interpretation of Article 
XX(g)’s ‘exhaustible natural resources.’ 
Particularly as these criteria set out to achieve sustainability, the Preamble 
might help to provide a legal basis for accepting the criteria. It provides conceptual 
support for sustainable development, but it is non-binding: a principle rather than a 
rule. The AB may take it into account when and how they choose. Thus, it is difficult 
to characterize its influence in general terms. Another way of approaching the 
question of the legal weight of sustainable development is through the GATT Article 
XX and TBT 2.2 ‘necessity’ tests. However, before undertaking this analysis, it is 
necessary to address the issue of whether the TBT Agreement is applicable to biofuels 
sustainability criteria. 
 
                                                
53 Communication from the Commission on the practical implementation of the EU biofuels and 
bioliquids sustainability scheme and on counting rules for biofuels, OJ 19.6.2010 C 160/8, Section 1. 
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C. Applicability of the TBT Agreement to EU Biofuels Sustainability Criteria 
The TBT Annex 1.1 states that a technical regulation is a: 
Document which lays down product characteristics or their related processes 
and production methods, including the applicable administrative provisions, 
with which compliance is mandatory. It may also include or deal exclusively 
with terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method.54  
Whether EU biofuels sustainability criteria are technical regulations under the TBT is 
somewhat of an open question. The issue has attracted controversy among WTO 
Member States. Under the TBT Agreement, WTO Member States must notify other 
Members of any technical regulation that does not simply reflect a relevant 
international standard. While the EU notified other Members of its intent to introduce 
regulations specifying renewable energy targets, they neglected to include biofuels 
sustainability criteria, as they did not believe the TBT Agreement was applicable.55 In 
response to the notification, Australia submitted a request for information about 
several aspects of the regulation, focusing on the sustainability requirements for 
biofuels.56 Australia’s request called into question the EU’s conclusion that the TBT 
Agreement did not apply.  
To evaluate the applicability of the TBT, the dispute settlement bodies in EC – 
Asbestos set out a three-tier test that expands upon the definition of a technical 
regulation laid out in TBT Agreement’s Annex 1.1. This test was applied in all three 
recent TBT disputes: 
... First, the document must apply to an identifiable product or group of 
products. The identifiable product or group of products need not, however, be 
expressly identified in the document. Second, the document must lay down one 
or more characteristics of the product. These product characteristics may be 
intrinsic, or they may be related to the product.  They may be prescribed or 
imposed in either a positive or a negative form.  Third, compliance with the 
product characteristics must be mandatory."57 
When applying the first component of the test, there is little ambiguity: the Directive 
itself clearly identifies the products as biofuels and bioliquids. The second and third 
components are less clear.  
                                                
54 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’), Annex 1.1, above n. 15, at 137. 
55 World Trade Organization, Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, 11 June 2008, 
G/TBT/N/EEC/200.  
56 TBT notification G/TBT/N/EEC/200, Proposal for a Directive on the promotion of the use of energy 
from renewable sources, Comments from Australia, 3 October 2008.  
57 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
Asbestos-Containing Products (EC-Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, paras. 66-
70. 
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There has been some uncertainty about whether TBT 2.1 applies to NPR 
PPMs. In their analysis of TBT applicability, Mitchell and Tran58 questioned the 
sustainability criteria’s adherence on this basis. Though Annex 1.1 specifies ‘related 
process and production methods’, they pointed out that this may only refer to those 
that influence product characteristics. They argued that the negotiating history of the 
TBT Agreement, and the lack of precedent, suggests that a sustainability regulation 
based upon NPR PPMs would not be considered as a ‘product characteristic’. Thus, 
they concluded that the TBT Agreement would probably not apply to the land-use 
based aspects of the criteria; on the other hand, emissions-related criteria would fall 
within the definition of Annex 1.1.59 In other words, while PPMs are permissible, 
NPR PPMs (based upon the process of production, and invisible in the final product) 
are not.  
With respect to the third component, whether regulations are mandatory, some 
interpretation is also required. Technically, the regulations are voluntary. They 
stipulate minimum criteria that must be met for biofuels to qualify for EU price 
supports, and to count toward the 10 per cent renewable energy target, but they do not 
prevent imports of non-compliant biofuels. The EU has suggested that the TBT 
Agreement is not applicable because the criteria are voluntary,60 a point which formed 
a key component of their response to Australia’s request for information.61  
The US – Tuna II TBT dispute provides a precedent that refutes both of these 
arguments, suggesting that the TBT Agreement would apply to biofuels sustainability 
criteria. This dispute concerned a NPR PPM-measure: a label for dolphin-safe tuna 
that could only be applied if the tuna were caught without setting on dolphins. The 
AB Report stated that making a determination about whether the TBT Agreement 
applies depended upon the measure’s particular circumstances and features.62 They 
                                                
58 A Mitchell and C Tran, ‘The Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive with the WTO 
Agreements’, Georgetown Law Faculty Working Papers, Georgetown Business, Economics and 
Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 1485549, October 2009, 10 – 11.  
59 Ibid at 11.   
60 A Lendle and M Schaus, ‘The EU’s Renewable Energy Directive – consistent with WTO rules?’ 
Trade Law Clinic 2010, Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Geneva, 15, 
http://graduateinstitute.ch/ctei/home/working_papers.html (visited 15 May 2012). 
61 Reply from the EC TBT Enquiry Point to Questions Received from Australia Relating to 
Notification G/TBT/N/EEC/200, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources. 
62 WTO Appellate Body Report on United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing 
and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II), WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012, at para. 
190. 
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did not specifically raise the question of whether product characteristics included 
those based upon PPMs. However, their determination that the TBT Agreement was 
applicable achieved this clarification.  
The Panel’s description of the relevance of the TBT Agreement, which the AB 
did not overrule, focused on the fact that the measure in dispute was a labelling 
requirement as specified in the second sentence of Annex 1.1. They then concluded 
that it did have to do with a product, process or production method.63 Biofuels 
sustainability requirements are not, strictly speaking, a labelling requirement; thus, the 
argumentation would differ slightly. However, this distinction is likely not that 
significant. The key question is whether NPR PPMs can be considered product 
characteristics; this dispute demonstrates that there is no inherent obstacle.  
Further, at the centre of the US – Tuna II dispute was a measure that was 
clearly voluntary. Producers could choose whether to comply with the criteria for the 
‘dolphin safe’ label. Yet US Federal law established this criteria. As there were no 
legal alternative definitions on the US market, the AB considered the requirement to 
be mandatory.64  
The dolphin-safe label could be considered even more ‘voluntary’ than the 
sustainability criteria. The only mandatory aspect of the dolphin-safe label was its 
minimum compliance criteria. The EU sustainability criteria also establish mandatory 
minimum compliance criteria. Additionally, the RED contains another mandatory 
component: a legal provision that 10 per cent of energy be sourced from renewable 
sources. The EU does not proscribe the means by which Member States should 
achieve this target; nonetheless it is binding. On this basis, the US – Tuna II precedent 
suggests that biofuels sustainability criteria certainly would be considered de facto 
mandatory.  The conclusion that the TBT Agreement applies forms the basis for the 
subsequent analysis.  
 
D. GATT Article XX/TBT Article 2.2 and the necessity test 
i. Article XX 
                                                
63 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II), WT/DS381/R, adopted 15 September 2011, at paras. 7.74, 
7.76 and 7.79. 
64 US – Tuna II, above n. 62, at para. 199. 
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The terms ‘necessary’ and ‘relating to’ occur in all of the Article XX subparagraphs 
quoted above, and have to do with the relationship between the measure in dispute 
and the objective it pursues. This chapter will focus primarily on the concept of 
‘necessity’. Article XX provides an exception to the GATT when a measure pursues 
certain public policy objectives recognized as vital by all WTO Members. Yet some 
tension arises as the evaluation of Article XX compliance depends on the judgment of 
the dispute settlement bodies. Empowering them to make such determinations has 
been politically sensitive.65 Thus, the interpretation of ‘necessary’ raises the larger 
issue of the regulatory freedom that the WTO system should provide. The 
fundamental issue is: who decides what is ‘necessary’?  
GATT Panels historically aimed to resolve this tension by making clear that 
the level of regulation a Member State wished to achieve would be respected, as long 
as they achieved this goal by the least GATT-inconsistent means reasonably 
available. 66  This approach avoids questioning the validity of a government’s 
regulatory goal, but instead focuses on the means by which it is achieved. However, 
maintaining deference to the desired level of enforcement while at the same time 
questioning the approach to achieving this level is difficult. Past disputes demonstrate 
that the dispute settlement bodies have indeed reformulated the desired level of 
protection, or second-guessed a Member State’s intention in setting that level, in the 
process of evaluating the measure’s trade-restrictiveness.  
In the GATT dispute Thailand – Cigarettes,67 Thailand argued that their 
import ban on cigarettes was necessary to protect human health, and therefore 
justified under Article XX(b), which deals with measures necessary to protect human 
life or health. Thailand’s goal was to reduce levels of smoking. The Panel found that 
other, GATT-consistent measures were reasonably available to achieve this goal, 
principally banning cigarette advertisements.68 However, Thailand had stated clearly 
that banning advertising would be ineffective. To prove this point, they referred the 
Panel to the World Health Organization, which supported Thailand’s conclusion that 
                                                
65 A Desmedt, ‘Proportionality in WTO Law’ (2001) 4(3) Journal of International Economic Law, 441 
– 480. 
66 United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, BISD 365/345, adopted 7 November 1989, 
para. 5.26, articulates this approach, which was also applied in Thailand – Restrictions on Importation 
of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes (Thailand – Cigarettes), BISD 37S/200, adopted 7 November 
1990, and WTO Appellate Body Report on United States – Standards for Reformulated and 
Conventional Gasoline (US-Gasoline), WT/DS2/AB/R, adopted 29 April 1996. 
67 Thailand – Cigarettes, ibid. 
68 Ibid at para. 78. 
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opening the market to imported cigarettes would likely lead to increased levels of 
smoking, even if advertising were banned.69  
The Panel focused on the means by which the regulatory goal was achieved 
(an import ban), rather than challenging the legitimacy of the goal itself (reducing 
smoking). Nevertheless, the impact of the Panel’s recommendation was to second-
guess Thailand’s judgment that banning advertising would be ineffective. This 
example demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining deference while at the same time 
reducing the trade-restrictiveness of the approach.  
The 2000 dispute Korea – Beef also illustrates the difficulty. The dispute 
focused on Korea’s ‘dual retail system’ for beef, in which imported and domestic beef 
were sold in separate stores. Korea stated that this system fell under the purview of 
Article XX(d), which deals with ‘the prevention of deceptive practices’.70 Korea 
stated that its intent in separating domestic and imported beef was to eliminate the 
deceptive practice of consumer fraud resulting from the mislabelling of imported beef 
as domestic, and vice-versa. The AB argued that, if their intent was to do this, they 
should have instituted a total ban on imports of beef. Therefore, the AB concluded 
that their regulatory intent must have been considerably reducing fraud; they could 
achieve this through less trade restrictive means.71  
Unlike in Thailand – Cigarettes, the AB approach was not to propose 
alternate, less trade-restrictive means to their regulatory goal, which implicitly 
lowered the desired level of regulation. They recognized that Korea was entitled to set 
the level of regulation it desired, but argued that it did not actually intend this level.72  
In the dispute, the AB introduced a new approach to ‘necessity’: a test that 
consisted of ‘weighing and balancing’ different elements. The first element was ‘the 
relative importance of the common interests or values that the law or regulation to be 
enforced is intended to protect’, so that ‘the more vital or important those common 
interests or values are, the easier it would be to accept as ‘necessary’ a measure 
designed as an enforcement instrument.’73 
The latter two elements were more or less equivalent to the previously 
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established approach. The first was an evaluation of the extent to which the trade-
restrictive measure contributed to the realization of the ends pursued; the second was 
whether less trade-restrictive means were reasonably available to achieve the same 
goal. The AB also set out a stronger emphasis on the concept of balancing with regard 
to these elements, stating that a measure with ‘a relatively slight impact on imported 
products might more easily be considered ‘necessary’ than a measure with intense or 
broader restrictive effects.’74  
The two established components of the necessity test relate more directly to 
the self-evident question of whether the measure in dispute is ‘necessary’ to achieve 
the objective in question. The three-part necessity test, however, introduced a new 
dimension, which expanded the purview of the judicial review. The new element 
formalized a consideration of the importance of the value being pursued. It required a 
wider degree of questioning, arguably falling outside the wording of the necessity test 
itself, which is focused on the measure’s contribution to a goal.75 Allowing Member 
States to determine the level of protection, while simultaneously sitting in judgment 
of the regulatory values they are trying to achieve, seems contradictory. Further, the 
dispute settlement bodies may not have the necessary expertise to evaluate the 
importance of different regulatory objectives. The approach thus posed a deeper 
challenge to national sovereignty.  
Interestingly, however, though they introduced this component in Korea – 
Beef, the AB did not discuss how the importance (or lack thereof) of consumer fraud 
influenced their decision. Instead, they stated that this determination could be 
‘comprehended in the determination of whether…a less WTO-inconsistent measure is 
‘reasonably available’’.76 As previously described, their decision thus first focused on 
lowering Korea’s desired level of protection to ‘considerably reducing’ fraud. Once 
they had done this, they then established that less trade-restrictive measures were 
reasonably available to meet this lower level.  
This decision thus confusingly conflated the established GATT approach with 
the new approach the AB itself introduced. On the one hand, they introduced an 
element of weighing and balancing the importance of the value at stake. However, 
                                                
74 Ibid. 
75 See G Kapterian, ‘A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on Necessary’ (2010) 59(1) International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 91. 
76 Korea – Beef, AB Report, above n. 71, at para. 166. 
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they did not make an explicit conclusion about this, but based their decision on a 
more traditional analysis. This raises the question of why it was necessary to 
introduce this first variable, and whether and how it influenced their decision.  
They also carefully delimited the applicability of the evaluation of the 
importance of the value at stake, connecting it only to certain disputes, and limiting it 
to XX(d).77 However, the three-step ‘weighing and balancing’ approach was applied 
in future disputes, including the 2001 EC – Asbestos78 and the 2007 Brazil – Tyres,79 
in both cases under Article XX(b). In contrast to Korea – Beef, both did include a 
direct consideration of the value at stake, in both cases affirming its importance, with 
reference to international standards.80 In these disputes, at the same time as evaluating 
the legitimacy of the regulatory goals, the AB maintained its seemingly contradictory 
position that Member States have the right to determine the level of protection that 
they wish to achieve.81  
In EC – Asbestos, for example, the regulatory goal of France, the defending 
country, was to ‘halt’ the spread of asbestos-related health risks.82 The means for 
achieving this goal was an import ban. In this dispute, the AB cited the World Health 
Organization to affirm the fact that asbestos was harmful to human health, and also 
supported the legitimacy of the import ban.  
The EC had followed the approach that the AB stated would have been 
logically consistent in Korea – Beef: an import ban. Following the AB’s reasoning, 
this would have been the only measure consistent with the aim of complete 
elimination of consumer fraud. This logic might be extended to France’s import ban 
on asbestos. Indeed, the AB in EC – Asbestos found that France’s import ban was 
consistent with their aim of halting asbestos-related health risks. The underlying 
supposition is that, when a country desires a high level of protection against a harm 
associated with a traded good, they must institute a severely trade-restrictive measure. 
This remains value-neutral: the gravity of the harm is based solely on a government’s 
judgment.  
                                                
77 Ibid at para. 162. 
78 EC – Asbestos, above n. 57. 
79 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – 
Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007, paras. 139-143, 156. 
80 EC – Asbestos, above n. 57, at para. 168; Brazil – Tyres, ibid at paras. 21, 121.  
81 Korea – Beef, AB Report, above n. 71, at paras. 178-180; EC – Asbestos, above n. 57, at para. 168; 
Brazil – Tyres, above n. 79, at paras. 56 – 57, 65. 
82 As paraphrased by the AB, EC – Asbestos, above n. 57, at para. 168. 
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Following this logic, if Korea had instated an import ban on beef, their 
measure would have been consistent with their desired level of regulation, and 
therefore WTO-compliant. However, this supposition is logically circular. An import 
ban is far more trade-restrictive than Korea’s disputed approach of separating beef 
into different retail outlets. Considering that Korea produced and sold beef 
domestically (unlike France, which also had an asbestos ban at home), such a ban 
would constitute formal discrimination. The AB reasoned that Korea did not take an 
extremely WTO-illegal measure, not because it would be certain to give rise to a 
WTO dispute, but because they did not wish to eliminate fraud.  
One possible reason why an evaluation of the importance of the value at stake 
featured more explicitly in later disputes than in Korea – Beef is that the AB later 
agreed with this importance. Disagreeing with regulatory values confirms fears of 
WTO judicial activism, while affirming their importance shows the desired deference 
to national sovereignty, even if this determination is derived from international 
standards. If this is the case, the implicit reasoning might have been that negative 
trade impacts of Korea’s dual retail system outweighed their positive contribution to 
preventing consumer fraud, as it was not a compelling enough regulatory value to 
justify such restrictions. This could be contrasted with EC – Asbestos and Brazil – 
Tyres, in which the value in question was human health, which they found more 
compelling.  
This brief review serves to outline some questions of importance in a dispute 
on sustainability regulations: what is the precise regulatory intent, how well do the 
regulations fulfil this intent, and what is the importance of the value at stake? These 
disputes demonstrate the difficulty of allowing national regulatory discretion to 
achieve non-trade goals whilst maintaining WTO obligations. They also demonstrate 
that the AB’s determination of the importance of the value at stake is a controversial 
factor, which has both explicit and also perhaps implicit influence in the their 
deliberation of a dispute.  
ii. TBT 2.2 
TBT 2.2 reads: 
Members shall ensure that technical regulations are not prepared, adopted or 
applied with a view to or with the effect of creating unnecessary obstacles to 
international trade. For this purpose, technical regulations shall not be more 
trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account 
of the risks non-fulfilment would create. Such legitimate objectives are, inter 
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alia: national security requirements; the prevention of deceptive practices; 
protection of human health or safety, animal or plant life or health, or the 
environment. In assessing such risks, relevant elements of consideration are, 
inter alia: available scientific and technical information, related processing 
technology or intended end-uses of products.83 
While GATT Article XX is an exception, TBT 2.2 is part of an integrated 
Agreement. This is an important distinction. If a measure conformed with GATT 
Articles I or III(4), there would be no violation, and thus no need to apply the 
exception of Article XX. On the other hand, a measure may comply with TBT 2.2 and 
still violate TBT 2.1. Moving beyond the rule/exception model of the GATT places 
more weight on the importance of legitimate policy goals as a fundamental 
component of determining a violation. However, this structure extends the influence 
of the provision to include measures that comply with the NTP: all technical measures 
must be the least trade-restrictive necessary to fulfil a legitimate objective. In this 
sense, the TBT Agreement is more intrusive with respect to domestic regulatory 
autonomy.84 
Also, while Article XX contains a limited and exhaustive list of subparagraphs 
identifying negotiated exceptions, TBT 2.2 covers any ‘legitimate objective’. The AB 
stated in US – Tuna II that they must independently assess a Member State’s 
regulatory objectives, rather than taking their stated intent at face value.85 The 
interpretation of this obligation contains parallel elements to the Article XX ‘necessity 
test’. Affirming these parallels, the Panel in US – Clove Cigarettes relied upon 
jurisprudence under Article XX(b) when evaluating a TBT 2.2 dispute. They justified 
their position based upon similarities in wording between the TBT Agreement’s 
Preamble and Article XX, and a negotiation history which suggested that the TBT 
Agreement was a development of the GATT.86 This ruling was not appealed.  
In US – Tuna II, the AB further elaborated on the TBT necessity test:  
In the context of Article 2.2, the assessment of ‘necessity’ involves a relational 
analysis of the trade-restrictiveness of the technical regulation, the degree of 
contribution that it makes to the achievement of a legitimate objective, and the 
risks non-fulfilment would create.87 
                                                
83 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’), Article 2.2, above n. 15, at 122.  
84 M Ming Du, ‘Domestic Regulatory Autonomy under the TBT Agreement: from Non-Discrimination 
to Harmonization’, (2007) 6 (2) Chinese Journal of International Law 269 – 306, 
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85 US – Tuna II, above n. 62, para. 314. 
86 US – Tuna II, above n. 63, at paras. 7.357 – 7.361. 
87 US – Tuna II, above n. 62, at para. 318. 
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The AB further stated that there should be ‘an element of weighing and balancing’ in 
this determination, and that the AB should consider whether a reasonably available 
less trade-restrictive measure would make an equivalent contribution to the legitimate 
objective.88 Thus this interpretation of the TBT necessity test includes the same 
elements as the necessity test under Article XX, except that rather than the importance 
of the value at stake the AB considers the risk of non-fulfilment.  
 
E.  Relevance of the XX subparagraphs/TBT 2.2 to labour standards 
One way to evaluate the EU criteria as ‘sustainability’ regulation is to consider 
hypothetical ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute focusing on non-binding criteria, but imagining 
it was binding. As noted, labour standards were included in the criteria, but only 
through requiring trade partners to belong to relevant international conventions like 
the International Labour Organization. The case for binding criteria has been argued. 
For example, the Swiss Confederation released an issue paper that included this 
analysis: 
Biofuels have the potential to create jobs in rural areas, but a large share of 
these jobs will only be for low-skilled seasonal agricultural workers. These 
workers, who are often migrants, are especially vulnerable. There are still too 
many reports of forced labor, child labor and dangerous working conditions 
in sugarcane fields and processing facilities…. Social criteria including better 
working conditions should be a component of the standards for biofuel 
production and trade. 89 
There was no reason to believe this was identified in the EU as one of the 
more urgent concerns; for example, the Parliament did not include labour standards in 
their draft criteria. Yet, precisely because it is somewhat of an outlier, it makes a 
useful hypothetical example. A defence of labour standards on the part of the EU 
raises particular questions about the notion of ‘sustainability’ regulations: what 
territory they cover, and on what basis these regulatory decisions are justified.  
While they are not listed as a specific Article XX exception, labour standards 
fall within the purview of several of the existing subparagraphs listed above, 
including (a), (b), (d) and (e). Regarding Article XX(a), on public morals, precedent 
suggests that the concept is interpreted broadly in the WTO context. 90 Demonstrating 
                                                
88 Ibid at para. 321. 
89 ‘Issue Paper: Biofuels, Opportunity or Threat to the Poor’, Swiss Agency for Cooperation and 
Development – Natural Resources and Environment Division, Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft, July 
2007, 9. 
90 WTO Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of 
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the EC’s own perception of the wide applicability of the concept of public morals, the 
Renewable Energy Directive itself states that ‘the consumers in the Community 
would… find it morally unacceptable that their increased use of biofuels…could have 
the effect of destroying biodiverse lands.’91 Given the EC’s attention to WTO law 
while crafting the RED, this statement seems to invoke a defence under Article 
XX(a). 92  Yet, if morality justifies biodiversity preservation, certainly it is as 
applicable to labour standards.  
Another obvious defence for labour standards is Article XX(b), on human life 
or health. This subparagraph is not specifically limited to domestic impacts, nor does 
it preclude a consideration of labour standards being the cause.93  
Article XX(d), which deals with measures that prevent deceptive practices, is 
also relevant, in the context of consumer perceptions. If biofuels are labelled as 
sustainable, this might suggest to consumers that they incorporate labour standards. 
Article XX(e) deals with measures relating to prison labour, a requirement which 
might provide scope for regulations to prevent the worst of the worst labour 
conditions. 
There would also be scope for the inclusion of social welfare-related 
objectives in the TBT Agreement’s Article 2.2, a provision which contains similar 
elements to Article XX’s ‘necessity’ test. As TBT 2.2 simply indicates that the policy 
objectives behind a measure must be ‘legitimate’, there is no prohibition against 
including labour standards.  
 
F.  Applying the necessity test: determining regulatory intent 
All of the above Article XX subparagraphs as well as TBT 2.2 contain the term 
‘necessary’. A core component of determining ‘necessity’ under both Article XX and 
TBT 2.2 is through evaluating the contribution of the measure to the ends pursued. 
One possible approach would be for the EU to argue that high labour standards are an 
integral component of the concept or definition of sustainability, its stated regulatory 
                                                                                                                                      
Gambling and Betting Services (US – Gambling), WT/DS285/AB/R, adopted 7 April 2005, paras. 296-
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goal. As the EU is extending financial support to biofuels producers, and creating a 
larger market, consumers may reasonably assume a greater interest in production 
conditions. Creating sustainability criteria suggests that negative impacts have been 
mitigated.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, common international law definitions of 
sustainable development emphasize three components, including social welfare.94 
Further, previously quoted EU statements on sustainable development include a 
recognition of social welfare issues. Along these lines, it could be argued that labour 
standards are fundamental aspect of social welfare, and thus must be represented.  
The US – Tuna II dispute provides useful comparative example. In this 
dispute, in the context of TBT 2.2, the dispute settlement bodies identified consumer 
information as one of the two major objectives of the measure. Specifically, 
consumers should not be misled or deceived about whether dolphins were adversely 
affected by tuna products. The US ‘dolphin safe’ label, though voluntary, was backed 
by a US law stipulating certain requirements, including that tuna within the Eastern 
Tropical Pacific (‘ETP’) could not be caught by setting on dolphins. The AB 
compared the US ‘dolphin safe’ requirement with an international voluntary label 
which did not contain this specification. The AB concluded that the US label better 
contributed to its consumer information objective as the international label may have 
allowed more harm to dolphins.95 Similarly, the EU might argue that consumers 
would be deceived if their definition of ‘sustainability’ did not include labour 
standards.  
Indeed, a joint NGO letter critiqued the EU’s omission of social welfare 
criteria on these grounds. The letter, signed by representatives of fifteen global 
organizations working on social and environmental issues, including Friends of the 
Earth, Bread for the World and Wetlands International, stated that: 
The Commission’s proposals only specify criteria for ‘environmental’ 
sustainability, despite the widely recognised Brundtland [international law] 
definition that includes environmental, social and economic components. The 
draft text does not provide any safeguards to protect people, particularly in 
the Global South, from the negative impacts of biofuel production. We believe 
that the omission of social criteria also contradicts EU policy as set out in the 
                                                
94 See, eg, Plan of Implementation (2002) United Nations, World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
at I. Introduction, para. 2, 
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95 US – Tuna II, above n. 62, at para. 324. 
 104 
context of promoting sustainability and social rights, e.g. in Council 
Regulation (EC) No 980/2005 of 27 June 2005 [on the EU’s generalized tariff 
preferences]. Therefore, by failing to include social criteria, the Commission’s 
proposals inevitably fall short of the member states’ requirements.96 
More generally, from a WTO perspective, it is significant to understand 
whether social welfare is part of the definition of sustainable development, 
particularly as it is a WTO treaty term. If it is integral to sustainable development, 
then, via the term’s inclusion in the Preamble, this could provide a source of 
institutional support for labour standards. Sharpening the definition would also mean 
that such omissions would better stand out.  
Yet the interpretation of what constitutes ‘social welfare’ and how it balances 
with sustainable development’s other pillars will vary vastly between WTO Members, 
and seems difficult to translate into specific shared guidelines. Developing countries 
in particular have resisted the range of trade-restrictive regulations that might be 
justified in the name of sustainability, arguing that they should not be forced to make 
sacrifices to solve problems they did not create.97 In this regard, social welfare, and 
specifically labour standards, are a particularly controversial area, suggesting that the 
EU’s omission may in part reflect this broader institutional ambivalence.  
The concept of sustainability is so broad that it intensifies questions about 
deference. Can the EU effectively justify a regulation by stating that it forms a part of 
its interpretation of ‘sustainability’? If it did, it would provide a vast free zone for 
trade-restrictive regulations. This suggests that it is the term’s scope, and its 
implications for empowering regulation, that has limited its legal influence in the 
WTO more generally. 
Indeed, the breadth of sustainable development gives rise to particular legal 
issues in the context of EU biofuels sustainability criteria. One such issue is drawing 
the boundary of the term’s applicability. It seems difficult to justify the logical 
consistency of applying such regulations solely to biofuels. In Korea – Beef, the Panel 
pointed out that Korea did not apply its dual-retail system to other meat products, 
such as pork and seafood. Instead, these were regulated using less trade-restrictive 
means. They reasoned that, as these products were ‘like or at least similar’, this cast 
                                                
96 ‘Re: social standards for the sustainability criteria for biofuels’, Joint NGO letter to the ad hoc 
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97 See GP Sampson, The WTO and Sustainable Development (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 
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doubt on the necessity of applying such a trade restrictive approach solely to beef.98 
Similarly, the AB might contend that, if the EU really intended to regulate labour 
standards in biofuels production, the criteria should apply to all imports. It might be 
difficult to justify why labour standards are so crucial to biofuels production and not 
to other agricultural products, or products in general. On this basis, as in Korea – 
Beef, they could second guess the EU’s desired level of regulation. 
This points to the importance of discerning a more specialized regulatory 
intent. One way of doing this is to consult the RED, of which the sustainability 
criteria form just one part. The RED’s Preamble specifies that its general objective is 
to mitigate climate change.99 It also states that the development of renewable energy 
should be ‘closely linked to increased energy efficiency.’100 If the EU were to include 
biofuels that contribute to global warming, it would sabotage the RED’s purpose. 
Therefore, emissions-savings criteria are fundamental to the EU’s intent, as they 
prevent perverse impacts.  
Unlike emissions criteria, labour standards cannot be attributed so directly to 
the aim of the RED as a whole. Also, there is no WTO precedent for associating 
sustainable development with social welfare objectives. However, there is a precedent 
for the AB to associate sustainable development with species conservation, and to 
affirm the legitimacy of this regulatory goal. The AB cited the Preamble’s statement 
on sustainable development to justify a broad interpretation of Article XX(g)’s 
‘exhaustible natural resources’.101 While this does not exclude the association of 
sustainability with other regulatory objectives, it does prove that the AB considered 
biodiversity as part of sustainable development.  
Underlying the lack of precedent is widespread rejection among developing 
countries of labour standards as a unilateral basis for disciplining trade in the WTO 
framework. Given disagreement in the WTO, supporting unilateral labour standards 
may be a precedent that the AB would establish with caution. If the EU omission 
resulted not from conscious regulatory choices, but rather a chilling effect from WTO 
law, it should be subject to critique on these grounds. Yet, regardless of the EU’s 
                                                
98 Korea – Beef, above n. 71, at paras. 168-172. 
99 RED, above n. 13, at Preamble, paras. 1 – 2. 
100 Ibid at Preamble, para. 5.  
101 US – Shrimp, above n. 37, at paras. 152, 153, 155. 
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intent, evaluating their role in a potential dispute is still useful as it crystallizes some 
of the legal problems raised by the breadth of the concept. 
The necessity test under Article XX also requires considering the importance 
of the value, while under TBT 2.2 the AB must recognize the ‘legitimacy’ of the 
regulatory goal at stake. Under both the AB assesses whether other, less trade 
restrictive measures are reasonably available. Labour standards are internationally 
recognized as important. However, they are a broad-based goal. International 
standards help to affirm the importance of regulatory values, as they ensure that they 
stem from multilateral objectives. As yet, there are no such international agreements 
on labour standards that focus on biofuels, providing guidance on how the issue 
should be defined and addressed.  
Further, there is the question of how, exactly, the EU would develop and 
enforce specific guidelines on labour. The EU’s current approach is to ensure that 
their trade partners have signed up to relevant international agreements. It is also an 
approach that has minimal trade impacts, and is much less invasive than conditioning 
imports on meeting certain standards. Thus, this approach would be a less trade 
restrictive means to achieving the ends of respecting international labour standards. In 
summary, in the event of a clash of norms between EU and international standards, it 
seems unlikely that the regulation would be affirmed solely because it constituted the 
important value of sustainability. This provides an important reflection on the limits 
of sustainability as a legal concept, particularly those deriving from its conceptual 
breadth. 
 
G. Article XX/TBT 2.2 and existing sustainability criteria 
The RED has several core provisions. It stipulates that biofuels must represent 
significant (and rising) emissions savings when compared with fossil fuels. It 
identifies areas of high biodiversity: primary forest, nature protection areas and highly 
biodiverse grassland. It also identifies areas of high carbon stock: wetland, 
continuously forested areas, and peat land. It specifies that biofuels crops should not 
be grown in these areas. As documented, foreign biofuels producers have already 
raised concerns about the structure of the criteria. If sustainability criteria were found 
not in compliance with GATT or TBT 2.1, then the AB would consider their 
compliance with Article XX or TBT 2.2, respectively. 
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i. Article XX  
Sustainable development is not listed, per se, as an Article XX exception. The 
regulatory goals of the criteria would need to be adapted to existing subparagraphs. 
The most clearly relevant subparagraphs are Article XX(b) on measures ‘necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health’ and Article XX(g) on measures ‘relating 
to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.’ The first step is to determine the 
regulatory objective at stake and the applicability of the listed exceptions. The AB 
must then establish whether the specific requirements of the subparagraph have been 
met. Finally they evaluate the measure’s compliance with the chapeau.102  
a) Article XX(b)  
Both the emissions and the land use criteria have to do with the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or health. Emissions criteria aim to prevent climate change and its 
negative health impacts to all life; the same argument applies for the land-use criteria 
that prohibit biofuels being grown in areas of high carbon stock. Similarly, land-use 
criteria that aim to protect biodiversity equate with the protection of animal and plant 
life.  
Under the established approach, the AB would apply the ‘necessity’ test, 
evaluating the importance of the common value at stake, the contribution of the 
measure to the regulatory goal, and the reasonable availability of other less trade 
restrictive measures to achieve the same level of protection.  
Again, a preliminary issue is the extent to which the fact that the regulations 
pursue ‘sustainability’ would provide a compelling defence in this context, given the 
role of the concept as a treaty term. In Brazil – Tyres,103 the AB based their 
assessment of the importance of the value at stake on international agreements and 
international standards relevant to a particular issue in dispute. It is interesting to note 
that the international standards that justify sustainable development’s importance are 
not very targeted compared to some of the other goals represented by the Article XX 
exceptions. For example, in EC – Asbestos, the AB cited specific language in the 
World Health Organization about the product in dispute (asbestos).104  
                                                
102 ‘GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, paragraphs (b), (d), and 
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103 Brazil – Tyres, above n. 79, at paras. 21 and 121.  
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No major standard-setting bodies, such as the International Standards 
Organization, have formulated biofuels sustainability standards. Neither are there 
established international agreements. Broader agreements that deal with sustainability 
in general are not particularly helpful. For example, consulting the WSSD Plan of 
Implementation yields contradictory results. The text states both that sustainable 
development should be implemented, and also, that unilateral trade measures should 
be avoided.  
The more vague the relevant norms, the more subjective, and therefore 
controversial, value judgments of their importance will appear.105 For this reason, the 
EU might be better served by focusing on greenhouse gas emissions savings and 
biodiversity conservation as the aims of the criteria. These are both stated as goals in 
the RED’s Preamble.106 These international standards are more targeted than those 
that support ‘sustainability’. This suggests that, as in the case of labour standards 
considered above, sustainable development may not be particularly legally influential 
in this circumstance, due to the concept’s breadth and vagueness. 
In the second step of the necessity test, the AB evaluates the contribution of 
the measure to the achievement of these objectives. In this context, as in the labour 
standards example, the question may arise of why biofuels have been singled out for a 
particularly high standard. Yet the emissions criteria contribute significantly to the 
EU’s objectives by ensuring that the RED does not have a perverse impact on global 
warming. In this sense they are imperative. Biodiversity conservation does not seem 
as conceptually central in this sense, although there may be overlap in that the 
preservation of ecosystems identified in this criteria, such as primary forest, also 
reduces climate change. Therefore, as in the example of labour standards, the question 
may arise of how well particular components of the criteria contribute to the RED’s 
overall goals, irrespective of their contribution to the achievement of ‘sustainability’.  
If sustainability were to take on an independent legal weight in this context, it 
might assist in the justification of biodiversity criteria. There is already a proven 
association between biodiversity and sustainable development. In US – Shrimp, the 
AB called upon the Preamble to justify a broader interpretation of Article XX(g) to 
include biodiversity conservation. A similar defence might take place in this context.  
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When evaluating the reasonable availability of less trade-restrictive measures, 
the AB stated in Brazil – Tyres that an import ban might be considered necessary; 
however, a measure so severe would need to make a material, rather than marginal, 
contribution to the achievement of the objective.107 In other words, the contribution of 
the regulation to the achievement of the regulatory goal is weighed against its trade 
restrictiveness: the most restrictive measures must contribute the most.  
The EU has not put in place an import ban, so the criteria are not maximally 
trade restrictive. Their contribution to the EU’s objective seems safely more than 
‘marginal’. However, the criteria are more trade-restrictive than their formally 
voluntary status would imply. A less trade-restrictive approach would be more similar 
to the EU’s approach to social welfare criteria such as labour standards. It might be 
based upon trade partners having signed relevant international treaties, or having in 
place national regulation of sustainability impacts. The AB’s interpretation seems 
somewhat of an open question.  
b) Aricle XX(g) 
Both emissions and land use criteria can be seen as ‘relating to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources’. In US – Gasoline, the Panel agreed that clean air was 
an exhaustible natural resource.108 The EU could use a similar argument that a global 
environment free of catastrophic climate change is an exhaustible natural resource 
that ILUC criteria help to protect. With respect to the land-use criteria, the 
justification for protecting species endangered by agricultural conversion would 
parallel US – Shrimp.109  
The language of Article XX(g) differs from Article XX(g) in that instead of 
‘necessary’ measures, it deals with measures ‘relating to’ the regulatory goals. The 
difference between ‘necessary’ and ‘relating to’ is relevant when establishing the 
relationship between the measure at issue and the objective pursued. During the 
GATT era, ‘relating to’ was interpreted to mean ‘primarily aimed at’;110 more recent 
jurisprudence in US – Shrimp has supported this interpretation, further clarifying it to 
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– Gasoline), WT/DS2/R, adopted 29 January 1996, at para. 6.37. 
109 US – Shrimp, above n. 37, at para. 128. 
110 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring and Salmon 
(Canada – Herring and Salmon), L/6268, Adopted 22 March 1998, BISD 35S/98, para. 4.6. 
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mean a direct connection or substantial relationship.111 This is an easier condition to 
meet than those imposed by the necessity test. Reid has stated that ‘[t]his 
unquestionably amounts to a very light touch review of the exercise by a Member of 
its regulatory autonomy’.112  
Similar to ‘necessity’, the evaluation of ‘relating to’ has contained the 
elements of assessing the contribution of the measure to the regulatory goal, and also 
its trade-restrictiveness. The term has not been explicitly subjected to the first part of 
the balancing test: evaluating the importance of the interest or value at stake. The 
same questions may arise regarding the effectiveness with which the sustainability 
criteria will achieve the EU’s regulatory goals. Yet it is less rigorous to establish that 
the sustainability criteria have a direct connection or substantial relationship with 
these goals than the analysis required under the ‘necessity’ test.  
One issue that has arisen in the context of Article XX(g) is whether Article 
XX contains a jurisdictional limitation to prohibit unilateral trade measures. The most 
specific jurisprudence resulted from US – Shrimp. The AB wondered whether it was 
necessary for a natural resource being protected, in this case sea turtles, to exist within 
the territory of the United States, the country defending its measure. They 
acknowledged that a degree of unilateralism is a common aspect of regulations that 
fall under the subparagraphs of Article XX.113 However, they also verified that there 
was, indeed, a territorial ‘nexus’ in this dispute, as sea turtles passed through the 
waters of the US. They did not specifically address the question of how to proceed 
when there is no obvious territorial nexus.114  
Sustainability criteria have a purer form of extraterritorial impact, based on no 
geographic link. The argument that EU criteria are not flexible enough to apply to all 
national contexts takes for granted that the regulatory goals behind them are 
legitimate. This critique may also be extended: these goals are specific to the EU, 
rather than universal. For example, perhaps a biofuels exporter has conservation areas 
that they feel can be sacrificed to meet their economic goals. When applied to imports 
as well as domestic products, the concept of sustainability seems particularly likely to 
give rise to this type of controversy. 
                                                
111 US – Shrimp, above n. 37, at para. 136. 
112 E Reid, ‘Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and the WTO: Defining and Defending Its Limits’ (2010) 
44(4) Journal of World Trade 894, 877 – 901. 
113 US – Shrimp, above n. 37, at para. 121. 
114 Ibid at para. 133. 
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On the other hand, many of the EU’s trade partners have signed international 
agreements that suggest their commitment to preventing climate change and 
protecting the ecosystems identified in the EU’s criteria. It could be argued that there 
is a shared basis for these regulations, even though they demand more than simply 
adherence to relevant international treaties.  
Vranes offers a clarification of the difference between extraterritoriality and 
extraterritorial effects. In the former, a country directly regulates conduct occurring 
abroad, eg, requiring that state enterprises located abroad do not enter into contracts 
with polluting agencies, or applying domestic law directly in a foreign country. In the 
latter, a country imposes conditions for entry into the regulating state, but does not 
directly govern the means by which these are applied.115 By this definition, it is clear 
that biofuels sustainability criteria are not extra-territorial as such, but simply have 
extra-territorial impacts. The third country is not forced to comply with the EU’s 
criteria; they may simply choose not to export to EU markets. As there is a gray area 
in WTO law regarding this issue, the AB would have some discretion.  
c) Article XX chapeau 
The chapeau focuses on the application of the measure rather than its content. It 
provides an additional safeguard to ensure that it is not ‘arbitrary discrimination’, 
‘unjustifiable discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restriction on trade’. If it does not meet 
any of these conditions it will not comply with Article XX as a whole.116 The 
influence of the chapeau was analysed in earlier Section 2(c). An additional 
consideration is that, in Brazil – Tyres, the AB focused its examination of compliance 
with the chapeau on the whether the application of the measure constituted arbitrary 
discrimination. The AB quoted the Panel that ‘what is arbitrary must be decided in the 
light of the stated objective of the measure’.117  The EU criteria seem vulnerable to a 
charge of arbitrary discrimination regarding the application of the measure’s 
greenhouse gas emissions savings threshold. With respect to the EU’s goal of 
preventing emissions, biofuels whose production only saves 34 per cent are not 
                                                
115 Vranes, above n. 105, at 165 – 168.  
116 ‘GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice’, above n. 102, at 22; US – Gambling, above n. 90, at 
para. 317; Interestingly, in the context of the equivalent ‘necessity’ test of the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (‘GATS’) dispute US – Gambling, the AB offered a conflicting view on the 
importance of negotiation. They specifically stated that engaging in consultations was not a reasonably 
available less trade restrictive measure, as consultations are a process whose outcome is unpredictable 
and therefore cannot be compared with the measure at issue. However this analysis did not take place 
in the context of the chapeau. 
117 Brazil – Tyres, above n. 79, para. 244. 
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substantially different in their contribution from those whose production meets the 35 
per cent target. While the RED sets out in general terms the justifications for its 
renewable energy targets, and specifically its targets for biofuels, it does not address 
in detail the basis for setting these precise values for emissions savings. As Swinback 
has suggested, rather than drawing a line that disqualifies all biofuels below a certain 
threshold, the criteria would appear less arbitrary if they adopted a graduated 
approach to financial support based upon the level of emissions savings.118  
ii. TBT 2.2 
Current jurisprudence suggests that the issues that arose under the TBT Agreement 
would likely be very similar. However, there are some differences, such as the fact 
that the TBT Agreement applies to any ‘legitimate objective’. Under the TBT 
Agreement, the EU would be able to define their precise regulatory objectives as they 
wished. This demonstrates an advantage of the TBT Agreement over Article XX, 
particularly in the case of emissions reduction, a regulatory goal for which there is not 
a perfect match. Yet the difficulty of adapting the EU provisions to Article XX 
subparagraphs should not be overstated, as there would likely be little political will to 
exclude the EU’s regulation on such grounds.  
 Though TBT 2.2 also has a ‘necessity’ test, as discussed earlier, its emphasis 
is slightly different: it focuses on risks of non-fulfilment.119 These risks may be 
assessed by considering, among other things, the scientific basis of a regulation. This 
emphasis and its implications form a focus of the next chapter.  
 
H. A note on TBT 2.4 
This thesis does not focus extensively on the TBT Agreement Article 2.4 (‘TBT 2.4’), 
in part because there are no clearly established international standards on biofuels 
sustainability criteria. Nonetheless the provision raises the important question of 
whether the fact that biofuels sustainability criteria respond to an emerging problem 
will make them less likely to comply with WTO law. This section reviews this issue 
briefly. 
                                                
118 A Swinback, ‘Sustainability Criteria, the EU’s RED, and the WTO: Some Economic Reflections’, 
Power Point Presentation from ‘Facts and myths about the compatibility of the EU Biofuels 
sustainability criteria with WTO rules’ workshop of the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association 
(UNICA) and the ICTSD, Brussels, Belgium, 30 November 2011.  
119 US – Tuna II, above n. 62, at para. 318. 
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TBT Article 2.4 stipulates that technical regulations should be based upon 
international standards where they exist or their completion is imminent, unless they 
are an ‘ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfilment of the legitimate 
objectives pursued’ eg because of geographic or technical limitations.120 Assessing the 
compliance of biofuels sustainability criteria with TBT Article 2.4 reveals two 
significant questions for which existing jurisprudence does not provide a definitive 
answer. The first is the applicability of existing international standards on biofuels. 
The TBT Agreement Annex 1.2 specifies the definition of a standard, which include 
that compliance is not mandatory. The explanatory note to Annex 1.2 also states that 
‘[s]tandards prepared by the international standardization community are based on 
consensus.’  
 In US – Tuna II the AB expanded upon this definition. They stated that for the 
purposes of the TBT Agreement, a standard must be adopted by a recognized 
international body whose primary function is to set standards, and which is open to 
participation by all WTO Members.121A TBT Committee Decision clarified that 
membership should be non-discriminatory, and it must be open at all stages of the 
development of the standards.  The AB in US – Tuna II also affirmed that, in order to 
be considered as ‘recognized’, a standardizing body should disseminate information 
about its activities as proscribed by the same TBT Committee Decision.122  
Multiple sustainability certification schemes for biofuels have emerged rapidly 
and recently; market forces are so dynamic that it is difficult to establish which 
standards are predominant. One advantage of basing national regulation on 
international standards is that it reduces the heterogeneity of national regulation, thus 
facilitating market integration. However, in this case heterogeneity is also an endemic 
feature of relevant international standards. 
Aside from the fact that this diversity undermines one of the purposes of such 
standards, there is also the question of which, if any, of these schemes would be 
considered relevant with respect to the TBT Agreement. For example, voluntary 
international standards, eg those of the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels, are based 
upon partnerships between different stakeholders rather than national governments. 
The standards of the Global Bioenergy Partnership were developed by groups of 
                                                
120 TBT Agreement, Article 2.4, above n. 15, at 124. 
121 US – Tuna II, above n. 62, at paras. 356 – 363; 381 - 385. 
122 Ibid at paras. 372 - 376.  
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countries that did not contain all WTO Member States.  
These issues are particularly relevant in circumstances where regulation 
applies to emerging environmental problems and thus international standards are 
emerging or in flux. Uncertainty regarding which standards are applicable under the 
TBT framework is a significant issue with respect to the proliferation of standards in 
the alternative energy sector more broadly. 123 
 Another, related question has to do with the importance of basing national 
regulation in international standards. The wording of the requirement makes clear that 
this is not essential, but encourages countries to do so. If regulation for issues such as 
biofuels sustainability criteria is disadvantaged by the lack of clear existing standards, 
this would function more broadly as a disciplining factor against regulating such 




This chapter analysed two central themes of the relationship between WTO law and 
EU biofuels sustainability criteria. First, it considered the implicit WTO influence on 
the process of crafting the criteria. Second, it argued that the attributes of 
sustainability regulation raise particular challenges of WTO law. With respect to the 
first theme, to achieve the promise of mutual supportiveness between sustainable 
development and trade liberalization, one WTO objective should be not interfering 
with national policies that aim to achieve sustainability. Yet, even without a trade 
dispute, this chapter argued that the WTO likely played a role in narrowing and 
weakening EU sustainability criteria. In this sense, the WTO did not provide 
institutional support for sustainable development, but rather undermined this goal. A 
WTO chilling influence is particularly problematic due to its embrace of the concept 
in principle.  
 However, to counterbalance these conclusions, it is also necessary assume a 
broader, less technical perspective. In the WTO, sustainable development wields soft 
power. Its inclusion in the founding agreement’s Preamble, as a general principle and 
source of conceptual guidance, exemplifies this role. Citing the Preamble is 
                                                
123 G Marceau, ‘The WTO in the Emerging Energy Governance Debate,’ in J Pauwelyn (ed.), Global 
Challenges at the Intersection of Trade, Energy and the Environment, Centre for Trade and Economic 
Integration (Geneva: Graduate Institute, 2010) 25, 37.   
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discretionary, and it is difficult to characterize its applications in general terms. 
Nonetheless, this soft power has broad applications. EU biofuels sustainability criteria 
do not just face inward, as a specialized WTO legal issue; they are of international 
interest. The criteria were developed in response to growing public concern about 
biofuels, and subsequent pressure on Member States’ governments. For this reason, in 
the event of a dispute, regardless of the technical details of the compatibility of 
sustainability criteria with WTO law, public response will focus on general 
perceptions of broad issues.  
If WTO dispute settlement bodies determined that sustainability criteria are 
incompatible with WTO law, this would undermine their commitment to sustainable 
development, from the perspective of EU popular opinion at least, as well as in other 
constituencies who hold it as an important value. It would reveal a disconnection 
between the embrace in principle and the support in practice of sustainable 
development. Thus, the force of public opinion may also ‘chill’ a Member’s desire to 
challenge such regulations through the dispute settlement system, and shape the 
outcome of such a dispute, were it to occur. For this reason, it would be inaccurate to 
dismiss the influence of sustainable development solely because of the limitations 
documented herein.  
But these limitations should not be dismissed, either. The likely influence of 
the WTO on weakening the criteria demonstrates that national sustainability policies 
that impact upon trade raise particular challenges of WTO law. The second part of 
this chapter examined these challenges. The problems with adjudicating 
sustainability, as a legal concept in its own right, come back to the question of 
regulatory discretion. What types of regulations may be considered necessary to 
support ‘sustainability’? On what basis can a Member State be empowered to make 
this determination, if it intrudes heavily on the domestic production scenarios of 
foreign countries? Sustainability as a legal concept, in practice, shares some of the 
same weaknesses as sustainable development in principle.  
These weaknesses include the criteria’s breadth. It may be difficult to justify 
why this broad concept must apply to a particular product. For this reason, simply 
proclaiming that labour standards, for example, are essential to sustainable 
development would seem not to justify such standards, unless there was a more 
specific rationale. More generally, this suggests a limited weight for ‘sustainable 
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development’ as an end in itself; otherwise it would provide a huge territory of 
regulatory discretion. Yet requiring a more targeted justification for a sustainability 
policy infringes upon on national sovereignty to promote the concept of sustainability 
when and how it chooses. As it stands, it is perhaps too easy to accept the final criteria 
at face value, without being aware of any concessions they make to WTO law.  
The EU criteria demonstrate these weaknesses in practice. As well as their 
breadth, the criteria play into a number of unresolved issues in WTO law, including 
the role of PPMs and extraterritorial measures. Underlying both of these issues is 
uncertainty about how to strike the balance between deference to Member States and 
pursuit of trade liberalization. This is also significant because these attributes seem 
likely to apply to ‘sustainability’ regulation in general.  
Because of its indeterminate soft power, the role of sustainable development 
in a WTO dispute on sustainability regulations is somewhat unpredictable. The scant 
WTO case law on sustainable development has associated it with species 
conservation. Thus, it remains unknown whether sustainable development might 
provide a similar justification for social welfare policies, such as labour standards or 
criteria to prevent food scarcity from biofuels production.  
There is no reason to conclude that the concept would carry no weight at all in 
a dispute. The GATT/WTO approach to trade and environment has undergone 
significant migration, demonstrating a high level of discretion on the part of the 
dispute settlement bodies and adaptation to shifting norms. The term sustainable 
development itself is also subject to a large degree of discretion: its flexible role 
means that it can be either dismissed completely or cited as a central principle. These 
flexibilities suggest uncertainty about how the AB would interpret the WTO-legality 
of EU sustainability regulations. Overall, a dispute on EU biofuels sustainability 
criteria would shed light on an aspect of WTO law that would benefit from greater 
clarity, by forcing a confrontation with some of the more controversial aspects of 











The previous chapter documented a regulatory dynamic that shaped the formation of 
EU biofuels sustainability criteria: desiring to avoid trade conflict, the EC (‘European 
Commission’) recommended modifications that also weakened the criteria. This 
process gives rise to reflection on the complexity of sustainable development as a 
regulatory concept and the WTO challenges it raises. This chapter extends the 
analysis of some of the same regulatory dynamics into a new area: the ongoing 
process of formulating criteria for Indirect Land Use Change (‘ILUC’). ILUC refers 
to the displacement of agricultural crops as a result of the biofuels use targets laid 
down by the EU Renewable Energy Directive (‘RED’)1. The same problem also 
results from the EU Fuel Quality Directive (‘FQD’); required emissions savings for 
fuel will be achieved in part through use of biofuels.2  
The RED and the FQD have caused a vast quantity of additional land to come 
into cultivation.3 An overall expansion in agricultural production results in conversion 
of other agricultural cultivation to biofuels. This means that non-biofuels crops, or 
biofuels not intended for the EU, are being grown in different areas, including land 
that has never before been cultivated for agriculture, resulting in greenhouse gas 
emissions from deforestation. Further, additional cropland coming into cultivation 
                                                
1 European Council Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC [2009] OJ L140/16 (‘RED’). 
2 European Council Directive 2009/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Directive 98/70/EC as regards the specification of petrol, diesel and gas-oil and introducing a 
mechanism to monitor and reduce greenhouse gas emissions and amending Council Directive 
1999/32/EC as regards the specification of fuel used by inland waterway vessels and repealing 
Directive 93/12/EEC [2009] OJ L 140/88 (‘FQD’). 
3 As noted in the thesis Introduction, estimates of the necessary land area vary. Reuters averaged fifteen 
different figures to estimate that the additional land area needed to meet EU biofuels targets is 
approximately the size of Denmark: P Harrison, ‘Special Report: Europe finds biofuels and politics 
don’t mix’, Reuters, 5 July 2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/07/05/uk-biofuels-europe-
idUKTRE6641G020100705 (visited 20 June 2012). 
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may be grown in areas that do not conform to other aspects of the EU criteria, such as 
its biodiversity conservation guidelines.  
Both within and outside of EU bodies it has been suggested that, due to ILUC, 
EU biofuels policies are a climate change problem presented as a climate change 
solution.4 Addressing this problem may be necessary to preserve the EU’s core 
objective of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For this reason, the EU is currently 
considering several options to extend existing sustainability criteria so that they 
address ILUC. The options include introducing additional sustainability criteria for 
certain biofuels that focus on ILUC, attributing emissions to biofuels based on their 
ILUC impact, or raising the overall requirement for emissions savings for biofuels 
across the board.  
Past WTO disputes suggest that these approaches may not conform with WTO 
law. The fact that the EU is responding to problem too new for scientific consensus or 
a multilateral regulatory framework may make it more difficult to justify binding 
regulation that evaluates feedstocks based upon ILUC emissions levels. Further, it is 
difficult to document ILUC as it cannot be observed directly, and results from a 
complex interaction of market-based, political and regulatory forces. As has already 
proven the case in California, which introduced ILUC regulation, the basis for this 
assessment will likely be controversial as affected countries contest the calculation 
methodology. 5  Thus the first two options may be seen to discriminate against 
countries that grow certain feedstock types.  
Likely in part to avoid this very problem, the EC has also proposed a third 
more general approach of raising the requirements for greenhouse gas emissions 
savings for biofuels across the board. Yet there is no guarantee that it will have any 
impact on reducing levels of ILUC, which could continue to undermine any emissions 
savings gained. While it avoids singling out individual countries, this overly 
simplistic approach does not seem that effective in responding to the complex 
problem of ILUC. 
These problems are significant. However, they do not necessarily indicate that 
the measure intends to discriminate between or among the EU’s trade partners. The 
case study suggests the need to examine more closely the problems posed by complex 
environmental regulation based upon emerging problems for which there is not a 
                                                
4 See sections 2(b) – (c). 
5 See section 3(a). 
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great deal of scientific or international consensus. Assuming that WTO trade norms 
lead to regulatory chill, or result in a trade conflict that the EU loses, WTO rules will 
have acted as a force in undermining the RED’s core objective of reducing omissions. 
The example prompts thought on how the WTO system may provide appropriate 
deference to such regulation.  
This chapter is divided into three parts. The first provides an overview of the 
controversy surrounding ILUC and the EU’s response. The second analyses the 
compatibility of the EU’s proposed solutions with GATT Articles I, III and XX and 
the TBT Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2. This analysis is very preliminary, as the EC 
has not yet provided much detail about regulatory options. The third comments upon 
the implications with respect to the balance between the EU’s environmental 
objectives and its WTO obligations. 
 
2. ILUC: A compelling and complex issue 
 
A. The EU’s response to ILUC 
Though the existing RED and FQD criteria do not respond to the problem of ILUC, 
they do recognize its importance. The RED contains the following language:  
The Commission should develop a concrete methodology to minimise 
greenhouse gas emissions caused by indirect land-use changes. To this end, 
the Commission should analyse, on the basis of best available scientific 
evidence, in particular, the inclusion of a factor for indirect land-use changes 
in the calculation of greenhouse gas emissions and the need to incentivise 
sustainable biofuels which minimise the impacts of land-use change and 
improve biofuel sustainability with respect to indirect land use change.6  
The EC committed to reviewing the impact of ILUC and proposing a strategy for 
minimizing that impact by the end of 2010. In December 2010, the EC published a 
report that contained a literature review of an array of studies, including reports from 
the Institute for Prospective Technological Studies of the EC's Joint Research Centre 
(‘JRC’), the International Food Policy Research Institute (‘IFPRI’) and the Institute 
for Environment and Sustainability of the EC's JRC.7  
The EC’s report emphasized the uncertainty of the science surrounding ILUC 
and the ‘deficiencies and limitations’ of the process of modeling these impacts. They 
                                                
6 RED, above n. 1, at Preamble para. 85. 
7 European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission on Indirect Land Use Change Related to 
Biofuels and Bioliquids’, Brussels COM(2010) 811 final. 
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noted that different models yielded different results, depending on their underlying 
assumptions.8 One of the limitations was that they could not take into account all of 
the factors that accounted for land-use change. Further, they stated that the 
inadequacy of current models meant that it was not possible to calculate the 
conversion of forest on peat lands, one the main ecosystems of concern with respect 
to ILUC. They estimated that a model that took into account more factors would 
reduce the estimated land use change.9 They concluded that ‘indirect land-use change 
can have an impact on greenhouse gas emissions savings associated with biofuels, 
which could reduce their contribution to the policy goals, under certain circumstances 
in the absence of intervention’.10  
The EC outlined four policy options for a response. These were: 1) take no 
action, but continue to monitor; 2) increase the minimum greenhouse gas emissions 
savings threshold across the board; 3) introduce additional sustainability requirements 
on certain types of biofuels; and 4) attribute a particular quantity of greenhouse gas 
emissions to biofuels based upon their ILUC impact.11 The EC also undertook public 
consultations on the issue. These consultations demonstrated that most industry and 
farmers’ associations, as well as foreign countries, supported taking no action, or 
responding through international efforts. Most NGOs and non-biofuels producing 
industrial stakeholders thought that the EU should include ILUC emissions in existing 
greenhouse gas emissions savings requirements.12 
The EC committed to formulating a response by mid-2011, a deadline which 
they did not uphold. On 2 May 2012 the college of EU commissioners met and 
demonstrated widespread support for responding to the problem, and the Directorate 
Generals for Energy (DG Energy) and Climate Action (DG Clima) have proposed to 
formulate a proposal by the end of 2012.13 This may not be a straightforward process. 
According to EurActiv, DG Clima has favoured including ILUC regulation in the 
RED and the FQD, while DG Energy has not supported this position.14 Further, as the 
RED and FQD are not delegated acts, any amendments to their sustainability criteria 
                                                
8 Ibid at 8 – 9. 
9 Ibid at 10 – 11. 
10 Ibid at 14. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid at 13.   
13 ‘Briefing: Biofuels and ILUC’, Transport and Environment, May 2012.  
14 ‘EU Report Questions Conventional Biofuels’ Sustainability’, EurActiv.com, 11 April 2012, 
http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/eu-report-questions-conventional-news-512076 (visited 
8 June 2012.  
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for biofuels will need to be approved by the Parliament and the Council, which will 
add to the timeline of response.   
 
B. ILUC controversy in the EU 
The EC’s conclusions in their 2010 report were relatively circumspect, limiting the 
necessity of response to ‘certain circumstances’ and stating that ILUC might reduce 
the contribution of biofuels to the policy goals, rather than undermining these goals 
completely. The report suggested that measures should be taken based upon the 
precautionary principle, rather than concluding outright that ILUC was a serious 
problem.15  
Despite these conclusions, controversy about ILUC is growing within EU 
bodies. The extent of the controversy has emerged from a combination of official 
reports and analyses and internal and leaked communications. The cumulative effect 
of these statements reveals a loss of confidence in biofuels targets due in large part to 
the undermining impact of ILUC. Concerns were surfacing before the EC’s initial 
report in late 2010. In February 2010, for example, the New York Times reported that 
a civil servant in the agriculture department at the EC, wrote a memo to a colleague 
that ‘an unguided use of ILUC would kill biofuels in the EU’.16  
More recently, in January 2012, EurActive reported on leaked EU data 
suggesting that palm oil, rapeseed and soybean oil had higher greenhouse gas 
emissions than conventional fuel when ILUC was taken into account. Instead, they 
were on par with oil obtained from the notoriously dirty tar sands of Canada. These 
results were disclaimed by the EC as they had not yet been published.17 While palm 
oil is tropical, rapeseed and soybean oil are primary crops for sourcing biofuels within 
the EU. The EurActive report  concluded that ‘introduction of any ILUC factor would 
probably rule out high-emitting conventional biodiesels, the majority of Europe’s 
biofuels production.’18  
                                                
15 European Commission, above n. 7, at 14. 
16 J Kanter, ‘Questions about Biofuels’ Environmental Costs Could Alter Europe’s Policies’, New York 
Times, 12 February 2010, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9901E3D81231F931A25751C0A9669D8B63, visited 
20 June 2012.  
17 ‘Biodiesels pollute more than crude oil, leaked data show’, EurActive.com, 27 January 2012, 
http://www.euractiv.com/climate-environment/biodiesels-pollute-crude-oil-lea-news-510437 (visited 
20 June 2012).  
18 ‘EU Report Questions Conventional Biofuels’ Sustainability’, above n. 15. 
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Indeed, if ILUC were to be taken into account on a crop-by-crop basis, it is 
likely that many feedstocks, both domestic and imported, would no longer qualify for 
the sustainability criteria’s requirement that biofuels represent a 35 per cent savings in 
greenhouse gas emissions as compared to fossil fuels. Corroborating this conclusion, 
a recent report commissioned by the EC,  ‘EU Transport GHG: Routes to 2050’, 
concluded that ‘it is not possible (and useful) to determine cost effectiveness figures 
for [conventional] biofuels” because their indirect effect - measured in cleared forests 
and grasslands (‘ILUC’) - make it a CO2-emitting technology.’19  
There is also considerable pressure on the EU not to include ILUC factors in 
their sustainability requirements as these may disqualify biofuels producers from any 
subsidies linked to greenhouse gas emissions savings targets. Allegations have 
emerged that EU bodies have been pressured by industry representatives to approach 
ILUC with extreme caution, emphasizing the uncertainty of the science and perhaps 
even distorting the assumptions of the models so that the problem would appear less 
grave.  
For example, after the release of the EC’s 2010 report on ILUC, Reuters 
reported that experts critiqued one of its primary sources, a 2010 IFPRI study,20 
suggesting it was biased against discerning negative impacts. They stated that the 
report lessened the estimated contribution of traditional biofuels toward the EU’s 10 
per cent renewable energy target and overestimated other, less energy-intensive 
sources. For example, the report assumed that 20 per cent of new cars would be 
electric by 2020. The EC was accused of requesting that IFPRI researchers ‘use a 
five-fold exaggeration of its own electric car forecasts’. 21 The article also claimed that 
the model was based on a much larger percentage of second-generation biofuels than 
will be commercially available. 22 While one of the lead authors, David Laborde, 
denied that the assumptions were biased, he did confirm that the EC had wrongly 
estimated the ratio of cleaner bioethanol to dirtier biodiesel at 55/45, which in fact 
would be closer to 80/20.23 Reuters invoked transparency laws to access a number of 
                                                
19 A Schroten, et al., ‘Cost effectiveness of policies and options for decarbonising transport’ (2011), 
AEA Technology plc, European Commission Directorate-General Climate Action, 
www.eutransportghg2050.eu (visited 20 June 2012).  
20 P Al-Riffai, B Dimaranan and D Laborde, ‘Global Trade and Environmental Impact Study of the EU 
Biofuels Mandate’, Final Report, March 2010, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).  
21 Harrison, above n. 3.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
 123 
emails between EC departments, and reported that EU agricultural officials had cut 
sections of the IFPRI report that showed how soybean biodiesel could be four times 
more damaging to the climate than standard diesel.24  
The 2011 IFPRI report corrected some of these assumptions. This report 
estimated a higher total percentage of biofuels contributing the RED renewable 
energy target (8.8 per cent instead of 5.6). The ratio of biodiesel to bioethanol, 83/17, 
was based upon more accurate forecasts. The report also increased the estimate of 
peat land emissions. The result was a higher estimate of the impact of land use 
change.25  
More broadly, there has been disillusionment with the EU’s support for 
biofuels based upon the allegation that they reflect industry special interests rather 
than environmental goals. An April 2012 report from EurActive quoted an European 
Parliament official stating that the emphasis on biofuels in the renewable energy 
targets responded to pressure from the agricultural and car lobbies. These industries 
felt that biofuels targets would provide financial rewards to offset some of the other 
costs of the EU’s clean energy requirements.26 
The report also quoted Laborde as stating: ‘The truth is that policy makers 
inside and outside Europe are doing biofuels for other reasons than environmental 
ones. It’s a new and easy way to give subsidies to farmers, and it’s also linked to 
industrial lobbies that produce these biodiesels…They want to diversify the energy 
supply, and keep their foreign currencies instead of buying oil from the Middle East. 
They prefer to keep it for something even if it is not efficient or even green.’27 
Including an ILUC factor in sustainability criteria may undermine the industry groups 
that lobbied for biofuels targets. 
 
C. Studies and industry response 
The 2011 IFPRI Report concluded that palm oil is the most important source of land 
use change emissions, due to conversion of peat lands.28 As peat lands store gasses 
that contribute to climate change, their conversion results in high emissions. Under 
                                                
24 Ibid.  
25 D Laborde, ‘Assessing the the Land Use Change Consequences of European Biofuel Policies’, 
International Food Policy Institute (‘IFPRI’) October 2011, at 36, 107 – 108. 
26 ‘EU Report Questions Conventional Biofuels’ Sustainability’, above n. 14. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Laborde, above n. 25, at 62-63.  
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existing sustainability criteria, EU imports of palm oil are not sourced from peat 
lands. The 2008 Report from the JRC Institute for Environment and Sustainability, 
one of the sources for the EC’s 2010 report on ILUC, came to the startling conclusion 
that ‘if roughly…2.4% of biodiesel comes directly or indirectly from palm oil grown 
on peat land, the GHG savings from EU biodiesel are cancelled out’.29 [Emphasis 
added] A report by Wetlands International concluded that biofuels targets have led to 
an increase to the deforestation of peat lands to make room for new plantations in 
Southeast Asia. The report indicated that the ecosystem was increasingly imperiled, 
and biofuels-related ILUC is a major driver of this problem.30 
Another source of concern is the impact of ILUC in biodiverse ecosystems of 
Brazil. One academic study found that ILUC emissions from forecasted growth in 
demand for sugarcane ethanol and soy biodiesel in Brazil would overcome emissions 
savings from biofuels use. This is because the additional cultivation would push cattle 
rangelands into new territory, primarily the Amazon rainforest and the cerrado 
ecosystem. The study examined areas of forecasted deforestation, reporting that: 
 Sugarcane ethanol and soybean biodiesel would be responsible for 41% and 
59% of this indirect deforestation, respectively. These percentages were 
determined by fulfilling only the demand for sugarcane ethanol, while keeping 
soybean biodiesel production at current levels and vice-versa. Higher 
potential productivity of grass favors allocation of rangelands in Amazonia 
instead of in other native habitats.31   
Another study developed a statistical model proving that the increase in biofuels 
production was pushing other crops into agricultural ‘frontier’ areas, in particular the 
Amazon rainforest.32  
But biofuels-related ILUC is an immature area of study. The results of the 
sugarcane ethanol studies, for example, are contested by the 2011 IFPRI report, which 
suggested that ethanol had a relatively low contribution to land-use change as 
                                                
29 R Edwards, et al., ‘Biofuels in the European Context: Facts and Uncertainties’ (2008) European 
Commission Joint Research Centre, Institute for Environment and Sustainability. 
30 Wetlands International, ‘New figures: palm oil destroys Malaysia’s peatswamp forests faster than 
ever’, Press Release, 1 February 2011, 
http://www.wetlands.org/NewsandEvents/NewsPressreleases/tabid/60/articleType/ArticleView/articleI
d/2583/Default.aspx (visited 20 June 2012). 
31 DM Lapola et al., ‘Indirect land-use changes can overcome carbon savings from biofuel in Brazil’ 
(2010) 107(8) PNAS, 3388 – 3393, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2840431/ (accessed 
8 June 2012).  
32 EY Arima et al., ‘Statistical confirmation of indirect land use change in the Brazilian Amazon’ 
(2011) 6(2) Environmental Research Letters, http://iopscience.iop.org/1748-9326/6/2/024010 (visited 8 
June 2012). 
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compared to biodiesel.33 As documented subsequently, the EU has taken the position 
that encouraging imports of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol will have a positive impact 
on the RED’s emissions-related goals.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, biofuels producers have emphasized the 
inconclusiveness of the science, and the gaps and discrepancies in the analyses that 
have been performed. One example can be found on SugarCane.org, a website 
developed by the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association and the Brazilian Trade 
and Investment Promotion Agency ‘to serve as a global information hub on sugarcane 
products and their economic, environmental and social benefits around the world’.34 
The website contains an article addressing ILUC from biofuels production in Brazil. 
The article stated that there is no scientific consensus on the issue, citing the range of 
figures for ILUC-related carbon dioxide emissions calculated by the 2011 IFPRI 
study as well as US regulatory bodies. It identified several sources of uncertainty, 
such as the lack of available data, the use of inaccurate default values, the inability to 
link the models to other, related agricultural sectors, and the inability to accurately 
take into account shifting conditions of production due to both market and regulatory 
factors. Instead, they concluded that the best response is internationally-negotiated 
solutions for better land management and protection of imperiled ecosystems.35  
Further, regarding the leaked EU figures that concluded certain types of 
biofuels were as dirty as oil from Canadian tar sands, a spokesperson from the 
European Biodiesel Board stated that the science was too contradictory to place any 
faith in these results. She also called into question the EU JRC and IFPRI reports, as 
they were not consistent with the results of studies performed in the US.36 Industry 
representative Gerard Tubery, Chairman of the lobby group Copa-Cogeca’s Working 
Party on Oilseeds and Protein Crops, also denounced the findings of this report on the 
basis that their models for calculating emissions from land use change were not based 
upon international standards.37 
 
                                                
33 Laborde, above n. 25, at 87, 14. 
34 SugarCane.org, Spreading the Word about Clean Solutions from Sugarcane, ‘About this Site’, 
http://sugarcane.org/unicaglobal/about-this-site (visited 20 June 2012).  
35 SugarCane.org, ‘Measuring changes in land-use’: http://sugarcane.org/sustainability/preserving-
biodiversity-and-precious-resources/measuring-changes-in-land-use (visited 8 June 2012).  
36 ‘Biodiesels pollute more than crude oil, leaked data show’, above n. 18. 
37 ‘Indirect Cost of Conventional Biofuels Highlighted in New Study’, International Centre for Trade 
and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), 16(2) Bridges, 16 April 2012, 
http://ictsd.org/i/news/biores/131117/ (visited 20 June 2012).  
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D. The complexities of regulating ILUC 
In another candid statement to EurActive, the chief author of the 2011 IFPRI report, 
Laborde, well summarized the problem facing the EU. He said that the EU’s biggest 
error was ‘that we started to make a policy without knowing the effect it would 
have….We are now discussing the land use effect after saying for ten years that we 
need biofuels to reduce emissions. It was a serious mistake.’38 In setting renewable 
energy targets, the EU created the obligation to respond to this perverse impact on 
greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, due to the controversial nature of the problem, as well 
as its sheer complexity and the lack of established scientific analyses, devising an 
appropriate regulatory response to ILUC is a steep challenge.  
 As documented earlier in this thesis, current EU biofuels sustainability criteria 
have already resulted in informal complaints from domestic and foreign producers. 
Yet existing criteria are much less ambitious in their scope. They apply only to the 
crops that supply the EU with its biofuels, and are implemented on a producer-by-
producer basis. Responding to ILUC will require taking into account impacts that 
occur beyond the spatial boundaries of biofuels production for the EU, and that 
concern agricultural products that may not even be consumed in the EU. ILUC is a 
macro-level problem, for which micro-level biofuels producers cannot be held 
responsible. Instead, ILUC results from agricultural market dynamics combined with 
large-scale regulatory failures to protect threatened ecosystems on the part of the 
producing countries.  
 Another key driver is the growing global demand for agricultural production 
for both food and fuel, and its resultant impact on all ecosystems that yield cropland. 
Some NGOs, such as Transport and Environment, have lobbied the EU to drop its 
targets, or ensure that no ‘first generation’ biofuels could count toward sustainability 
targets.39 Indeed, discarding these incentives would provide a more straightforward 
solution than imposing sustainability criteria. However, the EU has maintained its 
commitment to the RED and FQD targets.  
The following section focuses on another challenge to crafting an appropriate 
response to ILUC: international trade law. Just as the scientific uncertainty and 
complexity of the problem has become a principal argument of industry that the EU 
                                                
38 ‘EU report questions conventional biofuels’ sustainability’, above n 14. 
39 ‘Biofuels: Dealing with Indirect Land Use Change’, Transport and Environment briefing.  
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should not introduce regulations, these same factors may mean that regulations do not 
conform to WTO law.    
 
3. The EC’s proposed regulatory options and their relationship with WTO law 
 
The fact that both IFPRI reports on ILUC were commissioned by the EC’s DG Trade 
demonstrates that the EC has trade concerns in mind when considering its response to 
ILUC. The following analysis will focus upon the different options that the EC 
proposed in its 2010 report (apart from doing nothing but continuing to monitor the 
problem). It should be noted that, barring more specific information on the regulatory 
options, this is a broad-brush analysis. However it highlights issues with larger 
significance to the relationship between WTO law and national environmental 
regulation; these issues are addressed in the subsequent analysis.   
It is interesting to note that the EC does not include an incentive-based system 
for responding to ILUC. For example, their proposal does not include tying better-
performing biofuels to additional subsidies. The RED stated that the EC would 
examine options to incentivize biofuels that had low ILUC impacts.40 Yet these 
regulatory options all impose stricter regulatory requirements. A consortium of 
stakeholders including Shell and the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature commissioned Ernst and Young to examine pragmatic elements of the EU’s 
proposed options. The report concluded that incentive-based ILUC regulation would 
be more effective. They recommended to the EU that it extend its current reward 
mechanisms for particularly ecologically-friendly biofuels such as second-generation 
biofuels and those grown on highly degraded lands to include low-ILUC biofuels.41 
Therefore it is somewhat surprising that the EC does not appear to be proposing 
options along these lines.  
 
A. Introducing additional sustainability criteria for certain biofuels or 
attributing ILUC emissions by feedstock 
The EC outlined two options based upon regulating specific types of biofuels. The 
first is to apply additional sustainability criteria to some biofuels, focusing these on 
                                                
40 RED, above n. 1, at para. 85. 
41 ‘Biofuels and indirect land use change: the case for mitigation’, ‘Biofuels and indirect land use 
change: the case for mitigation’, Ernst and Young, October 2011, at 26.  
 128 
ILUC impacts. The second is to attribute emissions values to particular biofuels 
feedstocks based upon their contribution to ILUC. These two options raise similar 
trade concerns; thus they will be considered together.  
The EC did not outline these regulatory options in depth, but simply listed 
them; there are unanswered questions about how they would be applied. The first 
option leaves open questions about the precise nature of the additional criteria and the 
selection criteria for its applicability. Perhaps producers who grew certain types of 
biofuels in countries with certain ecosystems, such as peat lands, would be subject to 
additional scrutiny about the impacts of their production on ILUC. Possibly some 
biofuels would be subject to additional requirements for direct emissions savings. 
This might include, for example, minimum yields, the efficiency of conversion from 
feedstock to biofuels or using biofuels waste products to generate energy or for other 
purposes. 
The second option, to attribute certain emissions values to biofuels by 
feedstock based upon their contribution to ILUC, seems more likely; there is some 
indication that the EC are thinking of introducing at least minimal categories to 
distinguish types of biofuels based upon their emissions level. The International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development reported in its trade digest in April 
2012, ‘Brussels is due to publish a proposal measuring the indirect emissions caused 
by biofuels later this year, distinguishing between low-emitting biofuels such as 
ethanol and high-emitting ones like biodiesel.’42  
The strength of these approaches is that they target particular biofuels which 
contribute the most to ILUC. However, they pose the risk that they will impose 
regulatory requirements so stringent that producers of biofuels with negative ILUC 
impacts will simply export to different markets that do not have such requirements.  
 Another concern with both of these options is that they would have a perverse 
impact with respect to the FQD, which stipulates that there must be a 6 per cent 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, achieved in part through blending lower-
emission biofuels with fuel. If the standard for emissions savings is stricter, this may 
mean that overall more biofuels must be produced to fulfil the required threshold. 
This could result in greater levels of ILUC.43  
                                                
42 ‘Indirect Cost of Conventional Biofuels Highlighted in New Study’, above n. 37.  
43 ‘Biofuels and indirect land use change: the case for mitigation’, above n. 41, at 21.  
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 The second option, attributing ILUC emissions by feedstock, has already been 
adopted as part of California’s Low Carbon Fuels Standard (‘LCFS’), which provides 
a useful comparative study. The establishment of ILUC emissions values has proven 
controversial, and the uncertainties in the science have also made the effort 
susceptible to industry pressure. For example, the ILUC factor for corn ethanol was 
halved between 2010 and 2011.44   
 The California Air Resources Board that formulated the criteria also raised 
some additional concerns about modelling ILUC. These included the fact that ILUC is 
a dynamic issue and will need to be re-evaluated frequently. This creates regulatory 
uncertainty, with a negative impact on biofuels producers and markets.45 Similar 
problems would likely arise for the EU.  
 Also, there will be different methodologies for calculating ILUC indirect 
emissions and direct emissions. The latter are already included in the relevant 
Directives and the EU has produced a calculation methodology. There could be 
inconsistencies within the EU’s framework for climate change mitigation, such as its 
Emissions Trading Scheme.46 In sum, though they have the advantage of providing a 
relatively direct response to the regulatory problem of ILUC-related emissions, these 
approaches have some potential shortcomings. 
 
B. Trade considerations  
i. Most Favoured Nation Principle 
The options outlined raise questions with respect to the Most Favoured Nation 
(‘MFN’) Principle as articulated in GATT Article I(1) (‘Article I(1)’). The core of the 
MFN Principle is that Member States should not grant import advantages selectively 
to certain trade partners. More formally, Article I(1) stipulates that countries cannot 
discriminate between WTO Members with respect to customs duties and charges, 
rules of import and export, and taxes and regulations. Whatever advantage, privilege 
                                                
44 ‘RFA: CARB to cut LCFS penalty for ethanol in half’, Biofuels Journal, 19 November 2010, 
www.biofuelsjournal.com/articles/RFA__CARB_to_Cut_LCFS_Penalty_for_Ethanol_in_Half-
101602.html (visited 20 June 2012). 
45 Final Report of the CARB Expert Subgroup on ‘Comparative and Alternative Modelling 
Approaches’ (2010), http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/workgroups/ewg/010511-final-rpt-indirect-
effects.pdf (visited 20 June 2012). 
46 ‘Biofuels and indirect land use change: the case for mitigation’, above n. 41, at 22. 
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favour or immunity is extended to one must be extended to all.47 Article I(1) compares 
treatment between a category of imported products (in this case biofuels) and ‘like’ 
products imported from any third country that is a WTO Member State.  
Singling out certain feedstocks (or ecosystems) for additional regulatory 
requirements will disproportionately impact certain trade partners. A country that 
grows particular crops may argue that they have little choice which type of biofuels to 
produce due to natural or industry-related constraints. The regulation may be seen as 
identifying these countries for discriminatory treatment. 
Allocating ILUC greenhouse gas emissions by feedstock implies changes to 
the existing default values that the EU established as part of the RED.48 These default 
values calculate the amount of emissions savings of each feedstock when compared to 
fossil fuels; the higher the value, the cleaner the biofuel. The current required savings 
is 35 per cent; this jumps to 50 per cent in 2017.  
Some of the default values vary vastly based upon the way in which biofuels 
from a particular feedstock are produced. For example, palm oil with production 
method unspecified offers only a 19 per cent savings over fossil fuel. This is one of 
the lowest default values. Palm oil produced with methane capture offers 56 per cent 
savings, which meets the 2017 target. Similarly, wheat ethanol varies between 16 per 
cent and 69 per cent depending on production method. These differences provide 
incentives for producers to adopt cleaner production technology in order to gain better 
access to the EU market. Yet producers of biofuels with high ILUC values would take 
on an emissions burden that was not directly connected to the way they produced their 
biofuels. They would have to work very hard to reduce the direct emissions from their 
crops to the extent that they would qualify for the EU market. The addition of another 
variable for ILUC-related emissions would create winners and losers, and it is 
possible that some of these losers may feel that the additional regulation is 
particularly unfair. 
Palm oil would be one of these losers. If the ILUC-based reduction reached 
more than 6 per cent this would mean that even palm oil produced following the EU’s 
proscribed best practice of capturing methane would no longer qualify. While current 
                                                
47 See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Article I(1), 14 April 1994, GATT Secretariat, The 
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 424.  
48 RED, above n. 1, at Annex V. 
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emissions savings for palm oil can be altered based upon behaviour, the ILUC figure 
is beyond the reach of producers, and instead based upon fundamental ecosystem 
characteristics of the producing country. Thus, it introduces a type of discrimination 
between biofuels tied to the characteristics of certain producing countries and not 
others.  
 
ii. The National Treatment Principle 
The National Treatment Principle (‘NTP’) stipulates that a Member State must treat 
imported products equally to its own domestic products, with respect to taxes and 
regulations. It is certainly possible that a country would bring forth a complaint under 
the NTP of either GATT Article III(4) (‘Article III(4)’) or the TBT Agreement’s 
Article 2.1 (‘TBT 2.1).49 The TBT Agreement only applies to certain types of 
measures that can be described as ‘technical’. The definition of technical contains 
several components: the regulations must refer to an identifiable product or group of 
products, must lay down product characteristics, and must be mandatory. 50 Based 
upon recent TBT jurisprudence from US – Tuna II, this chapter assumes that the TBT 
Agreement would apply to ILUC criteria.51 
In some respects, making a claim under the NTP of either GATT Article III(4) 
or TBT 2.1 seems more difficult than under the MNF. This is because introducing 
extra sustainability criteria to certain biofuels, or adding ILUC emissions values based 
upon feedstock, would also have a negative impact on domestic biodiesel producers. 
Increasing the ratio of (largely imported) cleaner ethanol to (largely domestic) dirtier 
biodiesel has been a common recommendation for redressing negative environmental 
impacts of biofuels production.52  
This negative impact on domestic biodiesel has important implications. There 
will likely be strong resistance to these options from the EU biodiesel producers who 
would face additional requirements. Also, incorporating ILUC factors tied to specific 
                                                
49 See Chapters 3 and 5 for the full provisions. 
50 WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and 
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Commission, Press Release, 25 March 2010, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=542 
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biofuels would be beneficial for foreign ethanol producers. For these reasons, it is not 
logical that the EC would propose this approach with a protectionist aim in mind.  
However, not all foreign producers would be winners. For this reason, the 
MFN arguments above apply in the context of the NTP. For example, under the first 
option, if the EU identified certain ecosystems for extra criteria, or mandated certain 
emissions-lowering production procedures for some biofuels, this could be seen as a 
means for singling out imported biofuels for less favourable treatment. Along the 
same lines, under the second option, if they adopted ILUC emissions values for 
particular feedstocks, it could be argued that these were designed to unfairly 
disadvantage foreign producers. As no ILUC emissions values have yet been 
produced, it is not possible to examine their methodology in depth, but it is likely that 
its scientific basis will be highly contestable. If it appears that this methodology 
unfairly singles out foreign producers, this could certainly be the basis for an NTP 
claim.  
   
iii. GATT Article XX (‘Article XX’) 
If ILUC criteria violated Article I(1) or Article III, the dispute settlement bodies 
would then consider whether the measure qualified as an exception to the GATT 
under Article XX. These exceptions are listed in Article XX’s subparagraphs. Article 
XX also has a chapeau that serves as an additional safeguard to ensure that the 
measure is not protectionist in intent.53  
The RED committed the EC to developing methodologies to ‘minimise 
greenhouse gas emissions caused by indirect land-use changes.’ [Emphasis added] It 
also states that the EU should ‘incentivise sustainable biofuels which minimise the 
impacts of land-use change and improve biofuel sustainability with respect to indirect 
land use change’. 54  [Emphasis added] This suggests that the EU’s regulatory 
objectives are to reduce ILUC-related emissions as well as negative sustainability 
impacts of ILUC more generally.55 This interpretation is supported by the EC’s 2010 
Report on ILUC.56  
                                                
53 Relevant portions of Article XX are written in full in Chapter 3, Section 2(B). 
54 RED, above n. 1, at Preamble, para. 85. 
55 The EU stated that the broader regulatory goals outlined in the second statement should be 
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The most relevant Article XX subparagraphs are Article XX(b), which deals 
with measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, and Article 
XX(g), which deals with measures ‘relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption’.57  These are the same subparagraphs that would 
be most relevant in an Article XX dispute on the existing criteria. Jurisprudence on 
Article XX has stipulated that the AB first evaluates the measure’s compliance with 
the subparagraph and then the chapeau. 58 
a. Article XX(b) 
Under Article XX(b), the EU might argue that their regulatory objective of reducing 
ILUC emissions is necessary to prevent the negative human, animal and plant health 
consequences of climate change. There is no precedent for this argumentation, which 
would have larger significance. They also might argue that the same types of ILUC 
that create the highest emissions also imperil animal and plant life or health, through 
deforestation and biodiversity loss. Regulation addressing solely emissions levels 
does not take these impacts into account. The EU might establish a correlation 
between high emissions from ILUC and other negative sustainability impacts such as 
deforestation and biodiversity loss, but this is a very speculative assessment. 
Under XX(b), the AB would apply the necessity test, as explicated in Chapter 
3. This entails determining the importance of the value at stake, the contribution of 
the measure to the regulation’s goals, and whether it was the least trade-restrictive 
means reasonably available to achieve this goal.  
In general, there is not an excessive amount of judicial scrutiny when 
establishing the importance of the regulatory goal at stake. Such scrutiny would be 
politically sensitive given the WTO’s stated commitment to respecting Member’s 
rights to pursue the regulatory goals of their choosing. As the AB stated in US – 
Gasoline,  
WTO Members have a large measure of autonomy to determine their own 
policies on the environment (including its relationship with trade), their 
environmental objectives and the environmental legislation they enact and 
implement. So far as concerns the WTO, that autonomy is circumscribed only 
                                                
57 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article XX, above n. 48, at 455. 
58 ‘GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating to GATT Article XX, paragraphs (b), (d), and 
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by the need to respect the requirements of the General Agreement and the 
other covered agreements.59 
For this reason, particularly due to international recognition of climate change as an 
urgent environmental problem, the AB would probably confirm the importance of the 
value at stake.  
With respect to the option of appending extra sustainability criteria to some 
biofuels, it would be difficult to make an assessment of the second two components of 
the necessity test without a better idea of the specific criteria that the EU had in mind. 
It is easier to analyse the more likely option that the EU would assign ILUC emissions 
values to particular biofuels.  
 The contribution of this solution to the regulatory objective pursued is 
fundamental, in the sense that the overall aim of the EU RED and FQD is to mitigate 
climate change. If they actually increased climate change, this would be a serious 
concern. This approach directly targets biofuels that contribute the most to ILUC, and 
attempt to mitigate this negative impact.  
Yet this conclusion can also be critiqued on several grounds. First, the 
introduction of additional emissions does not address the EU’s regulatory objectives, 
as producers of biofuels with high ILUC emissions would simply export these to other 
markets. Second, regulating ILUC solely with respect to biofuels and not other 
agricultural products is inconsistent and ineffective, as biofuels constitute only a small 
percentage of agricultural production. Adding regulations will increase the burden on 
producers without making a significant contribution to the regulatory goal of 
preventing climate change.  
Third, it is an extremely indirect approach, as it does not have anything to do 
with the biofuels that are actually being imported into the EU. It is debatable whether 
these biofuels can be seen as responsible for ILUC, when their producers may have no 
ability to influence the ILUC for which their biofuels are purportedly responsible. 
Also, the specific emissions savings levels the EU establishes will be vulnerable to 
challenge on methodological grounds.  
 Finally, the AB may determine that a less trade restrictive means of regulating 
ILUC is reasonably available. The critique that this approach is ineffective and 
indirect may lead to the conclusion that the EU should pursue a broader and more 
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integrated approach to responding to ILUC that takes into account its other relevant 
regulations. This less trade restrictive approach might also involve pursuing 
international solutions to preventing climate change and deforestation/biodiversity 
loss that results from the conversion of frontier areas into agricultural production. All 
of these reasons suggest that it would be unlikely that this regulatory option could be 
justified under Article XX(b). 
 b. Article XX(g) 
Under Article XX(g), the EU might argue that introducing ILUC factors relates to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources, as the failure to do so would lead to 
deforestation of imperiled ecosystems and associated biodiversity loss. This focus on 
species conservation would parallel US – Shrimp.60 They might also attempt to adopt 
this provision to climate change. In US – Gasoline, the Panel agreed that clean air was 
an exhaustible natural resource.61 The EU could reverse the argument: current levels 
of atmospheric carbon dioxide are an exhaustible natural resource that ILUC criteria 
help to protect.  
Under Article XX(g), rather than being ‘necessary’ to fulfil the conditions of 
the subparagraph, the measure must ‘relate to’ the fulfilment of these conditions. The 
US – Shrimp dispute has demonstrated that this degree of connection must be 
substantial; the means and ends must be reasonably related, observably close and 
real.62 There is no requirement to determine the importance of the value at stake, or 
the existence of less trade restrictive means. It does not seem that the slightly weaker 
relationship required would have a significant impact in changing the judicial 
considerations outlined above. The requirement raises a similar set of problems as the 
Article XX(b) necessity test regarding the effectiveness of the measure in fulfiling the 
regulatory purpose. These problems have to do with the methodological difficulties 
involved with calculating ILUC values, as well as the indirectness and ineffectiveness 
of the approach with respect to the regulatory goal.   
The subparagraph also stipulates that the measure must be taken in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Any additional 
criteria or emissions values that the EU assigned would also be assigned to feedstocks 
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grown in the EU. Whether these additional requirements would be applied in a 
perfectly even-handed manner is an open question. It is possible that foreign biofuels 
will be more negatively impacted overall, and almost inevitable that certain countries 
will be more negatively impacted than others.  
 c. Article XX chapeau 
As a final step, the AB would consider whether the measure complied with the Article 
XX chapeau. The chapeau focuses on the application of the measure rather than its 
content. It provides an additional safeguard to ensure that it is not ‘arbitrary 
discrimination’, ‘unjustifiable discrimination’ or a ‘disguised restriction on trade’. If it 
does not meet any of these conditions it will not comply with Article XX as a whole.63 
When determining whether the application of the measure constitutes arbitrary or 
unjustifiable discrimination, the AB in US – Shrimp established some considerations, 
including an effort to negotiate toward concluding a bilateral or multilateral 
agreement, and the flexibility of the measure.64  
An ILUC emissions value will be calculated by the EU, rather than through a 
negotiation process. Further, there are no international standards for ILUC values 
against which these values can be measured. It is possible that the EU would enable 
trade partners to provide their own ILUC calculation methodology, as they do with 
greenhouse gas emissions in the existing Directives. This would provide some 
flexibility; however, these values would likely still be subject to conformity 
assessment, as they are under the current criteria. A more flexible approach would 
enable trade partners to address ILUC through a different regulatory approach 
entirely.  
Chapter 3 documented how calculating default values of RED emissions 
savings for biofuels feedstocks might lead to WTO challenges. With respect to ILUC, 
these types of problems are even more difficult. The EC’s 2010 Report recognized 
that: 
Estimating the greenhouse gas impact due to indirect land-use change 
requires projecting impacts into the future, which is inherently uncertain, 
since future developments will not necessarily follow trends of the past. 
Moreover, the estimated land-use change can never be validated, as indirect 
land-use change is a phenomenon that is impossible to directly observe or 
measure.65  
                                                
63 ‘GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice’, above n. 58, at 22. 
64 US – Shrimp, above n. 60, at para. 161-164, 166.  
65 European Commission, above n. 7, at 6. 
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In other words, ILUC emissions calculations are speculative. They are based 
upon an ex ante evaluation; actual emissions may differ from predicted emissions. 
This may lead to the perception that the regulation is unreliable and therefore 
arbitrary. It is also unilateral in its application.   
In EC – Asbestos, the Panel clarified that a disguised restriction on trade 
meant that the intent of the measure was in fact protectionism; this could be discerned 
by examining the measure’s ‘design, architecture and revealing structure’.66 The 
methodological uncertainties with calculating ILUC emissions levels make them 
vulnerable to the claim that they were calculated in order to disadvantage certain 
imported biofuels.  
 
iv. TBT Agreement 
 a. TBT Article 2.2 (‘TBT 2.2’) 
Under TBT Agreement, as with Article XX, there is little likelihood that the 
AB would deem a regulatory objective illegitimate, as this would not support their 
general position of deference. As the Preamble to the TBT Agreement states:  
No country should be prevented from taking measures necessary…for the 
protection of human, animal or plant life or health, of the environment, or for 
the prevention of deceptive practices, at the levels it considers appropriate.67  
However, they do undertake a formal evaluation of the legitimacy of this 
objective. As reviewed in the previous chapter, recent jurisprudence suggests that the 
TBT 2.2 necessity test also involves ‘weighing and balancing’, though of slightly 
different elements: the trade restrictiveness of the technical regulation, the 
contribution of the measure and the risks of non-fulfilment. In this ‘necessity’ test, the 
arguments raised in the analysis of Article XX(b) are also applicable. On one hand, 
regulating ILUC is fundamental to achieving the primary regulatory goal of the RED. 
The EU might also employ a consumer deception defence similar to the US in US – 
Tuna II. In this dispute, in the context of TBT 2.2, the dispute settlement bodies 
identified consumer information as one of two core objectives of the measure. 
Specifically, they did not want consumers to be misled about whether dolphins were 
harmed by tuna products.68 Similarly, the EU might argue that consumers are in fact 
                                                
66 WTO Panel Report on European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 18 September 2000, para. 8.236. 
67 TBT Agreement, Preamble, above n. 47, at 122. 
68 US – Tuna II, above n. 50, at para. 324. 
 138 
subsidizing biofuels. The overall objective of the EU criteria is to mitigate climate 
change. Therefore, consumers have the right to know that subsidies are not creating 
perverse incentives. These arguments support the conclusion that the measure 
contributes to the achievement of the legitimate objective of mitigating climate 
change.  
When assessing the trade-restrictiveness of the measure and its contribution to 
the regulatory goal, methodological shortcomings may again prove problematic. TBT 
2.2 clarifies that assessing the risks of non-fulfilment can be based upon ‘inter alia: 
available scientific and technical information, related processing technology or 
intended end-uses of products’.69  While the risks are serious; namely, undermining 
the core purpose of the RED and FQD to reduce emissions, scientific assessments of 
this risk are not well established. 
  
C. Increase minimum greenhouse gas savings threshold for all biofuels 
The final regulatory option that the EC proposed deals with indirect emissions 
prevention by increasing the requirements for direct emissions prevention for all 
biofuels. The downside of this approach is that it is not directed at the problem it aims 
to address. There is no guarantee that a crop that provides low direct greenhouse gas 
emissions is not also responsible for a high level of ILUC-related emissions. Palm oil 
is a good example: while palm oil with methane capture provides greenhouse gas 
emissions savings of 56 per cent, there are still concerns that the production of 
compliant palm oil is leading to deforestation of peat lands elsewhere. While this 
regulatory approach might result in lower ILUC overall, this would be coincidental; it 
might even encourage intensification of crops that lead to higher levels of ILUC if 
they had low direct emissions values.  
As it will not single out particular crops for more stringent criteria, this option 
will probably be more popular with producers and thus politically more feasible. 
Another major advantage is that it will not be bogged down in all of the 
methodological difficulties of calculating ILUC, and associated controversy.  
The 2011 IFPRI report recommended this course of action. They rejected the 
option of identifying particular feedstocks, as the introduction of additional criteria 
for certain biofuels would have ‘leakage’ impacts due to the interconnectedness of 
                                                
69 TBT Agreement, Article 2.2, above n. 47, at 124. 
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agricultural markets. For example, if a large additional emissions value is placed upon 
palm oil due to ILUC, this could simply increase the demand for biodiesel sourced 
from soybean oil, or producers may direct more of their product toward food rather 
than fuel markets. This may increase the demand for one or two feedstocks for 
biofuels, which could destabilize the market.70  
However, the approach suffers from a lack of clarity of intent. If it intends to 
combat ILUC-related emissions, its effectiveness seems dubious. If it intends simply 
to lower the greenhouse gas emissions from biofuels production, this raises a different 
set of questions: what is the justification for introducing additional requirements to 
the RED and the FQD now? On what basis is this calculation performed? These 
issues also make the regulatory approach difficult to justify from a WTO perspective.  
 
D. Trade considerations 
i. MFN/NTP 
Unlike the previously considered options, this approach would not single out 
particular biofuels for additional regulatory requirements. Yet it will probably still 
make a trade dispute more likely as all producers will face additional challenges in 
gaining access to the EU market. An increase in the requirements will mean that some 
crops that currently qualify under the EU’s default calculations will be pushed over 
the edge into non-compliance. These biofuels will face greater market access barriers. 
While it may increase the likelihood of a dispute based upon the protectionist nature 
of existing criteria, the additional ILUC factor does not seem to provide a basis for a 
dispute in itself, due to its even-handed application.  
 Rather than its discriminatory nature, the core difficulties with this approach 
have to do with the suitability of the regulation to the problem at stake, and whether it 
is more trade restrictive than necessary. However, in raising the overall emissions 
savings requirement and thus making the regulation more stringent, this approach will 
likely increase exporters’ interest in examining whether sustainability regulation has 
disproportionate regulatory impacts in certain countries or aims to protect domestic 
markets.   
 
ii. Article XX 
                                                
70 Laborde, above n. 25, at 18, 86. 
 140 
a. Article XX(b) and Article XX(g) 
As outlined above, it seems likely that the AB would consider these regulatory 
objectives to fall within the remit of either Article XX(b) (on protecting human, 
animal or plant life or health) or Article XX(g) (on conserving exhaustible natural 
resources). Although the regulatory approach of raising emissions levels across the 
board differs, its goals are the same: to mitigate climate change through preventing 
ILUC-related emissions, and to counter other negative sustainability impacts of 
ILUC.  
The approach is indirect with respect to achieving specific outcomes on ILUC, 
but it clearly addresses the goal of reducing emissions from biofuels production. It 
seems difficult to argue that its regulatory aims would include preventing any other 
negative impacts from ILUC such as deforestation and biodiversity loss.  
The AB would need to consider whether creating an additional emissions 
savings requirement to reflect the impact of ILUC is necessary to achieve the EU’s 
regulatory goals. The aspect of the necessity test that seems particularly problematic 
is establishing the contribution of the measure to achieving the regulatory goals. This 
approach does not rely upon assessing ILUC levels; therefore it will not face the same 
methodological scrutiny. Instead, it raises a different set of concerns. While it will 
self-evidently reduce emissions from biofuels production, this will not be tied to the 
EU’s goal of reducing negative impacts of ILUC. If the EU stated that their intent was 
simply to reduce emissions, there would be no clear justification for adding an 
additional level of emissions savings. It would also be difficult to justify the basis for 
calculating a particular requirement of emissions savings. If the EU relates this level 
of emissions savings to ILUC, it will not prove compelling, as there is no guaranteed 
correlation. There does not seem to be a clear basis for raising this level apart from 
preventing ILUC-related emissions.  
The indirectness of this approach suggests that the EU is not seeking a very 
high level of protection against ILUC. As outlined above, the AB might also 
recommend other reasonably available approaches that would be less trade-restrictive 
and equally effective in achieving the EU’s (low) desired level of protection.  
Raising all emissions savings requirements equally does seem more likely to 
comply with the second requirement of Article XX(g): the measure must be taken in 
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conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. With respect to 
this component, the approach has an advantage over feedstock-specific options.  
 
 c. Article XX chapeau 
The addition of higher regulatory requirements risks being arbitrary and unjustifiable. 
The imposition of additional greenhouse gas requirements will be undertaken without 
consultation with other Member States. Further, the justification for doing so, ILUC, 
is controversial and not backed by clear international standards.  
With respect to the flexibility of the measure, trade partners might criticize the 
imposition of additional emissions savings requirements. It is indiscriminate; 
therefore it is inflexible with respect to the impact of different feedstocks on ILUC-
related emissions. Instead, it imposes an equal regulatory burden on biofuels that may 
have no impact on ILUC-related emissions whatsoever and those that are its primary 
drivers. This is the opposite problem from that posed by the first two regulatory 
options, which identify particular biofuels that drive ILUC.  
Finally, with respect to whether the measure is a disguised restriction on trade, 
the AB would examine its ‘design, architecture and revealing structure’ to determine 
whether its intent was protectionist.71 Again, the approach is formally even-handed, 
and has exactly the same impact on domestic and foreign producers. However, in 
imposing additional requirements and pushing more biofuels out of conformity with 
EU targets, the measure also risks leading to more trade complaints, and scrutiny of 
the EU’s emissions savings rationale and methodology more generally.  
 
iii. TBT Agreement 
a. TBT 2.2 
Many of the same concerns regarding the lack of clarity of this regulatory approach 
would arise under Article XX and TBT 2.2. Under TBT 2.2, the AB would need to 
ensure that a technical regulations was not ‘more trade-restrictive than necessary to 
fulfil a legitimate objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfilment would create’. 
As previously reviewed, in US – Tuna II, the AB established an approach to this 
necessity test that involved evaluating the degree of contribution the measure makes 
to the legitimate objective, whether a reasonably available less trade-restrictive 
                                                
71 EC – Asbestos, Panel Report, above n. 66, at para. 8.236. 
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measure could achieve the same objective, and the risks of non-fulfilment.  
To review the shortcomings of the approach once again, if the legitimate 
objective specifically had to do with ILUC-related emissions reduction, then it seems 
difficult to argue that this regulatory approach would be an effective means of 
fulfiling this objective. If the EU argued more generally that their intent was to reduce 
emissions from biofuels production, this would raise questions about why it was 
necessary, and whether it was effective, to raise their requirements from those 
established in the original RED and FQD. The additional regulation would only 
address a small percentage of emissions and leave unaddressed the larger issue of 
agricultural land-use change. This would make it easier to argue that another, less 
trade-restrictive means was reasonably available, perhaps a multilateral approach that 
attempted to address the problem on a wider scale.  
Not addressing ILUC poses a serious risk to the EU’s regulatory objective, as 
it could undermine their goal of reducing emissions through the RED and the FQD. 
There are also global environmental risks that result from greenhouse gas emissions. 
However, it seems arbitrary that the EU would increase their emissions savings 
requirements after the RED and FQD have already come into force. The lack of clear 
scientific information underlying ILUC makes it difficult to justify a particular 




The proceeding analysis suggested that the options the EU has proposed for 
regulating ILUC all risk violating WTO law. Many of these trade concerns result 
from two interrelated problems. First, ILUC is an emerging environmental problem. 
This helps explain the thin and uneven body of scientific research, as well as the 
controversy about the methodological basis of ILUC calculation and ILUC’s 
contribution to global warming. These factors makes it easier to argue that whatever 
methodological approach the EU adopts has been designed to discriminate against or 
between imported goods. The fact that the problem is not well-recognized also 
underlies the lack of international standards and multilateral agreements. It takes time 
and political will to establish broad consensus. Yet this also may be problematic from 
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a WTO perspective, as it suggests that the EU is undertaking a unilateral form of 
negotiation.  
Second, ILUC is extremely complex. This casts doubt on the EU’s 
methodological approach, and makes scientific assessment more difficult and 
controversial. The fact that ILUC involves agricultural market dynamics that span 
international borders may lead to the critique that the EU’s approach of regulating 
individual producers is arbitrary. Indeed, ILUC’s complexity also creates domestic 
challenges. There may be backlash about the effectiveness of the response, and 
political pressure to avoid negative impacts on industry. 
As this suggests, these problems do not have to do with discrimination, as 
such. Instead, the attempt to respond to ILUC results from internal and external 
pressure regarding the fact that EU alternative energy targets may have perverse 
impacts. Rather than an existing environmental problem, these options respond to a 
problem the EU helped create by mandating biofuels use. Thus, the EU is examining 
regulatory options to respond to this issue, despite the fact that all of these options 
will likely have a negative impact on domestic producers.  
The complexity of regulating ILUC may lead to the perception that the EU is 
simply creating bad regulation, which should be streamlined, standardized or 
eliminated. However, this is not the function of the WTO. Instead, WTO disputes 
have repeatedly affirmed that Member States determine the regulatory objectives they 
wish to pursue and the level of protection they seek.  
It would be possible to interpret the relevant provisions in a way that was 
more deferent to emerging environmental regulation. For example, in the context of 
the NTP of Article III(4)/TBT 2.1, one weak point of a feedstock-based approach to 
regulating biofuels is that a country could argue that ILUC values were calculated in 
order to discriminate against certain biofuels. The emphasis in Article XX/TBT 2.2 on 
justifying the contribution of the measure to the regulatory aim also opens the door to 
criticism that particular methodologies are not effective in achieving a regulatory 
goal. In both cases, an underlying argument is that it may have been easier for the EU 
to manipulate the science due to methodological uncertainties. In such a circumstance, 
the AB should also take into account, either formally or informally, the precautionary 
principle. Even if the science is uncertain, if the measure also disciplined domestic 
feedstocks, this suggests that it is not protectionist by nature.    
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If there were an implicit spectrum where the more complex and process-
oriented a regulation, the more likely to violate WTO law, ILUC regulation would be 
on the outer extreme. Regulations based not on the physical characteristics or 
functionality of a product, but the way in which it is produced, are known as non-
product related Process and Production Method (NPR PPM)-based regulations. 
Technically, ILUC regulations are not based upon NPR PPMs. They do not focus on 
characteristics of the production processes for biofuels for the EU market. Instead, 
they focus on the implications of growing a particular crop with respect to the 
agricultural production system as a whole. For ILUC regulations, new terminology 
would be necessary in order to extend the concept of process-orientation even further. 
The bias that process-oriented regulations are identified with hidden 
protectionism has been prevalent among WTO Members.72 However, though it has 
never been stated explicitly, WTO jurisprudence has demonstrated that NPR PPMs 
are not always WTO-illegal.73 If the AB adopted a deferent position toward such 
process-oriented regulation, this would also improve the chances that ILUC regulation 
would be WTO-compatible.  
Another concern raised in the context of the Article XX(b) and TBT 2.2 
necessity tests is that the measure may not contribute the EU’s regulatory goal of 
reducing ILUC-related emissions as a whole, as it only applies to biofuels. Biofuels 
represent only approximately 2 per cent of global agricultural production.74 The 2011 
IFPRI report raised this concern. The report gave the example that agricultural trade 
liberalization from the successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda round 
of negotiations would result in greater ILUC emissions than biofuels targets.75 This 
argument can be countered without denying the importance of responding to ILUC as 
a whole. Under the RED, EU consumers are subsidizing biofuels with the explicit 
                                                
72 This view is summarized by M Echols, ‘Biofuels Certification and the Law of the World Trade 
Organization’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (‘ICTSD’), Programme on 
Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development. Issue paper no. 19, August 2009, 33: The details of 
the biofuels policy should help to justify the choice of targeted processes, products and benefits, and 
whether there will be a product focus (such as a percentage biofuels content for gasoline, or research 
support for next-generation products) or a production focus (a ban on imports of biofuels from 
deforested lands, or support for biofuels made using a particular process). The former is a standard 
goods-based approach. The latter involves a PPM, which is usually looked upon with some skepticism 
and the belief that it will be a disguised protectionist measure. 
73 See, eg, US – Tuna II, above n. 51; US – Shrimp, above n. 60. 
74 ‘Towards Sustainable Production and Use of Resources: Assessing Biofuels’ United Nations 
Environment Programme (2009), 18.  
75 Laborde, above n. 25, at 86.  
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understanding that they will contribute to greenhouse gas emissions savings. There is 
a fundamental link between addressing ILUC and achieving the aim of the RED. 
 With respect to concerns that the measure was ineffective as it penalized 
producers who were not contributing to ILUC directly, the AB should also take into 
account the fact that the overall regulatory goal of reducing ILUC was compelling. As 
long as it applied to both domestic and foreign producers, it would be appropriate to 
regulate biofuels producers in this manner. 
Though it is not a part of the original treaty text, the AB’s interpretation of the 
Article XX chapeau suggests the importance of examining whether Members have 
pursued a negotiated solution to the regulatory objective at stake (though it does not 
require a successful conclusion). Yet one impact of this approach is that it emphasizes 
not only preventing discrimination but also bringing about harmonization, which is 
not the goal of the WTO. Therefore, again, it is useful to consider whether a particular 
regulation represents an important environmental objective, rather than focusing on 
procedural requirements that aim to bring national regulation into a multilateral 
framework. The underlying intent of these interpretations is to avoid losing the forest 




It might be said that ILUC is a perfect storm for EU biofuels regulation. 
Countervailing forces have conspired to put the EU in a difficult position. On the one 
hand, they have an obligation to respond to a problem that risks turning their 
regulatory goal on its head: ILUC could well mean that fulfilling the requirements of 
their renewable energy Directives would lead to higher emissions overall. On the 
other hand, the addition of regulatory burdens to respond to ILUC will be unpopular 
with both domestic and foreign biofuels producers, and also may not be compatible 
with WTO law. 
This analysis of the compatibility of the EU’s proposed regulatory options 
with GATT Articles I, III and XX and the TBT Agreement Articles 2.1 and 2.2 is 
very preliminary. The outcome of a dispute would depend on the details of the EU’s 
regulation and how the AB interpreted relevant provisions of WTO law. Although it 
is not possible to predict the outcome of a dispute, it is clear that all of the regulatory 
options that the EU has proposed risk violating WTO law.  
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These challenges result from inherent characteristics of ILUC, particularly its 
complexity and recent emergence as an environmental problem. These challenges do 
not in principle suggest that a regulation violates WTO law’s core function of 
preventing discrimination between or among WTO Members. Of course, not all 
environmental regulation is altruistic; some does intend to protect domestic markets. 
However, the WTO should ensure that measures without protectionist intent are not 
swept away in the process of identifying protectionism.  
WTO law may pose particular constraints for emerging environmental 
problems. Yet multilateral solutions are compromise-driven, and may not respond 
adequately when they emerge. Barring a strong international framework for 
combatting an environmental problem, countries may be tempted to set unilateral 
regulation to respond more immediately. These issues are applicable not only to ILUC 
regulation, which attempts to mitigate climate change driven by agriculture, but also 
climate change regulation more generally. ILUC is also a result of complex causal 
relationships; it is process-, rather than product-oriented. Thus these features define 
not only ILUC but also a larger set of emerging environmental problems.  
There is a spectrum of possible interpretation of the WTO-compatibility of 
ILUC regulation. As outlined in the above analysis, the AB would be able to adopt a 
more deferent approach within the context of the existing Articles. In interpreting the 
WTO-compatibility of ILUC regulation, the AB is in a difficult position of evaluating 
environmental goals outside their core area of expertise. Yet unavoidably, not only do 
AB decisions reflect the influence of emerging environmental norms, they also have 






Competition and beyond in the interpretation of the 




Thus far this thesis has focused on the characteristics of sustainability regulation. It 
has outlined features of the EU criteria, such as its conceptual breadth and 
complexity, its response to emerging environmental problems, and its process 
orientation and extra-territorial impacts. Regulations that exhibit such characteristics 
raise challenges of WTO law; the thesis has focused its analysis of these challenges 
primarily on GATT Article XX (‘Article XX’) and the TBT Agreement Article 2.2 
(‘TBT 2.2’).  
The underlying concern is that the AB may tilt the balance toward trade 
liberalization at the expense of appropriate deference to national sustainability 
regulation. The next two chapters focus on this balancing process in the context of the 
National Treatment Principle (‘NTP’). These chapters also identify the potential for 
‘imbalance’ through the mechanisms by which the AB identifies protectionism. 
However, rather than the regulatory characteristics that may lead to this problem, 
these chapters focus on the interpretation of components of the NTP outlined below. 
There is a range of potential interpretation; however, past disputes reveal that there 
may be a bias toward trade liberalization.  
Along with the Most Favoured Nation Principle, 1  the NTP forms the 
foundation of WTO law’s non-discrimination provisions. Its basic role is to protect 
equality of competitive opportunities between imported and domestic products. Its 
adjudication requires balancing between WTO obligations on the one hand and 
Member States’ sovereignty to pursue regulatory goals on the other. The NTP would 
likely be central to a dispute regarding EU biofuels sustainability criteria. An 
importing country could complain that the criteria were crafted to award preferential 
                                                
1 See Section 9 for more discussion of the MFN Principle.  
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treatment to domestic biofuels, while discriminating against imported biofuels. The 
NTP is an important component in many WTO covered agreements. Due to particular 
relevance to biofuels sustainability criteria, this chapter focuses on the NTP as applied 
in GATT Article III and the TBT Agreement Article 2.1 (‘Article III’ and ‘TBT 2.1’).  
The interpretation of the NTP, and specifically the balance it strikes between 
national sovereignty and WTO law, is one of the central issues in the interpretation 
and application of WTO law. For this reason, it has been subject to numerous 
analyses from both academics and practitioners. Given the depth of the literature, 
there is no way that this chapter can be comprehensive in its treatment. However, 
because it is so often analysed, it is useful to conclude the substantive analysis of this 
thesis by reflecting on the interpretation of the NTP and its relationship with EU 
biofuels sustainability criteria.  
This chapter focuses on an issue of particular importance. This is the tension 
in NTP disputes between objective evaluation of competitiveness between products 
and a more interpretive approach that takes into account a wider range of factors, 
including the policy objective at stake. The chapter examines two interrelated facets 
of this larger issue: 1) the role of market-based evidence; and 2) the influence of 
policy objectives. There has been a range of interpretation of these two issues, and the 
interpretation adopted has important implications for the balance struck between trade 
liberalization and national regulatory autonomy.  
The NTP has two main components, and competition is theoretically central to 
both. First, the AB must determine if products are ‘like’. The AB has repeatedly 
affirmed that ‘like’ products are competitive products. Second, the AB must 
determine if the measure discriminates against imported products. This discrimination 
may be either de jure or de facto. The jurisprudence on this requirement has focused 
on whether the measure has a detrimental impact upon the competitiveness of 
imported products with respect to domestic ones.2  
The emphasis on competitiveness as the salient concern suggests that the 
process of establishing a violation will be simple: the AB simply must evaluate the 
nature of the competitive relationships between the products in dispute by analysing 
market evidence. However, both when establishing product ‘likeness’ and also the 
                                                
2 These statements are documented in Section 4 of the paper. 
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existence of protectionism, the AB has consistently made clear that this type of 
market evidence is not essential.  
Under the ‘like’ products test, they have reasoned that a regulation in dispute 
may distort the conditions of competition, therefore rendering impossible an objective 
assessment of whether goods are in competition (and therefore ‘like’). Thus, they 
have suggested that it may be necessary to take into account more speculative 
information, such as latent competition, and evidence from other similar markets. 
When determining protectionism, the rejection of evidence has been based 
upon the reasoning that relying upon a so-called ‘trade effects’ test may be 
misleading, as even a clearly protectionist measure may not be demonstrated by trade 
volumes. Instead, the evaluation of protectionism necessitates examining the structure 
and application of the measure. These are somewhat elusive concepts, leading to the 
criticism that this approach rests upon ‘an abstract notion of lack of regulatory 
neutrality.’3  
This is important with respect to the balancing process. The AB’s underlying 
concern is that relying solely upon market analysis would weaken the NTP. To the 
extent that moving away from a reliance on evidence enables a more speculative 
approach, employed to strengthen the enforcement of WTO law, it implies that the 
balance is being tipped at the expense of domestic regulatory autonomy. Yet relying 
upon analysis of the effects of a measure would not be empowering for national 
regulation either. If every measure with adverse effects on foreign producers 
automatically violated the NTP, this would suggest that the WTO was an instrument 
of deregulation rather than nondiscrimination.4 Thus, some degree of subjective 
discretion is unavoidable when balancing market evidence and stated regulatory intent 
to determine if a measure is designed to discriminate against imported products.  
This emphasis on competition as the central consideration of the NTP leads to 
potential discord between economic evidence of competitiveness between products, 
with its emphasis on objective, measurable outcomes, and the need to determine the 
legitimacy of trade-restrictive regulation with reference to more ‘subjective’ value 
                                                
3 H Horn and PC Mavroidis, ‘Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National 
Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15(1) European Journal of 
International Law 39, 50. 
4 G Verhoosel, National Treatment and WTO Dispute Settlement: Adjudicating the Boundaries of 
Regulatory Autonomy (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2002) 48. See also GATT Panel 
Report for the unadopted US – Taxes on Automobiles, DS31/R, 11 October 1994, 5.24. 
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judgments.5 The rejection of evidence leads to a situation in which more interpretation 
is required in order to determine whether a violation has occurred.  
This process forms the focus of the second part of the chapter; as will be 
discussed, it is of central importance to environmental regulation like EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria. In some disputes the AB has emphasized the existence of 
negative competition impacts on imported products as a decisive criterion. However, 
in others the AB has further clarified that a detrimental impact is permissible if it 
results from legitimate regulatory distinctions rather than the desire to protect 
domestic products. This provides an additional step through which the AB can 
recognize the WTO compliance of non-protectionist regulation even if it has a 
negative impact on imported products.   
Recent TBT AB Reports suggest an evolution toward this more deferent 
approach. It is unclear whether these developments demonstrate a general evolution in 
the AB approach or reflect the differences between the TBT Agreement and the 
GATT. In the GATT, if a measure is not in compliance with Article III but conforms 
with Article XX, it will be in compliance overall. However, under the TBT 
Agreement, even if a measure complies with TBT 2.2 Members will need to bring it 
into conformity with TBT 2.1. Thus a more deferent approach under TBT 2.1 may be 
appropriate as a counterbalance to the increased intrusiveness of the provision.  
TBT 2.1’s process of considering whether regulatory distinctions are 
legitimate is distinct from TBT Article 2.2 which considers whether policy objectives 
are legitimate. The former suggests that the AB is not evaluating the importance of 
the values but rather considering how the measure is structured. The latter involves an 
evaluation of the policy goal itself. While this is a fundamental distinction with 
respect to the nature of the provisions, the chapter speculates that it may be difficult to 
draw the line in some cases.  
Finally, the chapter examines the compatibility of EU biofuels sustainability 
criteria with the NTP. The analysis focuses on how the interpretation of these two 
issues, the treatment of evidence and the role of policy objectives, would influence the 
balance struck between deference to national law and enforcement of WTO law.   
 
                                                
5 See, eg, P Low, G Marceau, J Reinaud, ‘The Interface Between the Trade and Climate Change 
Regimes: Scoping the Issue’ (2011) Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-1, World Trade Organization, 
Economic Research and Statistics Division, 15. 
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2. The NTP in GATT Article III 
 
The majority of complaints under GATT Article III cite violations of either 
subparagraph 2 or subparagraph 4. Both are interpreted with reference to the same 
chapeau. Both focus on internal measures and whether they favour domestic products; 
Article III(2) deals with taxation, and Article III(4) regulation.  
Article III(1), the chapeau, reads: 
The Members recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and 
laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for 
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal 
quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products 
in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or 
domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production.6 
Article III(2) reads: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall not be subject, directly or 
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of 
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products. Moreover, no 
contracting party shall otherwise apply internal taxes or other internal 
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to the 
principles set forth in paragraph 1.7 
The second sentence has an interpretive note, which reads: 
A tax conforming to the requirements of the first sentence of paragraph 2 
would be considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the second 
sentence only in cases where competition was involved between, on the one 
hand, the taxed product, and, on the other hand, a directly competitive or 
substitutable product which was not similarly taxed. 
In the first sentence of Article III(2), there are two key questions. First, are the 
domestic and imported products ‘like’? Second, if they are ‘‘like’,’ is the imported 
product taxed ‘in excess of’ the domestic product? In the second sentence of Article 
III(2), combined with the Interpretive Note and Article III(1), to which it explicitly 
refers, the first key question is: are the imported and domestic product ‘directly 
competitive or substitutable’ (‘DCS’). The second part of Article III focuses on 
determining whether the tax discriminates against imported products. In this context, 
AB must establish whether the two products ‘not similarly taxed’, and finally, does 
                                                
6 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article III(1), 14 April 1994, 
GATT Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal 
Texts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 428. 
7 Ibid at Article III(2). 
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dissimilar taxation operate in a manner ‘so as to afford protection’ (‘SATAP’) to 
domestic production?   
Article III(4) reads: 
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the 
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less 
favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of 
all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering 
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use. The provisions of this 
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal 
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic operation 
of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the product.8 
The key questions are: first, are the domestic and imported products ‘like’? Second, if 
they are, is the imported product receiving treatment ‘no less favourable’ than that 
accorded to the domestic product? This paragraph does not include the concept of 
‘directly competitive or substitutable.’  
As part of the legislative matrix available under Article III, in the event that 
the measure in dispute has been adopted in support of a public policy goal, such as 
protection of human health or exhaustible natural resources, or the prevention of 
deceptive practices, inter alia, a Member State can defend their tax or regulatory 
measure under Article XX, the General Exception. A measure found to violate Article 
III may be justified under Article XX if, in the language of the chapeau, it is ‘not 
applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade’. Article XX has been discussed at length in Chapters 
3 and 4. 
 
3. The NTP in the TBT Agreement 
 
The TBT Agreement deals with technical regulations, standards and conformity 
assessment. TBT Article 2.1 contains a National Treatment provision, which reads: 
Members shall ensure that in respect of technical regulations, products 
imported from the territory of any Member shall be accorded treatment no 
less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin and to 
like products originating in any other country.9 
                                                
8 Ibid at Article III(4). 
9 Ibid, Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade at 122. 
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Due to the overlap in their jurisdictions, there may be initial uncertainty with respect 
to which WTO provision, Article III or the TBT Agreement, is most relevant to a 
measure in dispute. Because the definition of ‘technical regulation’ is selective, until 
recently, it has not been the focus of many disputes. This chapter thus evaluates three 
recent disputes: US – Clove Cigarettes,10 US – Tuna II11 and US – COOL, that have 
fallen under the TBT Agreement.12 (The US – COOL AB Report has not yet appeared 
at the time of this writing.) Not surprisingly, given their pioneering role, recent Panel 
Reports dedicate much time to explicating the differences between the application of 
Article III and TBT 2.1. These interpretations will be discussed subsequently. Overall, 
however, it can be said that the interpretation of the concepts of ‘like’ products and 
‘less favourable treatment’ has been very similar between Article III(4) and TBT 2.1. 
The interpretation of the National Treatment provision in recent TBT disputes, as well 
as their subject matter, is very relevant to both a hypothetical ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute 
and also the adjudication of disputes on environmental regulations more generally. 
For this reason, this chapter pays special attention to these disputes. 
The TBT Agreement also contains a component similar to GATT Article XX, 
though it does not contain a closed list of specific negotiated exceptions, but instead 
covers any ‘legitimate objective’. Further, it does not follow a rule/exception 
structure; even if a measure is in compliance with TBT 2.2 it still must be brought 
into conformity with TBT 2.1. Again, TBT 2.2 has been discussed earlier in the 
thesis.  
 
4. Competitiveness in Article III and TBT 2.1 
As summarized by the WTO Secretariat, ‘The essence of the principle of national 
treatment is to require that a WTO Member does not put the goods or services or 
persons of other WTO Members at a competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis its own goods 
                                                
10 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes 
(US – Clove Cigarettes), WT/DS406/R, adopted 2 September 2011, and Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS406/AB/R, adopted 4 April 2012. 
11 WTO Panel Report, United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II), WT/DS381/R, adopted 15 September 2011, and Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012. 
12 WTO Panel Report, United States – Certain Country of Origin Labelling (COOL) Requirements (US 
– COOL), WT/DS386/R, adopted 18 November 2011. 
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or services or nationals.’ [Emphasis added]13 This has been oft-reinforced in the 
disputes. The AB stated in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II: ‘Article III protects 
expectations…of the equal competitive relationship between imported and domestic 
products’. [Emphasis added]14 The AB in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages clarified that: 
‘The context of the competitive relationship is necessarily the marketplace since this 
is the forum where consumers choose between different products.’15  
For this reason, assessing compliance with the NTP requires considering the 
existence and nature of competitive relationships between products in dispute. The 
AB in EC – Asbestos has stated that ‘…a determination of "likeness" under Article 
III:4 is, fundamentally, a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive 
relationship between and among products’.16 This approach has been adopted in many 
disputes. For example, the 2011 AB Report for Philippines – Distilled Spirits used the 
same language as the EC – Asbestos AB Report above, specifically applying it to the 
‘like’ products test of Article III(2).17 
This rationale has also extended to the TBT. The Panel in the TBT dispute US 
– Tuna II directly quoted the AB’s precedent in EC – Asbestos, above, concluding: 
‘Although this statement was made in the context of Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, 
we find it  pertinent also to an interpretation of the terms "like products" in Article 2.1 
of the TBT Agreement.’ Further, the AB in US – Clove Cigarettes stated that:  
We agree that the very concept of "treatment no less favourable", which is 
expressed in the same words in Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 and in 
Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, informs the determination of likeness, 
suggesting that likeness is about the "nature and extent of a competitive 
relationship between and among products".18  
Article III(2) contains an additional test that establishes whether products in 
competition are ‘directly competitive or substitutable.’ As the AB has affirmed, the 
                                                
13 ‘The Fundamental WTO Principles of National Treatment, Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment and 
Transparency’, Background Note by the Secretariat, Working Group on the Interaction Between Trade 
and Competition Policy, WT/WGTCP/W/114, 14 April 1999, 4.  
14 WTO Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/R; WT/DS10/R; WT/DS11/R, adopted 11 July 1996; and Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 4 October 1996, para. 109.  
15 WTO Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea – Alcoholic Beverages), 
WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 September 1998, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS75/AB/R; 
WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 18 January 1999, para. 114. 
16 WTO Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, para. 99.  
17 WTO Appellate Body Report, Philippines – Taxes on Distilled Spirits (Philippines – Distilled 
Spirits), WT/DS396/AB/R; WT/DS403/AB/R 21, adopted December 2011, para. 170; 
18 US – Clove Cigarettes, Appellate Body Report, above n. 10, at para. 111. 
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importance of competitiveness is self-evident in the term itself. For example in Korea 
– Alcoholic Beverages, the AB stated that:  
It is evident from the wording of the term that the essence of that relationship 
is that the products are in competition.  This much is clear both from the word 
"competitive" which means "characterized by competition" 1, and from the 
word "substitutable" which means "able to be substituted".19 
The establishment of protectionism under Article III(2) is also closely linked 
to market competitiveness. The AB in Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages20 stated 
that ‘… [Article III(2), second sentence]… provides for equality of competitive 
conditions of all directly competitive or substitutable imported products, in relation to 
domestic products….’21  
Under Article III(4), the dispute settlement bodies consider whether an 
imported product is receiving treatment ‘no less favourable’ than that accorded to the 
‘like’ domestic product. The AB in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes stated that ‘a 
measure accords less favourable treatment to imported products if it gives domestic 
like products a competitive advantage in the market over imported like products’.22 
This approach has been repeated in many other disputes.  
Recent TBT Panel Reports also affirm this approach to ‘less favourable 
treatment’. For example, the Panel in US – COOL has stated that: ‘As we explained, 
like Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, Article 2.1 is concerned with the equality of 
competitive conditions between domestic and imported products. This has been 
interpreted as meaning that "a measure accords less favourable treatment to imported 
products if it gives domestic like products a competitive advantage in the market over 
imported like products".23 The AB Report of US – Clove Cigarettes also affirmed the 
existing approach with respect not only to ‘less favourable treatment’ but also the 
‘like’ products test, as documented below.   
 
5. The role of evidence in Article III/TBT 2.1 
 
                                                
19 Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, above n. 15, at para. 114. 
20 WTO Panel Report, Chile – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, (Chile – Alcoholic Beverages), 
WT/DS87/R; WT/DS110/R, adopted 15 June 1999, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS87/AB/R; 
WT/DS110/AB/R, adopted 13 December 1999.  
21 Ibid, Appellate Body Report at para. 67. 
22 WTO Panel Report on Dominican Republic – Import and Sale of Cigarettes (Dominican Republic – 
Cigarettes), WT/DS302/R, adopted 26 November 2004, and Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS302/AB/R, adopted 25 April 2005, para. 93.  
23 US – COOL, Panel Report, above n. 12, at para. 7.313. 
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Evaluating competition between products is at the centre of determining a violation of 
the NTP. This leads to the important question of how this competitive relationship is 
to be measured, and how strictly it should rely upon evidence. An approach based 
strictly upon evidence drawn from the countries in dispute would be based upon 
quantitative thresholds. Conversely, scrutinizing a measure’s application requires 
more interpretation. With respect to these different approaches, the AB has been 
consistent about their position. While quantitative market analysis has formed a 
component of AB decisions, they have repeatedly affirmed that decisions should not 
rest upon such evidence. The next section discusses how this shapes the balance 
between national sovereignty and trade commitments.  
 
A. Like/DCS products 
Elasticity of substitution, or cross price elasticity, is a standard econometric means to 
quantify latent product demand. It establishes whether consumers will switch to the 
competing product if the price of the original product rises. Such an approach fits with 
the emphasis on competitiveness between products. The early WTO dispute Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II employed this approach when determining whether products 
were directly competitive or substitutable under Article III(2). The AB stated:  
…the decisive criterion in order to determine whether two products are 
directly competitive or substitutable is whether they have common end-uses, 
inter alia, as shown by elasticity of substitution.’24  
However, in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, the AB distanced themselves from 
the role of cross-price elasticity proposed in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. The AB 
quoted the Panel Report in concluding: 
“[Q]uantitative analyses, while helpful, should not be considered 
necessary.”[footnote eliminated] Similarly, “quantitative studies of cross-
price elasticity are relevant, but not exclusive or even decisive in nature.”25  
This dispute established an oft-replicated rejection of relying solely upon 
evidence in the context of the NTP. It focused on Korea’s tax categories for alcoholic 
beverages. As a result of a surtax on the sale of distilled spirits, diluted soju benefitted 
from lower tax rates than imported distilled spirits. The Panel determined that 
                                                
24Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Appellate Body Report, above n. 14, referencing Panel Report, at 
para. 6.22.   
25 Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, above n. 15, at para. 109. 
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traditional shoju was DCS with some ‘western style’ liquors, and the dissimilar 
taxation was applied so as to afford protection to domestic products.26  
The AB supported the Panel’s conclusion that the relationship between the 
products was DCS. They clarified that ‘We believe that the Panel uses the term 
"nature of competition" as a synonym for quality of competition, as opposed 
to quantity of competition.’27 They rejected quantity for quality.  
The rationale was that, with respect to like or DCS products, the influence of a 
regulation in dispute may distort competitiveness. Thus, competition should have 
existed, though it could not be evidenced. They stated: 
 A determination of the precise extent of the competitive overlap can be 
complicated by the fact that protectionist government policies can distort the 
competitive relationship between products, causing the quantitative extent of 
the competitive relationship to be understated.28  
This sentiment was echoed in the AB Report for the TBT dispute US – Clove 
Cigarettes in the context of the ‘like’ products test: ‘We note, however, that, in 
determining likeness based on the competitive relationship between and among the 
products, a panel should discount any distortive effects that the measure at issue may 
itself have on the competitive relationship…’.29  
This has methodological implications. Rather than accepting a lack of 
competitive relationship at face value, the AB in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages found 
it necessary to rely upon more speculative sources of evidence. They stated: 
… the scope of the term “directly competitive or substitutable” cannot be 
limited to situations where consumers already regard products as alternatives. 
If reliance could be placed only on current instances of substitution, the object 
and purpose of Article III:2 could be defeated by the protective taxation that 
the provision aims to prohibit….In this case, the Panel committed no error of 
law in buttressing its finding of “present direct competition” by referring to a 
“strong potentially direct competitive relationship”.30 
The Panel broadened the scope of applicable evidence. For example, they considered 
the possibility that lack of experience would artificially dampen consumer demand in 
Korea. Thus, the Panel suggested that there was potential for future competition when 
consumers in Korea became more familiar with the imported product.31 This is a 
                                                
26 Ibid at para. 2. 
27 Ibid at para. 133. 
28 Ibid, Panel Report at para. 10.42. 
29 US – Clove Cigarettes, AB Report, above n. 10, at para. 111.  
30  Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, Appellate Body Report, above n. 15, at para. 120, 124. 
31 Ibid at para. 110.  
 158 
temporal extension. Also, they stated that evidence about consumer preference from a 
market with similar characteristics may have some relevance.32 This is a geographic 
extension. In both cases they stated that this was not a general approach to DCS 
products, but would need to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  
Korea contested the Panel’s finding, stating: 
Korea considers that, through the use of the term "nature of competition", the 
Panel has inserted a "vague and subjective element" which is not found in 
Article III:2, second sentence.33  
Korea felt that an absence of ‘actual’ competitive relationship between products in 
dispute should be interpreted as a strong indication that they were not ‘DCS’.34 They 
argued that potential competition was not covered by Article III(2). In bringing in 
evidence from the Japanese market, they accused the Panel of ‘impermissibly 
broadening’ Article III(2).35 
By broadening the scope of applicable evidence, the dispute settlement bodies 
also broadened the jurisdiction of the NTP. If they had accepted the lack of 
competitive relationship between the products in the existing market, Korea would 
likely have been in compliance. A more speculative approach enabled a larger degree 
of interpretation, to the end of establishing that products in dispute were competitive.  
This speculative approach is risky, as it is more activist about the boundaries 
of WTO obligations. For example, if consumers do not know about a product because 
of a measure in dispute, does this in itself suggest that the country is not complying 
with its GATT obligations? Also, a more speculative approach may be inaccurate. For 
example, the AB offered no criteria with which to establish if markets were 
sufficiently similar. Such an analysis should be approached with extreme caution, not 
only because it threatens the individual sovereignty of Member States but also 
because it may simply be wrong. Consumer behaviour may be irrational or 
unpredictable, and difficult to generalize.  
The Philippines – Distilled Spirits AB Report referenced Korea – Alcoholic 
Beverages in adopting the position that there should not be an excessive reliance on 
quantitative evidence.36 However, they also rejected cross-market comparison, stating:  
                                                
32 Ibid at para. 137. 
33 Ibid at para. 132.   
34 Ibid at para. 5 - 6. 
35 Ibid at para. 136. 
36 Philippines – Distilled Spirits, above n. 17, at para. 207. 
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If two spirits are considered to be “like products” in a given market, this does 
not necessarily mean that they would be considered “like products” in 
another market.…a panel needs to examine the nature and the extent of the 
competitive relationship between and among products, which will depend on 
the market where these products compete.  
This analysis addressed the designation of ‘like’ rather than ‘DCS’ products, a 
narrower category of comparison. However, the AB’s observation is still relevant: in 
the Philippines, sugar-derived alcohols were marketed as ‘whiskey’ and ‘brandy’, a 
practice that would not have been acceptable to European consumers. 37 
A recent study on consumer preference for biofuels provides another, 
thematically relevant, example.38 It analysed the purchasing habits of car owners with 
flex-fuel engines, which can take any blend of ethanol and gasoline. The concept 
behind the flex-fuel is that consumers will switch fuel type based upon which is 
cheapest, an easily measurable form of cross-price elasticity.  
 However, in Brazil, even when ethanol prices rose above those of gasoline, 
consumers did not switch. In Sweden, they did. Brazilian consumers felt less strongly 
that the ethanol and gasoline were directly competitive or substitutable. This 
demonstrates the diverse nature of markets; consumers in some countries may be 
economically irrational in valuing one choice over another.  
The Korea – Alcoholic Beverages AB specifically advocated comparing 
markets with ‘similar characteristics’. However, for an external body, such as a 
complaining government or the WTO dispute settlement system, to override 
differences between separate domestic markets on the basis of essential external 
characteristics seems to undermine the WTO commitment to respecting the 
sovereignty of each Member to set its own domestic regulations. In these examples, 
the extension of the evidence-gathering process tilted the balance toward the trade 
obligations under the NTP.  
 
B. Less Favourable Treatment/SATAP 
After advocating a more speculative approach to evidence under the DCS test, the AB 
in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages also distanced itself from the use of evidence in the 
SATAP test. They were concerned that relying upon quantitative data risked creating 
                                                
37 Ibid at para. 168.  
38 H Pacini and S Silveira, ‘Consumer choice between ethanol and gasoline: Lessons from Brazil and 
Sweden’ (2011) 39 Energy Policy, 6936 – 6942.  
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a ‘trade effects test’, under which the presence of discrimination would be determined 
based upon import volumes. They stressed that a violation should not be limited by 
such a requirement. Article III outlines a code of conduct for trade partners; thus, if it 
were to be applied exclusively in situations where discriminatory impact was already 
occurring, this would unduly limit its influence.  
This has become a standard interpretation under the NTP, repeated and further 
elaborated in future disputes. For example, in Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), the 
Panel stated: 
The analysis of whether imported products are accorded less favourable 
treatment requires a careful examination “grounded in close scrutiny of the 
'fundamental thrust and effect of the measure itself”, including of the 
implications of the measure for the conditions of competition between 
imported and like domestic products. This analysis need not be based on 
empirical evidence as to the actual effects of the measure at issue in the 
internal market of the Member concerned.39  
Focusing on application not evidence might lead to a more deferent approach 
to national regulation. The AB might consider that simply looking at trade effects 
would intrude excessively on domestic sovereignty, when the WTO is only supposed 
to prevent discrimination. On the other, hand, the AB might feel that looking at trade 
volumes limited the scope of the NTP, as there may be discriminatory treatment that 
is not reflected by trade volumes but still exists in the application of the regulation. 
Either position reflects the fact that interpretation rather than simply measuring is 
essential to evaluating a dispute. However, significantly, in its argumentation the AB 
has focused more on the latter issue.  
Diverging approaches in the Panel and AB Reports in US – Tuna II are 
instructive. The Panel stated:  
In the absence of further information as to what share of the US market 
Mexico might expect to secure in the absence of the measures at issue, we are 
not in a position to assess whether Mexico's level of participation in the 
US tuna market reflects a modification of the conditions of competition to the 
detriment of Mexican tuna products or whether it simply reflects Mexico's 
expected level of participation in the US market.40  
The Panel refused to interpret the evidence one way or another. By making a finding 
of less favourable treatment less likely, their approach deferred to the US. Indeed, 
based in part on this reasoning, they found the US to be in compliance with TBT 2.1.  
                                                
39 WTO Appellate Body Report on Thailand – Customs and Fiscal Measures on Cigarettes from the 
Philippines (Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), WT/DS371/AB/R, adopted 17 June 2011, para. 129.  
40 US – Tuna II , Panel Report, above n. 11, at para. 7.359. 
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 The AB contested the Panel’s conclusion: 
Moreover, it is well established that WTO rules protect competitive 
opportunities, not trade flows. [footnote omitted] It follows that, even if 
Mexican tuna products might not achieve a wide penetration of the US market 
in the absence of the measure at issue due to consumer objections to the 
method of setting on dolphins, this does not change the fact that it is the 
measure at issue… that denies most Mexican tuna products access to a 
"dolphin-safe" label in the US market.41  
The AB’s statement serves to remind the Panel that they needed to consider the wider 
impacts of the measure as a whole. However, they suggested that this protectionist 
impact was a violation irrespective of the volume of imports. Namely, even if the 
measure were removed and trade volumes did not increase, it would still be in 
violation. This clearly prioritizes the application of the measure over a quantitative 
consumer demand analysis. However, this ruling goes so far as to challenge the notion 
that products must be in competition in order to be ‘like’.  
Overall, under both the ‘like’ products test and the ‘less favourable treatment’ 
determination, moving away from an evidence-based approach and relying upon more 
speculative methods to establish competitiveness has been used to extend the 
jurisdiction of the NTP, based on concerns that relying solely on objective 
quantitative analysis would weaken the NTP. 
 
7. Product competitiveness/legitimate policy distinctions 
 
To summarize the previous section, the central consideration when determining the 
nature of the competitive relationship between products in dispute is the application 
of the measure, rather than market evidence. The AB has repeatedly affirmed that 
determining a violation requires more than simply quantitative assessment. The 
dismissal of evidence, or use of speculative evidence, to establish that products are 
competitive, has been used to tilt the balance toward trade liberalization. Yet an 
interpretation- rather than evidence-based approach may also tilt the balance in the 
other direction.  
This dichotomy forms the focus of this section. There has been a divided 
approach to interpreting the NTP. At times, the AB has concluded that a negative 
impact on competition (determined through a measure’s application rather than 
                                                
41 Ibid, AB Report, at para. 239.  
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market evidence) automatically constitutes a violation of the NTP. At other times, the 
AB has further distinguished between protectionist measures and those whose 
purpose is ‘innocent’, even if they have negative impacts upon competitive 
opportunities for imported products. 
The former approach gives the NTP a narrower band of compliance. The latter 
is more deferent, allowing for the possibility that the measure’s objectives were 
neutral with respect to imports. The approach to this important issue under Article 
III(2), Article III(4) and TBT 2.1 has differed substantially. Therefore the following 
analysis is divided into separate sections for each.  
 
A. Article III(2) 
An analysis of some early rejected GATT Panel Reports under Article III(2), 
outlining the ‘aim-and-effect’ approach, helps to set the stage for an analysis of later 
jurisprudence. In these reports, the Panel specifically took into account whether the 
intent of the regulation was discriminatory in the context of the ‘like’ products test. In 
a 1992 GATT dispute under III(2), US – Malt Beverages,42 the Panel decided that the 
determination of whether the products in dispute were ‘like’ should also regard the 
larger purpose of the Article, articulated in III(1), whose key concept is that a measure 
should not be applied so as to afford protection to domestic products. Thus, the Panel 
decided that, in the converse, Article III should not prevent measures not applied 
SATAP. 
This argument was applied and extended in the unadopted GATT Panel report 
in the dispute US – Taxes on Automobiles.43 The EC complained that a US luxury 
excise tax on automobiles that cost more than US $30,000 unfairly discriminated 
against European imports. The Panel stated that the purpose of the GATT was not to 
harmonize regulation but rather to lower barriers to trade; thus a measure not taken 
SATAP to domestic products was not in violation.44 They concluded that, though it 
had a de facto effect of discriminating against imports, the tax did not have a 
discriminatory intent. This was because the technology to manufacture cheaper cars 
was not inherent to the US, nor were luxury cars inherently of foreign origin.45 Thus, 
                                                
42 GATT Panel Report on United States – Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages (US – 
Malt Beverages), DS23/R – 39S/206, adopted 19 June 1992. 
43 US – Taxes on Automobiles, above n. 4.  
44 Ibid at para. 5.8. 
45 Ibid at para. 5.24. 
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the question of whether a measure is discriminatory was resolved in part by 
examining whether the intent or ‘aim’ of the tax was to protect domestic products.  
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, the AB soundly rejected this ‘aim-and-
effect’ approach. The AB argued that protective application need not be established as 
a part of the first sentence of Article III(2), containing the ‘like products’ test.  
 With regard to the second sentence, SATAP was not a question of intent – 
instead it had to do with how the measure was applied. They stated that;  
We believe that an examination in any case of whether dissimilar taxation has 
been applied so as to afford protection requires a comprehensive and 
objective analysis of the structure and application of the measure in question 
on domestic as compared to imported products. We believe it is possible to 
examine objectively the underlying criteria used in a particular tax measure, 
its structure, and its overall application to ascertain whether it is applied in a 
way that affords protection to domestic products.46 [Emphasis added] 
Such an approach, they suggested, would move away from the problem of 
subjectivity that results from trying to discern a government’s aim. This influential 
statement has shaped the dispute settlement bodies’ approach to determining the 
existence of protectionism in future disputes under Article III.  
Under this established approach, with respect to ‘like’ products, even the 
smallest amount of ‘excess’ tax on imported can be considered protectionist. The AB 
reasoned that Article III(I) informs all of Article III’s interpretation. Thus, although 
Article III(2) sentence one does not specifically reference Article III(1), if there is 
taxation ‘in excess of’ domestic ‘like’ products, this in itself amounts to a finding that 
a tax was applied ‘so as to afford protection’ to domestic products.47  
With DCS products, it is also necessary to determine whether a measure has 
been applied ‘so as to afford protection’ to domestic products.48 In this case, the Japan 
– Alcoholic Beverages II AB stated that ‘the dissimilar taxation must be more than de 
minimis’; however, they did not specify a specific quantity.49 Therefore, in general 
terms, if products are ‘like’ there is a stricter prohibition on differential treatment than 
if they are ‘DCS’. The analysis of ‘DCS’ products leaves more room for the AB to 
conclude that the differential treatment may have been shaped by something other 
than protectionism. However, there is no specifically defined threshold in either case. 
                                                
46 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, AB Report, above n. 14, at 28 – 29. 
47 Ibid at 23.  
48 Ibid at 27.  
49 Ibid at 30. 
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In Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, the AB reaffirmed its separation from the aim 
and effect approach, stating that ‘The subjective intentions inhabiting the minds of 
individual legislators or regulators do not bear upon the inquiry, if only because they 
are not accessible to treaty interpreters.’50 Following the AB in Alcoholic Beverages 
II, this establishes a dichotomy between subjective and objective, rejecting the former 
in favour of the latter. 
They also stated: 
We called for examination of the design, architecture and structure of a tax 
measure precisely to permit identification of a measure's objectives or 
purposes as revealed or objectified in the measure itself….a measure’s 
purposes, objectively manifested in the design, architecture and structure of 
the measure, are intensely pertinent to the task of evaluating whether or not 
that measure is applied so as to afford protection to domestic production. 
[Emphasis added]51 
As this statement reveals, what the AB rejected was not incorporating a consideration 
of policy objectives (‘a measure’s purposes’), but doing so subjectively.  
The AB cannot accept at face value a government’s statement that a tax was 
not intended to be protectionist. However, the ‘subjective’ versus ‘objective’ 
dichotomy can be critiqued on several grounds. First, the role of ‘subjective’ 
regulatory intent in interpreting discrimination has not disappeared; instead it has 
been incorporated into the question of protective application. Indeed, all of the Article 
III(2) disputes considered herein have explicitly considered a responding 
government’s stated intent, as it forms the central thrust of these governments’ 
argument that the measure is not applied SATAP. The concept of ‘revealing structure’ 
was used in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II to characterize the focus on objective 
application.52 One author has noted that the phrase itself begs the question: revealing 
what? The answer: protective regulatory intent.53  
Also, the dichotomy may imply a hierarchy. The use of the concept of 
subjectivity mirrors Korea’s complaint against the Panel in Korea – Alcoholic 
Beverages that the use of speculative evidence was subjective. In both cases, 
subjectivity was the basis for dismissing an argument. In Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II, it was associated with a national government’s argument as to why it is 
setting a particular regulatory goal.  
                                                
50 Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, AB Report, above n. 20, at para. 62. 
51 Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, AB Report, above n. 22, at para. 71. 
52 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, AB Report, above n. 14, at 29. 
53 Verhoosel, above n. 4, at 55. 
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This also implies that the AB is objective. As repeatedly affirmed by the AB 
themselves, they are not simply making a quantitative analysis, but engaging in an act 
of judgment; judgment is inherently subjective. Further, the AB is enforcing WTO 
law and embodying its institutional mandate.54 This is appropriate and in line with 
Member States’ voluntary agreement to comply with WTO rules. However, objective 
discernment seems to imply that the dispute settlement bodies are arbiters of a neutral 
standard.  
 
B. Article III(4) 
Article III(4) does not consider whether products are DCS, but only establishes if they 
are ‘like’. The AB in EC – Asbestos recognized that the interpretation of the term 
‘like’ is therefore different. They stated that the definition of ‘like’ products under 
III(4) should be somewhere in between Article III(2)’s ‘like products’ and ‘directly 
competitive or substitutable’ products.55 This can be seen as the general approach 
under Article III(4).  
 Along the same lines as in Article III(2), the question arises: once it has been 
established that products are ‘like’, is any differential treatment on imported products 
automatically a violation? It has been affirmed repeatedly that it does not.56 After 
clarifying this point, the AB in Korea – Beef further stated that: 
Whether or not imported products are treated "less favourably" than like 
domestic products should be assessed instead by examining whether a 
measure modifies the conditions of competition in the relevant market to the 
detriment of imported products.57 
This assessment has formed the baseline consideration in the less favourable 
treatment test. In some disputes, the AB considered that a negative impact on 
competitive opportunities was sufficient to constitute a violation. This approach, 
outlined in US – Section 337,58 was further developed in Korea – Beef. It has been 
                                                
54 This is supported by the fact that the WTO Secretariat has an influence on dispute outcomes, as it 
assists the Panel and in many cases makes recommendations that shape the outcome of the dispute. 
55 EC – Asbestos, above n. 16, at paras. 92 – 96. 
56 See, eg, WTO Panel Report on GATT United States – Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (US – 
Section 337), BISD 365/345, adopted 7 November 1989, at para. 5.11; WTO Appellate Body Report on 
Korea-Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea – Beef), 
WT/DS161/AB/R; WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2000, at para. 137; Thailand – Cigarettes 
(Philippines), above n. 39, at para 128; EC – Asbestos, above n. 16, at para. 100. 
57 Korea – Beef, ibid at para. 137. 
58 US – Section 337, above n. 56. 
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employed frequently, for example, in the recent AB Report of the dispute, Thailand – 
Cigarettes (Philippines): 
… what is relevant is whether such regulatory differences distort the 
conditions of competition to the detriment of imported products. If so, then the 
differential treatment will amount to treatment that is "less favourable" within 
the meaning of Article III:4.59 
The AB further clarified that there must be a ‘genuine relationship’ between the 
measure and its adverse impacts upon competitive opportunities for imported 
products in order for a violation to occur.60  
In EC – Asbestos, the AB developed a two-step analysis to determining less 
favourable treatment: first, establishing whether the ‘like’ products were treated 
differently; second, determining whether that differential treatment constituted less 
favourable treatment.61 However, they did not elaborate as there had been no appeal 
from the Panel’s ruling on this issue.   
In Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, the AB further clarified:  
However, the existence of a detrimental effect on a given imported product 
resulting from a measure does not necessarily imply that this measure accords 
less favourable treatment to imports if the detrimental effect is explained by 
factors or circumstances unrelated to the foreign origin of the product….62 
The interpretation of less favourable treatment now includes the possibility 
that a measure may have a negative impact on conditions of competition and still not 
violate the NTP, as long as that impact can be explained by something besides 
protectionism. In that it is not a strictly market-based approach, this more closely 
resembles the ‘aim-and-effect’ approach rejected under Article III(2), but for the 
important distinction that the consideration of policy objectives is housed in the less 
favourable treatment test rather than the ‘like’ products test. This has not become a 
universal approach; this extra step is only included in certain disputes, determined on 
a case-by-case basis.  
In theory, the evaluation of less favourable treatment should not be influenced 
by any consideration of the extent to which the public policy objectives are 
compelling, as this would involve a type of rationale limited to GATT Article XX. 
Instead, along the lines of Article III(2) the determination should focus solely on how 
the measure is applied. Even so, if a negative impact on conditions of competition can 
                                                
59 Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), above n. 39, at para. 128. 
60 Ibid at para. 134.  
61 EC – Asbestos, above n. 16, at para. 100.  
62 Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, AB Report, above n. 22, at para. 93 
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be explained by factors unrelated to the origin of the product; this inherently provides 
more deference to public policy objectives.  
This issue is significant with respect to non-product related process and 
production methods (‘NPR PPMs’). The AB has never directly addressed the legality 
of NPR PPMs based upon how a product is produced, and existing jurisprudence is 
ambiguous.63 There have been several instances in which the AB ruled against NPR 
PPM regulations, though these were based upon the characteristics of the producer, 
rather than how products were produced.64  Therefore, despite the precedent of US – 
Tuna II, discussed earlier in the thesis, there is still some ambiguity. 
A country may treat certain products unequally because of how they are 
produced; for example, biofuels grown in highly biodiverse areas. If NPR PPMs-
based regulatory distinctions are not recognized as a valid basis for discrimination, 
and the regulated products are imported but not produced domestically, it would be 
easy to conclude that the measure was discriminatory.  
The approach taken in Dominican Republic – Cigarettes provides more 
deference to regulation based upon NPR PPMs. For example, the AB might evaluate 
the application of the measure and determine that land-use criteria differentiating 
sustainable from conventional biofuels are not discriminatory as they are unrelated to 
the foreign origin of the product. In this case they would not violate the NTP, even if 
they have a negative impact on conditions of competition for imported biofuels. The 
wider implication is that NPR PPMs are acceptable in principle as long as the 
production method is clearly linked to the objective that the government wishes to 
achieve. 
 
C. TBT 2.1 
The US – Tuna II and US – Clove Cigarettes AB Reports consider whether a negative 
impact on conditions of competition may be explained by ‘legitimate regulatory 
distinctions’, a further step toward considering factors other than competition impacts. 
                                                
63 This argument was made in GATT Panel Report on United States – Restrictions on Imports of Tuna 
(US – Tuna), DS21/R – BISD 39S/155, unadopted, circulated 3 September 1991; see also US – Taxes 
on Automobiles, Panel Report, above n. 4. 
64 See, eg, US – Malt Beverages, above n. 42; WTO Panel Report on United States – Standards for 
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (US – Gasoline), WT/DS2/R, adopted 29 January 1996, 
paras. 6.11- 6.12. 
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The US – COOL Panel, on the other hand, focused on conditions of competition (the 
AB Report has not yet appeared at the time of writing). 
In US – Clove Cigarettes, Indonesia challenged the US ban, which was based 
on their conclusion that the flavour of clove cigarettes encouraged more young people 
to take up smoking. The Panel were reluctant to import Article III’s competition-
based approach. Instead, they proclaimed their strategy of bearing in mind the 
purpose of the regulation, which was public health, and more specifically the 
reduction of youth smoking. With respect to the public health objective, they 
considered it particularly significant that both (domestic) menthol and (imported) 
clove cigarettes had an additive that reduces harshness and acts as a numbing agent. 
Therefore, they considered these products to be ‘like’ with respect to the relevant 
criterion: whether youth smokers would take to them.65  
The Panel concluded that the US was inconsistent with respect to its policy 
objective of reducing youth smoking. While they banned clove cigarettes, they did not 
ban ‘like’ domestic menthol cigarettes. The Panel determined that they did not ban 
domestic menthols because to do so would be expensive. Therefore, they concluded 
that the US was imposing costs on other Members while protecting US entities from 
similar costs.66  
The AB Report disagreed with the Panel’s suggestion that the policy 
objectives of the measure should shape the interpretation of the ‘like’ products test. 
They reiterated that it was only in the marketplace that it could be determined how a 
measure treated ‘like’ products.67  
In their critique of the Panel’s approach to ‘like’ products, they echoed some 
of the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Panel’s initial reasoning regarding the rejection 
of the aim-and-effect test. They suggested that it might be difficult to ascertain the 
regulatory objectives pursued, as they might be multiple, and the Panel might not be 
in the position to prioritize. To support this argument, they cited the fact that the US 
themselves had criticized the Panel for focusing on the measure’s immediate 
objective, while disregarding its other regulatory goals.68 They were concerned that 
changing the terms of the ‘like’ product test to include policy objectives might narrow 
                                                
65 US – Clove Cigarettes, Panel Report, above n. 10, at paras. 7.182, 7.208 and 7.247. 
66 Ibid at para. 7.289. 
67 Ibid, AB Report, at para. 110 – 111.  
68 Ibid at para. 114. 
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or alter the scope of the concept in a way that would then impact upon the ‘less 
favourable treatment’ determination.69 Thus, along the lines of the rejection of the 
aim-and-effect test, this dispute provided a second clear rejection of incorporating 
policy objectives into the ‘like’ products test.  
The AB noted disagreement between Indonesia and the United States in their 
interpretation of the ‘treatment no less favourable’ requirement of TBT Article 2.1. 
Indonesia argued that a modification of conditions of competition to the detriment of 
imported goods implied that a violation had occurred, while the US believed that it 
was additionally necessary to establish that this treatment had to do with the foreign 
origin of the product in dispute.70 Thus these national positions exemplified differing 
interpretations of Article III(4).  
The AB agreed with the US interpretation. In so doing, they took into account 
the fact that a technical regulation establishes distinctions between products. Thus, 
any differential treatment between products should not per se be considered less 
favourable treatment.71 In sum, the AB clarified that the TBT Agreement permitted 
‘detrimental impact on competitive opportunities for imports that stems exclusively 
from legitimate regulatory distinctions’.72  
They emphasized that legitimate regulatory distinctions must be the exclusive 
cause of the negative impact on competition, and that the AB must scrutinize the 
measure to see if it was even-handed in its application.73 In so doing, they reviewed 
the US’s regulatory distinctions, including reducing youth smoking, preventing a 
surge in hospitalization from withdrawal from menthol cigarettes, and preventing a 
black market. The AB agreed with the Panel that both menthol and clove cigarettes 
contained flavouring, so there was no legitimate reason for less favourable treatment 
of the ‘like’ imported product. They also considered that preventing hospitalization 
was not a compelling objective, as this was associated with nicotine withdrawal, 
rather than withdrawal from mint (the active ingredient in menthols).74 On this basis, 
they concluded that less favourable treatment of imported ‘like’ products had 
occurred.  
                                                
69 Ibid at para.116. 
70 Ibid at para. 165. 
71 Ibid at para. 169. 
72 Ibid at para. 175. 
73 Ibid at para. 182. 
74 Ibid at para. 225. 
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 In US – Tuna II the AB employed a similar approach to the ‘less favourable 
treatment’ test. The dispute concerned a US law that tuna could not be labelled 
dolphin safe if it were fished by encircling dolphins with purse seine nets to catch the 
tuna that congregated underneath, a requirement that applied specifically within the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific (‘ETP’).75  
Mexico argued that the US should change its requirement from no encircling 
dolphins to ‘no dolphin mortality or serious injury’.76 They stated that Mexican fleets 
had made successful efforts to dramatically reduce dolphin mortality by following the 
procedures of an alternative international certification system. 77 Mexico also felt that 
the requirement was inconsistent: there were dolphins being killed by tuna fishing 
outside the ETP area, and the US was not strict enough in its response.78 
The US argued that encircling dolphins in fact was responsible for their 
continuing deaths, and also listed other negative impacts on dolphins, such as 
separating mothers from their dependent calves, and reducing reproduction rates due 
to stress. They also pointed out that the label was voluntary; Mexican tuna that did not 
qualify was still sold in the US.79 They argued that international efforts, while 
successful to some degree, had not been sufficient.  
The AB first provided a clarification with respect to the relationship between 
PPMs and the TBT’s Article 2.1. The AB stated that: 
Article 2.1 should not be read … to mean that any distinctions, in particular 
ones that are based exclusively on particular product characteristics or on 
particular processes and production methods, would per se constitute "less 
favourable treatment" within the meaning of Article 2.1.80 
Thus, they underlined that PPM-based measures did not automatically constitute a 
violation of the TBT Agreement.   
The AB made clear that a detrimental impact on imports is not sufficient to 
constitute less favourable treatment; it must also be established that this treatment 
does not stem from a legitimate regulatory distinction.81 Their approach thus aligned 
with that of US – Clove Cigarettes. Applying this approach, they divided their 
analysis into two stages: first, an assessment of whether the measure modified 
                                                
75 US – Tuna II, Panel Report, above n. 11, at para 2.15. 
76 Ibid at para. 2.38. 
77 Ibid at paras. 4.10 – 4.16. 
78 Ibid at paras. 4.33 – 4.34. 
79 Ibid at para. 4.74. 
80 Ibid, AB Report at para. 211. 
81 Ibid at para. 216. 
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conditions of competition to the detriment of Mexican tuna products; second, whether 
this detrimental impact stemmed exclusively from a legitimate regulatory 
distinction.82 
Undertaking the first stage, the AB concluded that there was a detrimental 
impact on Mexican tuna as the majority was caught using the ‘purse seine’ method 
prohibited in the US.83 Following guidance from Thailand – Cigarettes (Philippines), 
quoted above, that there should be a ‘genuine relationship’ between the measure and 
the adverse competitive impact, they stated that this should be determined by 
enquiring whether it was specifically the government intervention that determined the 
conditions under which the imported and domestic product competed. They 
concluded that, as the measure controlled access to the label, and allowed consumers 
to express their preference for dolphin-safe tuna, it determined the conditions of 
competition.84  
The AB then considered whether this negative impact was a result of a 
legitimate regulatory distinction. The AB stated that the labelling provision was not 
even-handed: it excluded tuna caught by setting on dolphins inside the ETP, while 
permitting tuna caught outside of the ETP by other fishing methods, despite the fact 
that significant detrimental impacts upon dolphins result from the latter.85 Thus, the 
AB concluded that the labelling provision did not comply with Article 2.1. Their 
ruling was based upon their interpretation of the consistency of the measure.  
The US – COOL Panel Report provides an interesting counterpoint. In the 
dispute, Canada and Mexico, as well as a number of third parties, complained that the 
US’s policy for country of origin labelling for a variety of products, particularly meat 
products, constituted de facto discrimination under the TBT Agreement. Their 
approach was based more strictly upon the effect of the measure on market 
competitiveness. They noted that the measure led to segregation between domestic 
and imported animals; while this in itself did not constitute de facto discrimination, 
segregation led to higher costs.86 They also concluded that the measure created 
incentives for participants to process domestic rather than imported livestock because 
                                                
82 Ibid at para. 231. 
83 Ibid at paras. 234 – 235. 
84 Ibid, AB Report at paras. 237 – 240. 
85 Ibid at para. 298. 
86 Ibid, Panel Report at paras. 7.328, 7.372. 
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it would be cheaper to do so.87 Thus, with reference to Korea – Beef, they concluded 
that the measure created a lack of competitive opportunities for imported livestock, 
and thus constituted less favourable treatment.88 The policy objectives of the measure 
did not constitute a separate judicial consideration.  
 
8. EU Biofuels Sustainability Criteria 
 
Though biofuels have not been the subject of a trade dispute, there is the potential for 
conflict under Article III(4) or TBT 2.1. Whether these provisions, when applied, will 
discriminate unfairly against importers is subject to debate. There could be a dispute 
under the NTP if exporting countries argue sustainable and conventional biofuels are 
‘like’, and that sustainability regulations de facto discriminate against imports.  
As the disputes in this chapter demonstrate, adjudicating a violation requires 
analysing its national implementation. The detailed analysis of past disputes that this 
chapter undertakes is based upon dispute settlement bodies’ reports which synthesize 
the information submitted by the parties in dispute. In examining tthe NTP-
compatibility of biofuels sustainability criteria, the following analysis focuses on the 
EU criteria themselves, rather than their national implementation.  
 
A. The role of evidence and the ‘like’ products test  
The next chapter focuses on the ‘like’ products test and biofuels sustainability criteria, 
so this section will be brief. The AB has consistently rejected the consideration of 
policy objectives when determining if products are ‘like’. While this rejection forms a 
focus of the next chapter, this section will focus on the role of evidence in the ‘like’ 
products test. In an ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute under the NTP, the dispute settlement 
bodies would first need to determine if the products in dispute are ‘like’.  
In general terms, it can be said that the lack of reliance on evidence has been 
used to strengthen, rather than check, the NTP; this could certainly be relevant in a 
dispute on biofuels sustainability criteria. If there were a negative competitive impact 
on imported biofuels because consumers did not like the fact that they were 
unsustainable, the AB might discount this, in keeping with previous practice. The 
                                                
87 Ibid at para. 7.357. 
88 Ibid at para. 7.373 – 7.374. 
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argument would be that the measure in dispute was in fact shaping consumer 
preference.  
The dynamics of this regulation differ from those in Korea – Alcoholic 
Beverages, for example, in which the AB suggested that consumers had yet to 
develop a taste for an imported alcoholic beverage as they had not been exposed to it 
enough. For this reason, it seems unlikely that the AB would cite the possibility of 
future competition, as they did in that dispute, to prove that domestic and imported 
biofuels were competitive.  
However, it is possible that the AB might take into account an argument that 
there was latent demand. For example, perhaps consumers would prefer to buy 
imported biofuels that did not comply with the criteria if they were cheaper. They 
might also incorporate evidence from similar markets to demonstrate that consumers 
in these countries purchased conventional biofuels without reservation. These are all 
speculative possibilities, but they illustrate how these approaches would make it more 
likely that the products in dispute would be considered ‘like’, even if consumers 
boycotted imported conventional biofuels.  
Measuring consumer preference will depend on the availability of imported 
versus domestic products, and how this distinction mapped onto the division between 
sustainable and non-sustainable biofuels. These supply chain issues also form a focus 
of the next chapter, so they will not be addressed at length here. 
 
B. Less favourable treatment 
i. The role of evidence 
While domestic biodiesels still account for the majority of EU biofuels consumption, 
imports have been on the rise at the expense of domestic production.89 Yet, regardless 
of current import levels or trends, under the established approach, simply identifying 
a discriminatory structure and application would be sufficient to establish a violation. 
US – Tuna II provides a useful example of the spectrum of interpretation of this issue 
even under the established approach. As previously cited, in this dispute only 1 per 
cent of the imports in the responding country, the US, came from Mexico, the 
complaining country.  
                                                
89 See, eg, M Hogan and I Sekularac, ‘Analysis: EU Biodiesel plans fear closure as imports surge’, 
Reuters, 15 November 2011; ‘‘EU likely to curb Indonesian palm biofuels imports’, Business Reporter, 
27 November 2011. 
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The Panel and the AB interpreted this differently. The Panel stated that there 
was no way of knowing whether the low level of imports was due to the behaviour of 
the market irrespective of the measure. This is an extremely deferent approach, in 
which the Panel actually disregarded evidence of low import volumes. They thus gave 
the US the benefit of the doubt; for this and other reasons, they finally determined that 
the measure did not violate TBT 2.1.  
The AB reaffirmed the importance of examining the application of the 
measure itself, rather than trade volumes. They further clarified that their finding that 
the measure was protectionist would stand even if Mexican products ‘might not 
achieve a wide penetration of the US market in the absence of the measure at issue 
due to consumer objections to the method of setting on dolphins’.90 The AB jettisoned 
consumer’s potential perceptions of morality even if they impacted upon the levels of 
competition between the products in dispute. They emphasized the application of the 
measure over trade volumes. This suggests that, even if aversion to purse seine fishing 
meant that tuna thus caught would never be competitive, the measure would still 
violate the NTP.  
These interpretations would be applicable to an ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute. If 
trade volumes of imported biofuels were low, the dispute settlement bodies would 
face a similar question: do these figures reflect market forces, or are they a result of 
the measure at issue? Following the Panel’s approach, they would be more likely to 
conclude that the measure was not protectionist. Following the AB’s rationale, 
however, the application of the measure and whether it de facto discriminated against 
imported biofuels would be the main consideration, even if consumers would not 
purchase imported ‘unsustainable’ biofuels if the measure were removed.  
ii. Conditions of competition versus legitimate policy distinctions  
The AB’s interpretation of whether the EU’s regulatory distinction is legitimate will 
also be influential in their ruling. For example, the EU’s identification of prohibited 
land areas for growing biofuels may have a negative impact on conditions of 
competition for certain exporters. This might automatically indicate that the measure 
is protectionist. Yet the AB might also focus on whether the application of the 
measure is even-handed and based upon the legitimate regulatory distinction between 
conventional biofuels and those produced with the goals of biodiversity preservation 
                                                
90 US – Tuna II, AB Report, above n. 11, at para. 239.  
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and emissions reduction.91 If so, the regulation would not have to do with the foreign 
origin of the biofuels as such.  
As TBT disputes demonstrate, adding a separate consideration of whether the 
measure is based upon a legitimate policy distinction does not guarantee that it will be 
compliant. In US – Tuna II, Mexico questioned some inconsistencies, for example, 
more stringent requirements inside than outside the ETP. The AB agreed with Mexico 
that these inconsistencies suggested that the measure was discriminatory rather than 
reflecting a legitimate regulatory distinction. Similarly, a complaining country might 
raise inconsistencies in the RED, such as methodological flaws in calculating various 
emissions savings or establishing land-use categories.  
Nonetheless, this interpretation is clearly more deferent to the regulating 
country. The fact that the EU has chosen to regulate biofuels products differently 
based upon land-use impacts suggests that they do see a legitimate regulatory 
distinction. As one author has written, ‘Where WTO dispute resolution panels review 
and reject domestic regulatory categories, they sit in judgment of the rationality of 
those categories and of the regulation itself’.92 Affirming that an NPR PPM, in this 
case the land-use criteria, can be the basis for legitimate regulatory distinction also 
implicitly affirms that this category of regulation is legal and valid.  
It is interesting to note that there are no criteria to determine which approach 
the AB adopts. One hypothesis, though it is speculative, is that the approach reflects 
in part the perceived importance of the regulatory goals that the measure pursues, an 
implicit balancing process. If this is the case, the AB’s interpretation of the NTP 
would also suggest something about the importance they gave to biodiversity 
conservation and emissions reduction, when weighed against the trade impacts. This 




A central and oft-analysed issue in WTO law has to do with the balance between 
regulatory autonomy and trade commitments under the NTP. This analysis suggests 
                                                
91 European Council Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the 
promotion of the use of energy from renewable sources and amending and subsequently repealing 
Directives 2001/77/EC and 2003/30/EC’ OJ [2009] L140/16 (‘RED’), at Preamble paras. 69 – 70. 
92 J Trachtman, ‘Trade and…Problems: Problems, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Subsidiarity’ (1998) 9 
European Journal of International Law, 66. 
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that there are elements of the EU’s regulation that may not conform with the NTP. 
Determining conformity would depend in part on the AB’s interpretation of the two 
issues that form the focus of this chapter: the influence of evidence and whether the 
AB considered that legitimate regulatory distinctions might account for a negative 
impact on conditions of competition. The jurisprudence demonstrates that there is 
room for interpretation on a dispute-by-dispute basis, particularly with respect to the 
latter issue. 
The theme that connects both of these topics is the importance of 
interpretation. This is significant with respect to the AB’s emphasis on the existence 
and nature of competitive relationships between products in dispute as the key factor 
in assessing compliance with the NTP. Assessing competitiveness may seem to imply 
undertaking quantitative analyses of market flows. In fact this has been decisively 
rejected. In the ‘like’ and DCS products test, the AB has rejected quantitative 
assessment of existing market relationships in favour of an approach that is more 
speculative. When determining whether a measure is discriminatory, the AB has 
focused on its applications, rather than evidence of trade volumes.  
This has implications for the balance between national sovereignty and WTO 
law. Adjudicating the NTP solely based upon market evidence of competition would 
not be desirable, as it would result in automatic deregulation with respect to any 
measure which had a negative impact upon imported products. Yet this chapter 
pointed out instances in which the dismissal of evidence, and use of more speculative 
evidence, were employed to find measures not in compliance. The rationale has been 
that relying on evidence will weaken the NTP’s influence, as the principle evaluates 
the application of a measure rather than its effects.  
The nature of the AB’s interpretation is also significant with respect to the 
second theme of this chapter. This chapter outlined two approaches. Under the first, a 
finding of violation is based upon assessing the presence of a negative impact on 
conditions of competition to the detriment of imported products (though this may 
require interpreting the nature of the competitive relationships). Under the second, the 
AB also takes into account whether this negative impact might be explained by 
something other than the products’ foreign origin, or based upon ‘legitimate 
regulatory distinctions’. Considering whether regulatory distinctions are legitimate 
necessitates another layer of interpretation. In this case, this is a more deferent 
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approach, as it allows the possibility that even a measure with a negative impact on 
competition for imported products might not violate the NTP.   
This approach can be distinguished from the type of reasoning that the AB 
undertakes in GATT Article XX or TBT 2.2. The AB is not linking their 
interpretation to the policy objectives at stake, as they would under these Articles, but 
simply assessing whether it seems likely that the measure is discriminatory based 
upon its structure and application. In this sense, it remains a neutral approach with 
respect to the importance of the regulatory values at stake. However, the concept of 
‘legitimate’ policy distinctions, as stated under TBT 2.1 jurisprudence, suggests a bit 
of a gray area. It may be difficult to establish that a policy distinction is ‘legitimate’ 
without any reflection on the importance of the value at stake.  
The AB has not explained the reasoning behind adopting this more deferent 
approach in some disputes and not others. One possibility is that this determination is 
influenced by the importance of the values at stake, an implicit balancing process. For 
example, the regulatory objectives of two of the recent TBT disputes had clear public 
policy implications: preventing youth smoking and eliminating dolphin bycatch in 
tuna fishing. On the other hand, the US – COOL dispute focused on country of origin 
labelling for meat products. Perhaps the compelling public policy implications of the 
former disputes might go some of the way toward explaining why the AB considered 
the possibility of ‘legitimate policy objectives’ while the Panel in US – COOL did not. 
This might also contribute to the fact that the AB has taken a more conservative 
approach to rejecting ‘subjective’ regulatory intent in disputes under Article III(2), 
which dealt with taxation measures that did not have such controversial implications. 
This possibility is also significant with respect to biofuels sustainability criteria. It 
raises the question of whether sustainability is as compelling as preventing youth 
smoking or dolphin safety. The suggestion that an implicit balancing process may 





Biofuels sustainability, consumer preference and the 




A. Consumer preferences and the National Treatment Principle 
This chapter focuses on how consumer preferences have been interpreted and applied 
in deliberation of WTO disputes under the National Treatment Principle (‘NTP’). The 
two central issues of the previous chapter also define this analysis. The first is the role 
of market evidence, and the implications of an evidence-based versus interpretive 
approach for the balance between trade liberalization and deference to national policy 
goals. In the ‘like’ products test, in particular, the previous chapter argued that the 
AB’s approach of looking beyond evidence from existing markets to establish product 
competitiveness has increased the jurisdiction of the NTP. This suggests that an 
evidence-based approach, namely measuring consumer behaviour to ascertain product 
competitiveness, is advisable to tilt the balance back toward national regulatory 
autonomy. Taking this suggestion as a starting point for further analysis, this chapter 
examines methodological questions of how these behaviours are measured, and in 
which circumstances they should be dismissed or interpreted.  
The second issue is whether, and how, national policy objectives inform the 
adjudication of whether products are ‘like’. The previous chapter introduced the 
suggestion that the level of deference that the AB showed toward national policy 
objectives may have been influenced by the importance of the value at stake. The AB 
has repeatedly affirmed that the ‘like’ products test is the most market-based aspect of 
the NTP. However, this chapter suggests that the importance of the objectives that a 
measure pursues may influence this determination, when it is too difficult to assess 
consumer preference for an objective, competition-based argument.  
The entry point for this analysis is the concept of ‘like’ products. This concept, 
which recurs throughout the WTO Agreements, is an influential aspect of WTO law 
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in general.1 The consideration of what constitutes ‘like’ products has differed both 
between, and within, relevant Articles, and the slightly varied phrasing of these 
Articles also influences their interpretation. However, the basic concept is that less 
favourable treatment should not be awarded to ‘like’ products, regardless of their 
origin.  
This chapter focuses on the NTP as it is applied in GATT Article III (‘Article 
III’) and TBT Article 2.1 (‘TBT 2.1’), due to their particular applicability to EU 
biofuels sustainability criteria. The full articles and a brief overview of their 
interpretation is provided in the previous chapter, in Sections 2 and 3. By way of 
review, the NTP generally stipulates that, with regard to regulations, imported 
products must be treated the same way as domestic products.  
The majority of Article III disputes fall under either Article III(2), which 
specifically addresses taxation, or Article III(4), which addresses other forms of 
regulation. The first step in determining whether a national tax or regulation 
discriminates against imported products, thus constituting an Article III violation, is to 
determine whether two products, domestic (favoured) and imported (unfavoured) are 
‘like’. The TBT Agreement contains a National Treatment provision similar to Article 
III(4), whose employment of the term ‘like’ is very similar to that of Article III(4). If 
they are ‘like’, the dispute settlement bodies, which consist of the Panel and the 
Appellate Body (‘AB’), then consider whether the measure is discriminatory. The 
interpretation of the term ‘like’ thus outlines the boundary of the NTP’s jurisdiction. 
When establishing whether products are ‘like’, consumer preferences are an 
important consideration, for two reasons. First, as will be further discussed, 
jurisprudence on the NTP demonstrates that ‘likeness’ is determined in the 
marketplace, based upon consumers’ perceptions of whether goods are in a 
competitive relationship with one another. The Appellate Body (‘AB’) has repeatedly 
affirmed that ‘likeness’ is based upon competition; it should not include an evaluation 
of the policy objectives that led a country to distinguish these products.  
Second, ‘consumer tastes and habits’ forms one of four traditional criteria, 
drawn from a 1970 GATT Border Tax Adjustment Working Party report (‘BTA 
criteria’), utilized to determine whether products are ‘like’. These include: ‘the 
                                                
1 WM Choi, ‘Like Products’ in International Trade Law: Towards a Consistent GATT/WTO 
Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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product's end-uses in a given market; consumers' tastes and habits, which change 
from country to country; the product's properties, nature and quality’ [Emphasis 
added] (GATT, 1970: 3).2 This chapter uses the term ‘consumer preferences,’ rather 
than simply the GATT criterion’s ‘consumer tastes and habits’, to avoid confusion, as 
the influence of consumer preferences goes beyond the application of this criterion, 
and includes a broader consideration of product competitiveness.  
The BTA criteria are meant to define what ‘like’ means, and product 
competitiveness is an essential component of ‘likeness.’ However, it has not been 
clearly established that the BTA criteria are intended to somehow add up to a 
definition of competitiveness. The two enquiries seem to operate in parallel, 
sometimes overlapping.3 Overall, the approach varies widely, and there is not much 
consistency from dispute to dispute, nor generalized guidance. 
In the GATT Agreement, as well as the other WTO Agreements, there are 
very few explicit mentions of consumers, and none in the National Treatment 
Principle itself.4 Though it is not a mandatory aspect of Article III deliberation, of the 
20 disputes that have fallen under Article III since the WTO’s formation in 1995, 
fourteen cite the BTA criteria,5 and more than half utilize consumer preferences in 
coming to their conclusions, often through analysis of whether products are 
competitive with one another.6 While there are too few TBT disputes to evaluate 
general trends, the role of consumer preferences in these disputes will also be 
examined in this chapter.   
One author has suggested that consumer preferences could play a special role 
in WTO disputes that have to do with public policy regulations, specifically with 
                                                
2 In a later Article III dispute, the Panel amended the list to include the customs classification, or HS 
Code, of the product. 
3 In some disputes, for example Japan – Film, the Chile – Alcoholic Beverages Panel Report, and EC – 
Bananas III, discussions of competitiveness, including reference to consumers, occur independent of 
any citation of the BTA criterion. 
4 One mention of consumers occurs in GATT Article IX and XI; WTO GATS Agreement and TRIPS 
Agreement.  
5 See: US – Gasoline, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Canada – Periodicals, Indonesia – Autos, 
Dominican Republic – Cigarettes, Mexico – Soft Drinks, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, EC – Asbestos, 
Canada – Autos, Korea – Beef, Canada – Wheat Exports, EC – Commercial Vessels, US – FSC, Brazil 
– Tyres; see Bibliography for complete references.  
6 See: Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Canada – Periodicals, Indonesia – Autos, Dominican Republic 
– Cigarettes, Mexico – Soft Drinks, Korea – Alcoholic Beverages, Chile – Alcoholic Beverages, EC – 
Bananas III, Japan – Film, EC – Asbestos, Canada – Autos, Korea – Beef, Canada – Wheat Exports, 
Brazil – Tyres; see Bibliography for complete references. 
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regard to emerging regulations that respond to climate change.7 This is because 
products otherwise ‘like’ with regard to the BTA criteria might be different to 
consumers. For example, consumers might prefer goods that have been produced with 
low carbon emissions, and see them as different from conventional goods. In much 
the same way, consumer preferences would also be relevant in a potential dispute on 
biofuels sustainability criteria. The NTP is fundamentally concerned with market 
relationships, rather than the physical characteristics of products in dispute. 
Consumers may see physically similar goods as non-competitive; conversely, they 
may consider physically distinct goods as interchangeable and competitive.8 Thus, 
though measuring consumer preference necessitates market analysis, which makes it 
more difficult to capture than more self-evident BTA criteria, it promises to provide a 
more accurate basis for assessing whether products are ‘like’. 
This chapter investigates the potential importance of consumer preference in a 
dispute on biofuels sustainability criteria. In spite of ongoing controversy about the 
treatment of environmental regulation in the WTO, and scrutiny of the Appellate 
Body (‘AB’) approach to such disputes, not much targeted analysis has been 
undertaken of how consumer preferences have influenced past disputes on public 
policy regulations, and how they should be interpreted in the future. Indeed, much of 
the existing literature has analysed, from an economic perspective, the best 
methodologies for determining ‘like’ products.9  
For the reasons stated above, consumer preference (as it shapes product 
competitiveness) plays a primary role in assessing whether products are ‘like’. 
However, an economic approach to ‘like’ products has faced particular challenges 
when confronted by public policy regulations. This chapter will examine these 
challenges (from a legal, rather than economic, perspective) by contrasting the 
economic approach taken in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II with the approach taken 
in EC – Asbestos, a dispute that raised more difficult ethical questions. It will also 
                                                
7 E Vranes, ‘Climate Labelling and the WTO: The 2010 EU Ecolabelling Programme as a Test Case 
Under WTO Law’ in C Herrman and J Terhechte (eds), European Yearbook of International Economic 
Law (9 March 2010) 11. 
8 E Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law, and 
Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 194. 
9 See, eg, G Berg, ‘An economic interpretation of ‘like-product”’ (1996), 30(2) Journal of World 
Trade, 195-209; Choi, above n. 1. 
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analyse the approach of US – Tuna II10 which raises important questions about the 
applicability of the concept to the relevant product category.  
 
B. Approaches to consumer preferences 
This chapter focuses primarily on two disputes: Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II11 and 
EC – Asbestos. 12  Others have also included substantial analysis of consumer 
preferences. However, the selected disputes, as well as providing important 
benchmarks in the jurisprudence, also well illustrate a spectrum of interpretive 
possibility.  
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II the dispute settlement bodies utilized what 
this chapter calls an objective approach to consumer preference.13 This approach 
emphasized the importance of ‘objective’ BTA criteria, such as how products 
appeared (‘the product’s properties, nature and quality’) and were used (‘the product’s 
end-uses in a given market’), as opposed to ‘subjective’ consumer preferences, such 
as traditional patterns of consumption.  
Further, the dispute emphasized the importance of a competitive market 
relationship between products, from a consumer perspective, as a way to determine 
their ‘likeness.’14 To establish competitiveness, the objective analysis of consumer 
preferences was approached economically. For example, the parties utilized elasticity 
of substitution studies to measure whether consumers would switch to one disputed 
alcoholic beverage if the price of the other rose. As noted in the previous chapter, this 
                                                
10 WTO Panel Report on United States – Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of 
Tuna and Tuna Products (US – Tuna II), WT/DS381/R, adopted 15 September 2011, and Appellate 
Body Report, WT/DS381/AB/R, adopted 16 May 2012. 
11 WTO Panel Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II), 
WT/DS8/R; WT/DS10/R; WT/DS11/R, adopted 11 July 1996; and Appellate Body Report, 
WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R, adopted 4 October 1996. 
12  WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/R, adopted 18 September 2000; and Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001. 
13 This term is borrowed from another analysis, also referenced later, which characterizes the dispute 
settlement bodies’ general approach to Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II as ‘objective’: H Horn and J 
Weiler, ‘European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products’ in 
H Horn (ed), The American Law Institute Reporters’ Studies on WTO Case Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 27-52. 
14 M Bronckers and N McNelis, ‘Rethinking the “Like Product” Definition in GATT 1994: Anti-
Dumping and Environmental Protection’ in T Cottier, et al. (eds), The World Trade Forum, Vol. 2. 
(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000) 345, 347.  
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approach to evidence was subsequently dismissed in Korea – Alcoholic Beverages.15 
In this dispute, the AB emphasized the ‘objectivity’ of their interpretation, as opposed 
to subjective arguments made by the government in dispute.16 However, they also 
rejected a sole reliance on evidence. For the purposes of this chapter, ‘objective’ will 
refer to an evidence-based approach.  
In EC – Asbestos, the dispute settlement bodies faced a very different set of 
circumstances from either of these disputes. None of the disputing parties had 
submitted any evidence, market-based or otherwise, about consumer preferences. In 
part, this reflected the fact that, rather than many individuals, asbestos was purchased 
by few, industrial consumers, which made their preferences more difficult to quantify. 
Further, the measure in question was a public health regulation. The Panel applied the 
same ‘objective’ approach, concluding that consumer preference, as it could not be 
measured, was not a relevant consideration.  
The AB disagreed, asserting that consumers would not prefer asbestos. This 
conclusion was not based in evidence, but common sense, grounded in international 
standards. Though their reasoning represented a departure from the objective 
approach described above, they disingenuously presented it as objective. They did so 
by basing their argument on likely quantitative impacts in the market (a negative 
competition effect), and the objective BTA criterion of physical characteristics of the 
products in question, which then affected consumer preferences.  
EC – Asbestos brings up a fundamental question: should this approach be 
generalized, so that the AB can interpret what constitutes consumer preference when 
dealing with normative regulations that limit, or eliminate, the ability of consumers to 
choose, and thus have their preferences measured? If this approach is not permissible, 
should consumer preferences just be disregarded, despite their relevance to such an 
important public policy decision?  
 
2. Preliminary analysis 
 
                                                
15 WTO Panel Report, Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea – Alcoholic Beverages), 
WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 September 1998, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS75/AB/R; 
WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 18 January 1999. 
16 The previous chapter’s section 6(a) addresses this comprehensively.   
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Considering the different strategies employed in these two disputes, it is possible to 
simply assert that the interpretation of consumer preferences has been inconsistent, 
and even illogical. However, it is perhaps more useful to examine the causes behind 
these discrepancies, and what they reveal about the challenges of capturing consumer 
preferences more generally. In EC – Asbestos, the AB evaluated consumer 
preferences, and product ‘likeness’, without reference to evidence of competitiveness 
between the products. For this to occur, the public policy at issue needed to represent 
a fairly unambiguous consensual societal norm, such as human health, as well as a 
situation where objective evidence about consumer preferences was not available, or 
difficult to obtain. In such a situation, it became politically difficult to keep consumer 
preference, and the associated public policy goal of supporting human health, out of 
the NTP, due to the potential for public backlash.  
The dispute settlement bodies’ approach to consumer preferences reflects oft-
discussed strategies of NTP interpretation employed more broadly in each dispute. 
Thus, considering the influence of consumer preferences involves grappling with 
some of the same controversies that they raised. Principal among these is whether, 
under the NTP, product ‘likeness’ is determined solely by product competitiveness. 
On the other hand, can public policy goals that inform how the product is regulated 
make one product unlike another? In other words, to what extent should the types of 
concerns addressed under GATT Article XX (‘Article XX’) or TBT Article 2.2 (‘TBT 
2.2’) be considered within the ‘likeness’ test of the NTP?  
In this sense, consumer preferences raise some of the same questions as the 
‘aim-and-effect’ test, an approach to interpreting product ‘likeness’ whose rejection 
forms an interrelated theme of the disputes in question. This approach was rejected, in 
part because it unduly empowered a government’s unprovable claim: that its aim in 
setting a regulation was not to discriminate. Consumer preferences would seem not to 
have much in common with this approach, as they represent the collective behaviours 
of individuals, rather than the discretion of a single government. Also, consumer 
preferences are an objectively measured entity, rather than an unprovable claim.  
Or are they? In EC – Asbestos, consumer preferences had two important 
features in common with ‘aim-and-effect’. First, they provided a tool (though used 
rather disingenuously) for broadening the scope of what constituted ‘like’ products, to 
include public policy considerations. Second, they stood in for a discretionary 
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approach to determining the validity of a regulation, though employed by the AB, 
rather than a national government. There is a common theme uniting this approach 
with the previous chapters: the conceptual structure of balancing. This chapter argues 
that, in EC – Asbestos, the AB took the importance of the common value at stake, in 
this case human health, into account when evaluating the measure’s compliance with 
Article III. The dispute demonstrates the difficulty of excluding factors beyond 
quantifiable market impacts when considering whether a measure violates the NTP.  
Perhaps one reason this balancing exercise took place through the 
consideration of consumer preferences is that, while ‘aim and effect’ has been 
rejected, consumer preferences still play an important role in dispute deliberation. 
Future public policy disputes that fall under the NTP will likely provoke the same 
problems and concerns, even if not so strongly as in EC – Asbestos. The potential for 
correlation between products with import bans or restrictions, products that generate 
strong preferences from consumers, and products that come under scrutiny for 
violating WTO rules such as the NTP, suggests that the measurement of consumer 
preferences forms an important area of enquiry.  
The chapter finally considers the example of a hypothetical dispute on EU 
sustainability standards for biofuels. As in EC – Asbestos, the biofuels supply chain 
would likely make it difficult to quantify consumer preferences. To complicate things 
further, a common sense determination is probably more difficult than in the example 
of carcinogenic asbestos. Thus, an approach based on measurement might be difficult; 
an approach based on interpretation would leave a huge amount of discretion to the 
AB, to decide the importance of sustainability to consumers. ‘EU – Biofuels’ is useful 
for illustrating the difficulties that arise regarding consumer preferences in public 
policy disputes, when ‘common sense’ becomes less common.  
In this context, it is also important to consider recent jurisprudence under the 
TBT Agreement, from the Panel Report in US – Tuna II. In the report, the Panel 
dismissed consumer preference because some imported products complied with the 
specification of the regulation, ie, dolphin-safeness. If this same reasoning were 
applied to sustainable biofuels, consumer preference would also be dismissed. Thus, 
the dispute brings up important questions about the categorization of imported versus 
domestic products and how consumer preference maps onto this distinction.  
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3. Case study 1: Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II 
 
A. The dispute 
In 1996, the newly-formed WTO faced its first Article III dispute, Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II, which followed from a 1987 GATT dispute, and had many similar 
elements.17 In the GATT dispute, the EEC argued that, although Japan’s taxation 
policy with regard to alcoholic beverages was origin-neutral, it violated Article III(2). 
They claimed that the policy was both protective and discriminatory, as it levied 
higher taxes on imported ‘like’ products, such as whisky and vodka, than domestic 
products, such as Japanese shochu. Japan argued that its intent was non-
discriminatory. Rather, liquor tax was levied according to the tax-bearing ability. 
Japan also claimed that traditional shochu was not ‘like’ vodka and other competitors. 
The Panel dismissed Japan’s argument about the non-discriminatory intent of its 
measure, concluding that a wide range of the beverages in question were ‘like,’ and 
that the taxation system discriminated against imported alcoholic beverages.   
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, in 1996, followed from the GATT Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages. The US, EC and Canada charged that there was still de facto 
discrimination against imported alcohol under Article III(2), even after the 1987 
GATT ruling. Japan had responded to the 1987 dispute by changing its laws, but put 
in place an excise tax reduction for small producers of shochu. Also, Japan continued 
to tax ‘white’ and ‘brown’ liquor differently, which the complainants charged was a 
discriminatory practice; in particular, they argued that (brown) whisky was ‘directly 
competitive or substitutable’ (‘DCS’) to (white) Japanese shochu.18 
One of the core debates of both disputes concerned consumer preferences: 
were differences consumers perceived between shochu, Japan’s traditional alcoholic 
beverage, and imported alcoholic spirits, significant enough to determine that the 
products were not ‘like’ or ‘DCS’? The dispute settlement bodies’ response to this 
question demonstrated what this chapter is calling the ‘objective’ approach to 
consumer preferences. 
 
                                                
17 GATT Panel Report on Japan – Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines 
and Alcoholic Beverages (Japan – Alcoholic Beverages), L/6216, BISD 34S/83, adopted 13 October 
1987. 
18 Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, above n. 11, at paras. 3.1 – 3.4. 
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B. The objective approach to consumer preferences 
This approach explicitly embraced aspects of consumer preferences that were 
observable, measurable and quantifiable. The 1987 GATT Panel Report illustrated 
some components of the objective approach. In coming to its decision, the 1996 Panel 
Report quoted this section of the 1987 Report: 
…even though the Panel was of the view that the ‘likeness’ of products must 
be examined taking into account not only objective criteria (such as 
composition and manufacturing processes of products) but also the more 
subjective consumers’ viewpoint (such as consumption and use by consumers) 
the Panel agreed…that Japanese shochu (Group A) and vodka could be 
considered as ‘like’ products in terms of Article III:2 because they were both 
white/clean spirits, made of similar raw materials, and their end-uses were 
virtually identical.19 [Emphasis added] 
The Panel established a hierarchy of value between subjective and objective 
components of the ‘like’ products determination. They asserted that physical 
characteristics (which can be observed), and product end-uses (which examine not 
what consumers feel about a product, but what they can do with it) were more 
decisive BTA criteria than ‘subjective consumers’ viewpoint’. This paragraph 
suggested that these, here defined as ‘consumption and use by consumers,’ were not 
influential at all. (In EC – Asbestos we will see that this hierarchy was still in 
operation, but in a more nested way: consumer preferences were made ‘objective’ by 
being measured using this ‘objective’ BTA criteria.)  
In another section quoted by the 1996 Report, the 1987 Panel affirmed that 
since, as ‘the aim of Article III:2…could not be achieved if differential taxes could be 
used to crystallize consumer preference for traditional domestic products, the Panel 
found that the traditional Japanese consumer habits with regard to shochu provided no 
reason for not considering vodka to be a ‘like’ product.’20 In other words, taxation 
measures should not interfere with consumer preferences, whose basis should be the 
free market, rather than the influence of government taxation. The final aspect of the 
‘objective’ approach was the quantification of consumer preferences, to establish the 
market competitiveness of products in dispute.  
 
C. The rejection of ‘aim and effect’ 
                                                
19 Ibid at para. 5.7. 
20 Ibid.  
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By examining the GATT Report, we can deduce that ‘subjective consumers’ 
viewpoints’ referred to two of Japan’s arguments: first, shochu was a traditional 
beverage and thus consumers perceived it differently. Second, consumers perceived 
imported alcoholic beverages as luxury products.21 Japan called upon this second 
argument to justify its intent, which, it stated, was not to discriminate against imports, 
but rather to tax based upon tax-bearing ability.22 
Japan presented similar arguments on both points in 1996, arguing that the 
products were differentiated by the ways in which they were consumed. For example, 
shochu was drunk before dinner; vodka after dinner. Many shochu drinkers added hot 
water to the drink, which they did not do to other spirits.23 These differences resulted 
from the fact that shochu was a traditional beverage, and the others were not. Further, 
Japan claimed that its taxation system was based upon the principle of ‘horizontal 
equity,’ so that tax/price ratios were consistent between all alcoholic beverages.24 In 
other words, wealthier consumers’ preference for luxury imported alcohol justified 
the tax differential.  
Japan argued that exporters and distributors exploited this perception, to keep 
their prices high. Thus, it would be impossible for shochu manufacturers to raise their 
prices so that they competed with imported goods, because consumers perceived 
shochu as a less expensive product. 
In their view, Japan was not distorting consumer perceptions by levying a 
higher tax on whisky, nor were they making it less likely that consumers would buy 
whisky. Instead, they were acting in keeping with consumer perceptions. Japan 
argued that it would be impossible for shochu manufacturers to raise their prices so 
that they competed with imported goods, because consumers perceived shochu as a 
less expensive product. On the other hand, Japan had not included such reasoning 
when it initially drafted the policy; thus the Panel considered it to be an ex post facto 
rationalization.25 
                                                
21 See Japan – Alcoholic Beverages GATT report, above n. 17: Paragraph 3.1 (b) explains the tax 
system; (f) describes consumer perceptions of whisky as a ‘luxury good’. 
22 The Panel rejected Japan’s approach to taxation, because it rested on ‘necessarily subjective 
assumptions about future competition and inevitably uncertain consumer responses (GATT Report 
5.13). [Emphasis added] The implication: as goods become globalized, familiarity increases, and 
consumers may become more comfortable with what they previously saw as luxury goods. 
23 Panel Report, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, above n. 11, at para. 4.54.  
24 Ibid at para. 4.19, 4.71. 
25 Ibid at para. 6.25. 
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However, the Panel agreed with the EC that the ‘use of product and tax 
differentiations with the view of maintaining or promoting certain production and 
consumption patterns could easily distort price-competition among like or directly 
competitive products by creating price differences…which would not exist in case of 
non-discriminatory internal taxation consistent with Article III’.26 This suggests that 
the causal relationship goes the other way from what Japan is submitting. Consumer 
perceptions are not driving the tax differential; rather, the government taxation policy 
is driving consumer tastes and habits. They noted that the concept of ‘taxation 
according to tax-bearing ability of prospective consumers’ of a product did not offer 
an objective criterion because it relied on necessarily subjective assumptions about 
future competition and inevitably uncertain consumer responses.’ It was these 
government measures that might shape consumer behavior, and this should be 
avoided, as it would distort the competitiveness of the products.  
Critical analyses have characterized the dispute settlement bodies’ approach to 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II as ‘objective’,27 ‘formalist’28 or ‘end-use’29. Though 
these analyses differ, they all note that the dispute settlement bodies dismissed not 
only Japan’s argument that its intent was non-discriminatory, but also the justification 
of a measure based on intent: the ‘aim-and-effect’ test. This dismissal became a 
consistent strategy.  
Rejecting the ‘aim-and-effect’ test implies that extra-market issues will be 
considered as exceptions, rather than being a part of the initial determination of 
whether products are ‘like.’ This rejection echoed the 1987 GATT Panel’s assertion 
that taxation should not crystallize consumer preferences. The Panel affirmed the 
market basis of the Article III ‘like’ products determination. 
In their dismissal of aim and effect, the dispute settlement bodies argued that 
Japan was utilizing subjective arguments, such as analysis of traditional patterns of 
consumption, to support an unprovable claim of its ‘intent’. Japan had explained its 
‘aim’, and justified this aim as non-discriminatory, with reference to its analysis of 
consumer preferences. As discussed in the previous chapter, the dispute settlement 
                                                
26 Ibid at 29. 
27 Horn and Weiler, above n. 13, at 31. 
28 MJ Trebilcock and R Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd Edition (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2005) 90. 
29 Choi, above n. 1, at 21.  
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bodies equated ‘aim’ with a subjective approach to consumer preferences, and the 
problem of subjectivity in general: how can you prove an ‘aim’?  
 
D. An econometric approach 
Thus far, this analysis has focused on the criteria for determining consumer 
preferences as part of the consideration of ‘like’ products, and the rejection of aim and 
effect in this context. On this topic, the Panel suggested one principal danger of a 
subjective approach to consumer preferences: a government might use factors such as 
traditional patterns of consumption, to support an unprovable claim of its intent. 
However, we have not discussed the efficacy of its alternative: a proof based, 
objective approach.  
A positive ‘objective’ approach to consumer preferences is best demonstrated 
in the dispute settlement bodies’ examination of ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ 
products. After determining that vodka and shochu were ‘like’, they turned their 
attention to the remaining alcoholic beverages in dispute, and whether they fit into 
this broader category of comparison. The AB interpreted ‘like products’ in the first 
sentence as being defined narrowly, while DCS products are defined more broadly.  
They stated that both ‘like’ and also DCS were relative concepts, whose 
precise interpretation should be determined on a case-by-case basis.30 However, Japan 
– Alcoholic Beverages II is noteworthy for having developed perhaps the most 
econometric approach of any Article III dispute.31 The Panel Report stated that ‘…in 
the Panel’s view, the wording makes it clear that the appropriate test to define 
whether two products are ‘like’ or ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ is 
the marketplace. The Panel recalled…the words used in the Interpretative Note ad 
Article III, paragraph 2, namely ‘where competition exists’: competition exists by 
definition in markets.’32 The AB broadly agreed with this interpretation.33  
The dispute settlement bodies used econometric methods to measure 
competition. The Panel asserted the importance of elasticity of substitution in 
                                                
30 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, AB Report, above n. 11, at H:1(a) – H:2(a). 
31 H Horn and P Mavroidis, ‘Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment 
in the GATT/WTO Case-law on Tax Discrimination’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International 
Law 39, 62.  
32 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Panel Report, above n. 11, at para. 6.22.  
33 Ibid, AB Report at 25.  
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determining whether the alcoholic beverages were ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable’. The AB quoted the Panel: 
…In the Panel’s view, the decisive criterion in order to determine whether two 
products are directly competitive or substitutable is whether they have 
common end-uses, inter alia, as shown by elasticity of substitution.34  
The AB indicated that they agreed with this interpretation. 
One of the main products in dispute was whisky. Japan used elasticity of 
substitution studies to argue that an increase in the price of shochu would not cause 
significant numbers of consumers to switch to whisky, or vice-versa. Japan cited a 
study conducted by its Institute for Social Studies, which found that, in either case, 
only 10 per cent of consumers would switch. Also, the study found no significant 
impact on whisky consumption based on the price of shochu, or vice versa.35 The 
complainants found fault with Japan’s study, pointing out procedural errors, such as 
the way that the time-series model was calculated, and the need for more variables 
which might alter consumer behaviour. They introduced separate surveys, which 
indicated that there had been a negative competitiveness effect of high taxes of 
whisky, as compared with shochu.36 
The Panel had to interpret these competing claims. In the end, they rejected 
Japan’s 10 per cent figure, as it was obtained in the context of the current pricing 
regime, the subject of dispute. Here, a tax seen as distorting the market was cause to 
invalidate Japan’s evidence regarding consumer preferences. This rationale recalls the 
GATT Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Panel Report statement, that a tax measure 
should not crystallize consumer preferences. The Panel then stated that, even so, 10 
per cent elasticity was sufficient to prove direct competitiveness or substitutability.37 
The AB agreed that the beverages were directly competitive or substitutable.38 
In this example, econometric analysis was no ‘objective’ silver bullet: it 
demanded discretion on the part of the dispute settlement bodies, in order to answer 
questions such as, how much cross-price elasticity was necessary? Which 
econometric techniques and studies were most reliable? Certainly, given the 
imperfection of the econometric tools, the dichotomy between subjective and 
objective should not be too neatly drawn.  
                                                
34 Ibid, AB Report at 25 referencing Panel Report at para. 6.22. 
35 Ibid, Panel Report at para. 4.85.  
36 Ibid at para. 4.82.  
37 Ibid at para. 6.31. 
38 Ibid, AB Report at Section 2(a), para. 56. 
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However, despite these imperfections, an econometric approach such as this 
seems to represent the best possible attempt to capture consumer preferences in a way 
that conforms to the objective approach which the dispute settlement bodies intended. 
The approach was consistent with a market-based interpretation, translating consumer 
preferences into competitiveness indices. Assessing consumer preference based upon 
econometric market data also provides a bottom-up, rather than top-down, approach. 
Weighing a mass of individual ‘votes’ about whether products are in competition 
seems a more democratic strategy than limiting the assessment to the judgment of the 
dispute settlement bodies. As argued in the previous chapter, the more speculative 
approaches employed after Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, such as in Korea – 
Alcoholic Beverages, resulted in the widening of the NTP at the expense of regulatory 
sovereignty.  
Yet this approach was also made possible by the fact that consumers were 
choosing between products on the shelf, and could express their preferences in a 
quantifiable way. Consumer preferences could be captured through a market-based 
approach. In this sense, Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II forms an illustrative contrast 
with EC – Asbestos.  
 
4. Case study 2: EC – Asbestos 
 
A. The dispute 
Under Article III(4), Canada challenged an import ban that France had imposed on 
chrysotile asbestos, as it was a known carcinogen. Rather than imposing a ban, 
Canada argued France could have instituted special installation and maintenance 
procedures that would lessen the carcinogenic effect. This would be a less trade-
restrictive approach. France defended its ban as a public health protection regulation.  
Canada argued that two types of products, its asbestos and France’s substitute, 
were ‘like’ with respect to all of the BTA criteria.39 With regard to ‘consumer tastes 
and habits,’ they asserted that as the products were not for mass, but instead 
industrial, consumption, normal consumers found them to be virtually identical. 
Therefore, there was no reason to differentiate between the two.40  
                                                
39 Ibid, Panel Report at para. 3.419. 
40 Ibid at para. 3.422. 
 193 
Following the rationale of the Panel in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, 
Canada had also argued that consumer preferences in France were irrelevant, as the 
import ban altered the normal conditions of competition. Along the lines of Korea – 
Alcoholic Beverages, the AB stated that in such a circumstance, it would be possible 
for a Member to assess, and submit, information about latent or suppressed consumer 
demand, or substitutability from a relevant third market.41  
The EC disagreed that the products were ‘like.’ With respect to physical 
characteristics, they pointed out that the smaller diameter of asbestos fibres, a 
differing physical property, made them carcinogenic.42 When it came to ‘consumer 
tastes and habits,’ however, they dismissed the criterion altogether, as it was only 
industrial consumers who purchased the product 
 To resolve the differing claims about the ‘likeness’ of the products’ physical 
characteristics, the Panel determined that the products must not just be viewed in 
terms of chemical properties, whose differences might be minute, but also in the 
context of markets. Thus, they affirmed the market-based approach taken in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II. This approach to ‘likeness’ in Article III(4) has been broadly 
accepted.  
The Panel did not think that differences in physical characteristics, or the end-
uses of the products, were significant enough to differentiate the products.43 The Panel 
then stated: 
We note first of all that the risk of a product for human or animal health has 
never been used as a factor of comparison by panels entrusted with applying 
the concept of ‘likeness’ within the meaning of Article III. In addition to the 
fact that no other panel has probably ever been called upon to examine a 
question similar to the one before us, in our view the reason is to be found in 
the economy of the GATT 1994. Its primordial role is to ensure that a certain 
number of disciplines are applied to domestic trade regulations. Article XX of 
the GATT, however, recognizes that certain interests may take precedence 
over the rules governing international trade and authorizes the adoption of 
trade measures aimed at preserving these interests while at the same time 
observing certain criteria.44  
This analysis reiterates the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Panel’s rejection of 
‘aim and effect’, as it would replicate the purpose of Article XX. Finally, the Panel 
concluded that, although the two products were ‘like, and therefore the import ban 
                                                
41 Ibid, AB Report at para. 123. 
42 Ibid, Panel Report at para. 3.431. 
43 Ibid at para. 8.122.  
44 Ibid at para. 8.129. 
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violated Article III(4), it did satisfy the conditions of Article XX(b).45 On this basis, 
they did not recommend that France remove the ban. Though the AB agreed that the 
ban could remain, they disagreed with the way that the Panel came to this conclusion; 
a feature of their disagreement was the Panel’s treatment of consumer preferences. 
 
B. How to measure consumer preferences 
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, while a good deal of attention was given to 
consumers, in particular as they related to competition, their influence was defined 
narrowly, in the sense that they were choosing between ‘like’ products based upon 
small price differentials in the marketplace. However, in EC – Asbestos, consumers 
did not have market choice. Asbestos is an industrial product, with industrial 
consumers, so it would be more difficult to obtain the type of data used in Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages II. The Panel felt that it was too difficult to determine precisely 
the tastes and habits of consumers in France before the asbestos ban. Also, consumer 
preferences were inevitably varied. Therefore, the criteria would not provide clear 
results. They refrained from taking a position.46  
In fact, based on the impossibility of assessing them in an ‘objective’ manner, 
neither Canada, the EC nor the Panel considered consumer preferences to be a 
compelling aspect of their argument.47 In a broader sense, this reveals a limitation in 
approaching consumer preferences through quantitative analysis: it becomes more 
applicable in certain types of product supply chains.  
The AB clarified that the definition of ‘like’ products should fall in between 
Article III(2)’s ‘like products’ and ‘directly competitive or substitutable’ products.48 
Though the Panel’s finding was consistent with Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II’s 
objective approach to consumers, the AB criticized the Panel’s omission of ‘consumer 
tastes and habits’ as a criterion for determining whether the two products were ‘like’. 
Again affirming the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II approach, the AB stated that this 
criterion was particularly important as Article III dealt with competitive relationships. 
They stated: 
                                                
45 XX(b) deals with measures ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’; Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article XX, 14 April 1994, GATT Secretariat, 
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) at 455. 
46 EC – Asbestos Panel Report, above n. 12, at para. 8.139. 
47 Ibid at paras. 3.419 – 3.431; 8.139. 
48 Ibid, AB Report at paras. 92-96. 
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We do not wish to speculate on what the evidence regarding these consumers 
would have indicated; rather, we wish to highlight that consumers' tastes and 
habits regarding fibres, even in the case of commercial parties, such as 
manufacturers, are very likely to be shaped by the health risks associated with 
a product which is known to be highly carcinogenic. A manufacturer cannot, 
for instance, ignore the preferences of the ultimate consumer of its products. If 
the risks posed by a particular product are sufficiently great, the ultimate 
consumer may simply cease to buy that product. This would, undoubtedly, 
affect a manufacturer's decisions in the marketplace.49 [Emphasis added] 
Here, the AB attempted to include consumer preferences in an analysis of 
competition. As the words ‘very likely’ demonstrate, it revealed their interpretation of 
consumer preference, particularly as none of the disputing parties had made any 
claims about it. The interpretation was based on a strong common-sense argument, 
grounded in international standards and guidelines, that consumers would not want to 
purchase a substance with known carcinogenic properties.50 Therefore, unlike the 
Panel, the AB assumed that consumer preferences could be interpreted, in a normative 
fashion.  
But presumably, in Canada, industrial consumers did purchase the product. 
Neither Canada, nor any of the other disputing parties, had submitted studies on 
consumer preferences and asbestos to substantiate any claim. The Panel’s argument 
that ‘consumer tastes and habits’ are varied seems more plausible than the AB’s 
argument, that they are normative. Further, the logic of the Panel is more consistent 
with Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, and an objective view of consumer preferences. 
Using this approach, public health concerns are addressed under Article XX, which 
deals with them explicitly. As the Panel pointed out, they were never introduced into 
the ‘like’ products determination itself.  
However, there was a problem with the Panel’s logic: it created the potential 
for a legitimacy crisis.51 By deeming a carcinogenic and non-carcinogenic product 
‘like,’ the Panel appeared insensitive to public health concerns. Their reasoning 
demonstrated a public relations risk of jettisoning extra-market considerations to 
Article XX, even in the context of the ‘like’ products test, when considering 
regulations with consumer protection objectives. 
                                                
49 Ibid at paras. 103-104. 
50 WHO International Programme on Chemical Safety (IPCS), Environmental Health Criteria 203 – 
Chrysotile Asbestos (1998), para. 144. 
51 M Howse and E Tuerk, ‘The WTO Impact on Internal Regulations — A Case Study of the Canada – 
EC Asbestos’ in G De Burca and J Scott, The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001) 284 – 321. 
 
 196 
The AB were forced to abandon an objective approach to consumer 
preferences because of these limitations, and adapt a discretionary, subjective, 
interpretation, which this chapter calls a common-sense approach. However, they did 
not acknowledge this. After affirming the importance of ‘consumer tastes and habits’, 
the AB questioned the Panel’s finding that the two products were ‘like’, but because 
there was not enough evidence that the products had similar physical characteristics. 
In so doing, they adopted the EC’s argument about differing particle diameter. Then, 
they interpreted consumer preferences through physical characteristics. The different 
microscopic properties that led one product to be carcinogenic were the basis for 
consumer’s distinction between the products, and thereby made the products 
uncompetitive.  
The AB presented their approach as ‘objective’. ‘Consumer tastes and habits’ 
were based upon market competitiveness between products, and interpreted in the 
light of other, more objective BTA criteria of physical characteristics. The AB stated 
that they did not want to speculate about consumer preferences, but that very 
speculation seemed to form the substantive justification for the differentiation. 
Further, considering that many ‘like’ products differ on a molecular level, their 
argument about physical characteristics does not seem that rigorous. 
While the AB claimed they were evaluating the products based on their 
competitive relationship, it could easily be argued that their rationale reflected a 
subjective ‘aim-and-effect’ approach.52 The AB raised the point that the dictionary 
definition of ‘likeness’ does not specify from whose perspective likeness should be 
judged.53 While they did not answer this question explicitly, the subsequent analysis 
implied that they empowered consumers as arbiters of ‘likeness’. Though this analysis 
argues that what actually occurred was a transfer of discretionary power to the AB, 
the intent behind this statement, at least apparently, was to transfer the agency from 
the regulating government to the consumer.54 Under the ‘likeness’ test itself, rather 
than under Article XX, the AB honoured the fact that the aim of the regulation was to 
protect consumers, even though its effect was to eliminate trade in this product. They 
thus introduced an extra-market dimension into the ‘like’ products determination. 
                                                
52 Ibid at 301. 
53 EC – Asbestos, AB Report, above n. 12, at para. 92. 
54 Howse and Tuerk, above n. 51, at 301. 
 197 
They also overstepped an important boundary. Findings of fact, based in 
interpretation of the evidence of the dispute, are the responsibility of the Panel. The 
AB, on the other hand, is empowered only to make findings of law, derived directly 
from legal principles. Perhaps the most problematic aspect of this decision is not even 
that they made a finding based upon no evidence, but that they made a finding of fact 
at all. However, the AB did not acknowledge this breach. Instead, they finally 
concluded that, though they would not agree with the Panel that the products were 
‘like,’ there was not enough evidence to prove they were unlike. 
As analysed in Chapter 5, the AB has been clear that evidence is not an 
essential component of determining whether products are competitive and whether a 
measure discriminates against imported products. In general, this rationale has been 
used to increase the strength of the NTP at the expense of national sovereignty. Yet in 
EC – Asbestos, the AB concluded that the products would likely not be competitive if 
consumers had perfect information. Thus the dismissal of evidence was used to 
provide more deference to national regulation. In this case, the rationale was possibly 
influenced by the importance of the value at stake, ie, human health.   
With regards to consumer preferences, EC – Asbestos seems to offer a lose-
lose situation. If, following the Panel, consumer preferences are interpreted as 
‘varied’, and therefore irrelevant, there is no basis for incorporating consumer 
preferences into an important public policy decision. However, when consumer 
preferences were defined by the AB’s discretion, this involved a transfer of power, 
presented as an ‘objective’ evaluation of product competition and physical 
differences. There is a gap between stated approach and the content of the decision. 
Though the ends were good, from the perspective that they humanized the decision, 
the means were bad, in the sense that they opened up the potential (which perhaps 
will never be realized) for a future overstepping of discretion.  
In this dispute, a market-bound determination on ‘likeness’ under Article III 
had its limitations. Had product ‘likeness’ been evaluated on the basis of health 
impacts, rather than product competitiveness, the AB’s assessment would have been 
logical. Horn and Weiler term this an ‘alternative comparator’ approach.55 Versions of 
such an approach have also been proposed by authors such as Regan56 and Reid.57 In 
                                                
55 Horn and Weiler, above n. 13, at 31. 
56 DH Regan, ‘Regulatory Purpose and “Like Products” in Article III(4) of the GATT (with Additional 
Remarks on Article III(2))’ (2002) 36 Journal of World Trade, 443 – 478. 
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fact, the AB explicitly repudiated the Panel’s statement that considering health 
impacts under Article III would nullify the effect of Article XX, stating that ‘the fact 
that an interpretation of Article III:4 … implies a less frequent recourse to Article 
XX(b) does not deprive the exception in Article XX(b) of effet utile’.58 They made 
this statement to defend their analysis that negative competition impacts flowed from 
health impacts, rather than to introduce public health as a factor defining ‘likeness’.  
This could not be seen as an explicit introduction of Article XX’s listed 
objectives into Article III. Even so, this alternate reading of the AB’s decision 
suggests that it contained an element of balancing between the trade obligations under 
Article III and the importance of the value at stake. While there was no systematic 
analysis, this importance may have implicitly influenced their decision.  
However, the dispute settlement bodies have resisted measuring ‘likeness’ 
using any other baseline than competitiveness. Whether it is used to legitimate or to 
undermine national regulation, allowing this level of AB discretion in interpreting 
consumer preferences seems an unsatisfying approach. 
 The AB Report from the TBT dispute US – Clove Cigarettes59 is significant 
with respect to the issue of using consumer preference to broaden the ‘like’ products 
test. In the report, the AB referenced the treatment of consumer preferences in EC – 
Asbestos. Using this as a precedent, the AB noted that the goals of a measure might be 
taken into account, in the context of the ‘like’ products test, ‘to the extent they have 
an impact on the competitive relationship between and among the products 
concerned’.60 They summarized their findings as follows: 
In the light of this context and of the object and purpose of the 
TBT Agreement, as expressed in its preamble, we consider that the 
determination of likeness under Article 2.1 of the TBT Agreement, as well as 
under Article III:4 of the GATT 1994, is a determination about the nature and 
extent of a competitive relationship between and among the products at issue.  
To the extent that they are relevant to the examination of certain "likeness" 
criteria and are reflected in the products' competitive relationship, regulatory 
concerns underlying technical regulations may play a role in the 
determination of likeness.61 
                                                                                                                                      
57 E Reid, ‘Regulatory Autonomy in the EU and the WTO: Defining and Defending Its Limits’ (2010) 
44(4) Journal of World Trade 877, 891. 
58 EC – Asbestos, AB Report, above n. 12, at para. 115. 
59 WTO Panel Report on Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US – Clove 
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/R, adopted 2 September 2011, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS406/AB/R, 
adopted 4 April 2012. 
60 Ibid, AB Report at para. 119. 
61 Ibid at para. 120.  
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While this statement maintains the emphasis on the competitive relationship between 
products as the decisive factor when determining if products are ‘like’, it also 
reinforces the AB’s approach in EC – Asbestos, which in fact was based upon 
speculation regarding competitiveness.  
This chapter has characterized the rationale employed here as an implicit form 
of balancing. It is significant that both EC – Asbestos and US – Clove Cigarettes 
considered regulations with strong impacts upon human health. This suggests the 
possibility that human health is a particularly compelling regulatory objective that 
motivated the AB to tilt the balance toward a greater degree of deference. (Though 
there have been other trade disputes about cigarettes that have not employed such 
reasoning, such as Thailand – Cigarettes.) Under Article XX, the AB in Brazil – 
Retreaded Tyres agreed with the panel that ‘few interests are more ‘vital’ and 
‘important’ than protecting human beings from health risks’.62 While the legal context 
differs, the underlying sentiment remains relevant to the NTP.  
 
5. Case study 3: US – Tuna II 
 
US – Tuna II provides an important precedent on the role of consumer preference in 
the ‘like’ product test.63 The following decision was made by the Panel; however, 
their conclusions were not appealed. Due to its potential for broader applications, it is 
significant to consider their reasoning. The Panel acknowledged the relevance of 
consumer preferences, to the extent that they impacted upon the competitive 
relationship between the products in the marketplace.64 Yet, significantly, the Panel 
indicated that the products in dispute were not dolphin-safe versus non-dolphin safe 
tuna, but rather domestic versus imported tuna. They would not assume that tuna 
could be considered dolphin unsafe simply because they were Mexican. Further, to 
the extent that US consumers preferred dolphin-safe tuna, they would do so regardless 
                                                
62 WTO Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – 
Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007, para 144.  
63 Under the TBT ‘necessity’ test, Article 2.2, the dispute settlement bodies considered the risk of 
consumers being misled or deceived by product labeling. This was further discussed in Chapter 3, 
Section 3. 
64 US – Tuna II Panel Report, above n. 10, at para. 7.249. 
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of the origin of the product. Therefore, they concluded that consumer preference 
should not modify their conclusion that the products in dispute were ‘like’.65  
The basis for the dismissal of consumer preference in this scenario has 
implications with respect to the trade and environment relationship more broadly. By 
extension, for example, consumer preference in a biofuels dispute would also be 
dismissed. However, the reasoning behind this decision seems flawed. The NTP 
focuses on the relationship between the ‘like’ imported and domestic products in 
dispute as a whole, rather than subsets of those products. Mexico’s tuna exports were 
considered ‘like’ US domestic tuna. Thus, the product group in question is all 
Mexican tuna. Yet Mexican tuna might be separated into two subgroups: those that 
qualify for the US dolphin-safe label, and those that do not. At the same time, Mexico 
argued that all of their tuna was dolphin-safe, though this was measured using 
different criteria than those adopted by the United States.  
The Panel stated that they would not assume that Mexico’s tuna were not 
dolphin-safe; therefore it could not be differentiated, from the perspective of 
consumers, on the basis of nationality. There are two possible interpretations of the 
Panel’s statement. The first is that that imported and domestic products could not be 
differentiated because some of the Mexican tuna adopted the US specifications. 
Another possible interpretation is that the Panel will not pass judgment on Mexican 
fishing practices as a whole by implying they are unsafe to dolphins.  
However, both of these interpretations, as a justification for dismissing 
consumer preference, are problematic. The first does not make sense with respect to 
the fact that the product in dispute is all imported Mexican tuna, not simply the subset 
that adopt the US label. This is self-evident, given that the tuna that adopt the label do 
not face trade restrictions.  
The AB clarified this in general terms in the US – Clove Cigarettes AB 
Report. They stated: 
Once the imported and domestic like products have been properly identified, 
Article 2.1 requires a panel dealing with a national treatment claim to 
compare, on the one hand, the treatment accorded under the technical 
regulation at issue to all like products imported from the complaining Member 
with, on the other hand, that accorded to all like domestic products. . . .66 
[Emphasis added] 
                                                
65 Ibid at para. 7.250. 
66 US – Clove Cigarettes , AB Report, above n. 57, at para. 193.   
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The second interpretation is also problematic. Mexico argued that its tuna are 
dolphin-safe, even if they do not conform to the US label. Yet, the dispute does not 
consider a broad, abstract category of dolphin-safe tuna. In the context of the ‘like’ 
products test, the definition of dolphin-safe tuna is that it qualifies for the label, as this 
is the regulation in dispute.  
Comparison with another dispute helps to illustrate why the legitimacy of the 
regulatory category is particularly important with respect to environmental 
regulations. In EC – Asbestos, the AB determined that asbestos and its substitutes 
were ‘like’ with respect to some of the BTA criteria. However, they questioned 
whether consumers would prefer carcinogenic asbestos, if they had perfect 
information about its health impacts. This dispute differed in that the product in 
dispute was by definition carcinogenic, whereas Mexican tuna is not by definition 
unsafe for dolphins. For example, if Canada produced non-carcinogenic asbestos, it 
would not face any barriers to entry to France. With respect to consumers, 
carcinogenic asbestos and its substitutes can be demarcated more clearly. The tuna 
example provides more of a gray area.  
However, the distinction is somewhat of a false one. The US has established 
criteria for dolphin-safe, which was at issue in the dispute. It was not part of the 
Panel’s task to assess overall whether tuna from any particular country are dolphin-
safe; the dispute rests upon qualification for a particular standard. Thus, dolphin-safe 
certified tuna might be compared with a Canadian export of non-carcinogenic 
asbestos substitute: it would not encounter the same trade barrier.  
Under TBT 2.1, the AB also consider whether the US definition offers less 
favourable treatment to Mexican tuna. Therefore, in the context of the ‘like’ products 
test, the Mexican product in dispute should be tuna that does not conform with the 
specifications of the US label. This means that the issue of consumer preference 
should be relevant; specifically at issue is whether consumers prefer tuna caught 
without encircling dolphins.  
This example is relevant with respect to PPM measures in general. 
Environmental distinctions such as those between dolphin-safe and unsafe tuna, or 
sustainable and conventional biofuels, rest upon similar uncertainties about the 
imported goods as a coherent and separate regulatory category. If a similar position is 
adopted in all of these disputes, it may automatically disallow domestic consumer 
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perceptions as a relevant factor in assessing product likeness. In order for consumer 
preferences to be included, it is necessary that the regulation established by the 
responding country be seen as constituting in itself a salient category, to which either 
domestic or imported goods can conform.  
The dismissal of consumer preference is particularly surprising as the Panel 
did consider this issue when establishing whether less favourable treatment had 
occurred. They stated:  
We further note that it is undisputed that US consumers are sensitive to the 
dolphin-safe issue. This is acknowledged by both Mexico and the 
United States, and is also confirmed by the evidence presented with the amicus 
curiae brief to which the United States has referred to in its answers to 
questions. This evidence suggests that, following public campaigning by the 
environmental organization "Earth Island Institute" in the late 1980s 
(including through film footage shot in 1987-88 showing the capture and 
killing of dolphins during a fishing trip where setting on dolphins was used), 
tuna processors were under pressure to stop purchasing tuna caught in 
conditions that were harmful to dolphins. The evidence presented to the Panel 
also shows that major tuna processors reacted to these dolphin-safe concerns, 
and that this led to changes in their purchasing policies as of April 1990.  
These policies are still in place: such companies will not purchase tuna from 
vessels that fish in association with dolphins.67  
This paragraph demonstrates that not only do consumers prefer dolphin-safe 
tuna, they specifically prefer tuna that have not been caught through setting upon 
dolphins. The Panel further extrapolated that the dolphin-safe label had a commercial 
value, and that producers actually refused to buy uncertified tuna, for fear of 
consumer boycotts. Thus, from the perspective of US consumers, dolphin-safe tuna 
are not ‘like’ uncertified tuna, as they are not competitive in the marketplace. 
However, the Panel did not take this into account in the context of the ‘like’ products 
test. Instead, they simply argued that the measure had a detrimental market impact on 
Mexican tuna.  
 
6. Case study 4: ‘EU – Biofuels’ 
 
If a government were to challenge the EU criteria in the WTO, they would 
presumably wish to advocate importing biofuels that did not conform to its 
requirements. Indeed, the establishment of the criteria demarcates certain biofuels as 
compliant or non-compliant and establishes clear regulatory categories. Whether or 
                                                
67 US – Tuna II Panel Report, above n. 10, at para. 7.289. 
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not imported biofuels fit an abstract, general concept of sustainability, the relevant 
question is if they comply with the specific criteria. Therefore, it seems reasonable to 
construct the ‘like’ products analysis based on the difference between conventional 
and EU-certified sustainable biofuels. Whether the measure is discriminatory should 
be considered under the less favourable treatment test.   
For this reason, the following analysis focuses on ‘sustainable’ domestic 
versus ‘conventional’ biofuels, rather than simply domestic versus imported. 
However, it is possible that the AB would follow the questionable logic of US – Tuna 
II and dismiss consumer preference in this context.  
To analyse the role of consumer preference in an ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute, this 
section reviews the three approaches documented in this chapter, and how they would 
apply in this dispute: first, objective and quantitative; second, objective and 
dismissive; and third, common sense.  
It should be noted, of course, that this is a very speculative exercise. Not only 
is the dispute settlement bodies’ interpretation in this context unpredictable, but the 
specific details of the submissions by the Parties would necessarily shape the 
outcomes. However, without attempting to discern an outcome, this exercise intends 
to outline some basic contours of the challenge with regard to consumer preferences.  
 
A. The objective approach 1: quantitative measuring 
As well as consumer preferences, evaluated econometrically, Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II also emphasized the importance of physical characteristics and end-uses 
of products, when determining whether they are ‘like.’ The criterion of product end-
uses is directly relevant to consumers. To some extent, the criterion of physical 
characteristics operates in parallel to the consumer preferences query. However, EC – 
Asbestos provided an unusual demonstration of how physical characteristics, in this 
case molecular differences, might directly influence consumer preferences.  
There are physical differences between different types of biofuels. EU biofuels 
are sourced from temperate-climate feedstocks such as rapeseed, wheat, corn and 
beets; many imports, on the other hand, come from tropical feedstocks such as palm 
oil and sugarcane. Also, biodiesel and bioethanol have different chemical properties. 
If a dispute focused on imported palm oil biodiesel versus domestic wheat ethanol, an 
argument could be made that these are not ‘like’ products. However, physical 
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differences between feedstocks are substantially lessened when biofuels are blended 
into petrol or diesel. Further, these types of product differences are not substantial; for 
example, vodka and shochu were considered ‘like’ even though they are sourced from 
different feedstocks, due to their similar physical characteristics and end-uses. In a 
GATT dispute, US – Superfund, the Panel determined that crude oil, natural gasoline 
and refined oil, inter alia, were ‘like’ products despite some physical differences, as 
they were crude oil products with very similar end uses.68  
One interesting question is whether the AB would take into account the 
purpose of sustainability regulation when determining whether the products were 
‘like’. In EC – Asbestos, the AB considered the physical differences between asbestos 
and its substitutes in the light of the EU’s goal of preventing harm to human health. 
They concluded that the products might not be ‘like’. In contrast, physical differences 
between different types of biofuels have no inherent implications with respect to their 
sustainability. Instead, the meaningful differences between biofuels for the purposes 
of sustainability regulation are related to their production process. Even on a 
molecular level, it would be impossible to distinguish any systematic differences 
between, for example, palm oil whose production has involved the clearing of virgin 
forest, and palm oil whose production has not. This suggests that physical differences 
between biofuels are irrelevant. While the AB adopted this approach in EC – 
Asbestos, in US – Clove Cigarettes, they rejected the Panel’s argument that 
determining whether products were ‘like’ should be informed by the US’s policy goal 
of preventing youth smoking.69 The justification for the AB’s approach in EC – 
Asbestos was the importance of physical characteristics to product ‘likeness’; this 
does not apply with biofuels.  
However, even if the AB focused on product competitiveness and disregarded 
the policy goal at stake, it seems unlikely that they would conclude that the products 
were not ‘like’, as discussed subsequently and in the previous chapter. Further, the 
end-use of bioethanol and biodiesel, regardless of their feedstock, is the same: fuel. In 
terms of end-uses, sustainable and conventional biofuels would be virtually identical. 
In Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, Japan argued that consumers drank shochu in a 
                                                
68 GATT Panel Report on United States – Taxes on Petroleum and Certain Imported Substances (US – 
Superfund), L/6175, BISD 34S/136, adopted 17 June 1987, para. 5.1.1.  
69 US – Clove Cigarettes Panel Report, above n. 57, at para. 7.182, 7.208 and 7.247, and Appellate 
Body Report, at para. 108. 
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traditional way; this type of argument could not be made for biofuels. The dispute 
settlement bodies did not consider this a persuasive distinction on the part of Japan; 
they still considered the end-uses to be the same. Regarding end-uses sustainable and 
conventional biofuels are even more ‘like’ than, for example, shochu and vodka.   
The customs classification code, another BTA criterion for determining 
whether products are ‘like’, differs: biodiesel is classified as an industrial good, and 
bioethanol as an agricultural good. However, neither has a strictly defined code, and 
the complexity of their classification has led to calls for reform, due to the difficulty 
with tracking import and export volumes.70 The complexity also results from the fact 
that similar products may have different end-uses. For example, bioethanol in 
modified form may be used for cosmetics, medical sterilization or alcoholic 
beverages; soybean and palm oil are also cooking oils. Therefore customs 
classification is not a straightforward basis for clarifying the degrees of similarity 
between biofuels.  
Yet many trade analyses of biofuels sustainability criteria have concluded that 
products would be ‘like’ in a trade dispute, due to their physical similarities and end-
uses, and the difficulty of arguing that the products would not be competitive.71  
As discussed throughout this thesis, biofuels, produced sustainably versus 
conventionally, provide an excellent example of a regulatory distinction based upon 
non-product related process and production methods (‘NPR PPMs’). 72  This is 
particularly true for land-use criteria. Given the ‘like’ products test’s emphasis on 
physical characteristics and end-uses, there has been some debate about whether two 
otherwise identical products may be seen as unlike, solely because they are produced 
differently.16 This is an important question for environmental regulations in general, 
as many rely upon such distinctions.  
                                                
70 USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN) Report 
Number E36056, 6 April 2006. 
71 See, eg, A Swinback, ‘EU Support for Biofuels and Bioenergy, Environmental Sustainability 
Criteria, and Trade Policy’, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Programme 
on Agricultural Trade and Sustainable Development, Issue paper no. 17, June 2009; A Lendle and M 
Schaus, ‘Sustainability Criteria in the EU Renewable Energy Directive: Consistent with WTO Rules?’, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (‘ICTSD’) Information Note No. 2 
(2010), http://ictsd.org/i/publications/86798/ (visited 14 November 2011); A Mitchell and C Tran, ‘The 
Consistency of the EU Renewable Energy Directive with the WTO Agreements’, Georgetown Law 
Faculty Working Papers, Georgetown Business, Economics and Regulatory Law Research Paper No. 
1485549, October 2009. 
72 Mitchell and Tran, ibid at 3.  
16 Some Member States vigorously oppose the approach of declaring products unlike due to differences 
in NPR PPMs, On the other hand, in articles that also provide a useful overview of the controversy, 
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Neither of the disputes analysed herein explicitly addressed the role of NPR 
PPMs in establishing ‘like’ products; however, both emphasized the importance of 
physical characteristics. This functions as a counter-argument to basing product 
distinctions on NPR PPMs. On the other hand, it has been argued convincingly that 
the market-based approach to consumer preference established in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II, and emulated in EC – Asbestos, resolves some of the environmental 
shortcomings associated with a reluctance to acknowledge PPM distinctions.73 This is 
because, under this approach, if consumers clearly distinguish between identically 
produced products, so that they are no longer competitive, it forms a strong basis for 
determining that they are not ‘like’. This de-emphasizes aspects of the ‘likeness’ test 
related to observable product characteristics and end-uses.  
Thus, a greater role for consumer preferences represents a useful evolution in 
the PPMs debate. However, these consumer preferences will only be significant to the 
extent that they impact upon the competitive market relationship of the products. 
Thus, one problem that remains is methodological: how will these preferences be 
measured? ‘EU – Biofuels’ illustrates these difficulties. With regard to the 
econometric approach to consumer preferences, the Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II 
approach contained, in particular, one requirement missing in ‘EU – Biofuels’: 
consumer choice. The approach of measuring consumer preferences necessitated data 
and surveys on purchasing behaviours, which most likely would not exist in this 
scenario. The supply chain of most biofuels is probably more similar to that of 
asbestos, in that consumer preferences are not economically explicit. Within Canada, 
asbestos was purchased by industrial consumers, and installed without end-of-the-line 
consumers having any say. The same was true for asbestos substitutes in France.  
The main consumers for biofuels are also industrial: the companies who 
purchase them, often blending them with conventional gasoline, and manage their ‘at 
the pump’ distribution. It would be unlikely that individual consumers would have 
much choice between sustainable and conventional biofuels, in either a complaining 
or a responding country. Small-scale distribution channels might be feasible for some 
                                                                                                                                      
both Charnovitz and Howse and Regan argue that, with regard to WTO law, NPR PPM-based 
distinctions are not necessarily illegal. There is a scarcity of WTO jurisprudence that directly addresses 
the topic. S Charnovitz, ‘The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO: Debunking the Myth of 
Illegality’ (2002) 27 Yale Journal of International Law, 59-110; R Howse and D Regan, ‘The 
Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining ‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ 
(2000) 11(2) European Journal of International Law, 249-289. 
73 Bronckers and McNelis, above n. 14, at 374 – 378. 
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types of biofuels, such as recycled cooking oil. However, given the presumed 
difficulty of sourcing, transporting and delivering fuels on a mass scale, while a 
separate pump with sustainable biofuel is certainly an option, it seems unlikely as an 
EU-wide practice. For the same reason, it seems unlikely that econometric data could 
be drawn from a complainant country.  
Given the supply chain, it is certainly possible that the AB would focus their 
determination of consumer preference at the industrial level. However, despite this 
limitation, in EC – Asbestos the AB made a particular effort to incorporate the 
potential views of the ‘ultimate consumer’, though they had little influence over their 
purchasing choices. This suggests a willingness to consider consumers through a 
broader definition, in which they more closely resemble ‘the public’, or, alternately, 
actors in an idealized market with perfect information. Thus, given that it is a public 
policy regulation, it is possible that consumers would receive similar treatment in ‘EU 
– Biofuels’.  
One important implication of this analysis is that product characteristics, to 
some extent, determine their regulatory treatment. Biofuels, in particular, seem a very 
likely candidate for state intervention. A unified delivery infrastructure requires a 
degree of regulatory involvement at the point of purchase. Rather than the individual 
or industrial consumer, the state might be deeply implicated in deciding what kind of 
biofuels to certify and import. This is a significant departure from many existing 
labelling schemes, such as Fair Trade and Forest Stewardship Council certification, 
which involve producing goods with superior ethics, as indicated by a label and/or 
explicit marketing, aimed at capturing a premium market share of alternative 
consumers. The willingness of consumers to pay more for a product which supports 
their environmental and social values underwrites the diversification of market 
choice. These types of voluntary schemes are less likely to violate WTO law. The 
element of consumer choice is preserved, and there are no restrictions on imports of 
uncertified or unlabelled goods. The fact that sustainability criteria are being 
developed by the EU makes them more problematic, from a WTO perspective.  
Demonstrating this, in a dispute under Article III(4), the AB stated:  
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… What is addressed by Article III:4 is merely the  governmental  intervention 
that affects the conditions under which like goods, domestic and imported, 
compete in the market within a Member's territory.74  
For this supply-chain related reason of lack of market choice, it would likely 
be difficult to amass data about consumer preferences using market-based surveys or 
data like those in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II. However, perhaps the notion of 
‘measuring’ consumer preferences might be incorporated through another strategy, 
which does not rely upon such economically explicit data. An attempt to measure 
consumer preferences through surveys probably represents the best attempt to capture 
them objectively. For example, surveys could be administered which queried 
consumers for their views on sustainable versus conventional biofuels. The emphasis, 
of course, would be on determining competitiveness between products.  
To obtain this information, a survey would have to undertake a fairly nuanced 
set of questions. If more than half of consumers stated that they would prefer 
sustainable to conventional biofuels, this would represent a collective consumer 
preference toward sustainable biofuels. Yet, if consumers said they would prefer 
sustainable biofuels, would this mean that they would not purchase conventional ones, 
if they were available, even if they were cheaper? If only conventional biofuels were 
available, would consumers go further, and boycott these? There is also the problem 
that this type of data is speculative. Is there a gap between how consumers would 
respond to such a survey, and how they would act in real life? Also, to use the word 
of the GATT Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II Panel, what if a regulation supporting 
the use of sustainable biofuels ‘crystallized’ consumer preference toward these 
biofuels? Would the presence of the regulation, as it did in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II, invalidate data gathered about consumer preferences? In that case, 
would the only legitimate data about consumer preferences be gathered from 
countries which did not offer sustainable biofuels?  
 
B. The objective approach 2: dismissing consumer preferences 
In EC – Asbestos, the Panel concluded that the products in dispute were ‘like,’ and 
then moved on to an analysis of whether the regulation represented less favourable 
treatment of imported products. Due to lack of evidence, consumer preferences were 
                                                
74 WTO Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen 
Beef (Korea – Beef), WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 11 December 2000, para. 149. 
 209 
dismissed as ‘varied’. The public policy justifications behind the regulation were 
considered in the context of Article XX, where they were not evaluated in terms of 
consumer preferences, per se.  
 Of course, under EC – Asbestos, the Parties in dispute made no claims about 
consumer preferences. Thus, the Panel had no evidence to go on. Had the Parties 
undertaken surveys, there would have been more of a rigorous basis for their 
conclusion. Clearly, whether evidence is submitted is beyond the control of the 
dispute settlement bodies.  
In the event of an ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute, it might prove impossible to 
measure, or interpret, consumer preferences with any degree of accuracy. In this 
event, one approach would be to follow the Panel in EC – Asbestos, and dismiss 
consumer preferences. In a sense, dismissal is unsatisfying, because it seems to be 
such an important component of public policy. Undoubtedly, at least some consumers 
have strong preferences. However, given the similarities between physical 
characteristics and end-uses of the products, and lack of data on consumer 
preferences, it would be easy to argue that sustainable and conventional biofuels were 
‘like’, and then undertake the other steps of the analysis. 
Based on the example of EC – Asbestos, it seems there is another force at 
work: an intuition as to the degree of controversy the issue will provoke. The 
emphasis in determining ‘likeness’ has been product competitiveness. Would 
consumers really refuse to buy conventional biofuels on a mass scale, making them 
uncompetitive with sustainable ones? Perhaps, in ‘EU – Biofuels,’ it would be easier 
for the dispute settlement bodies to dismiss consumer preferences than in EC – 
Asbestos, as it is less likely to be such a controversial issue.  
 
C. The common sense approach 
The example of ‘EU – Biofuels’ is instructive because it inspires thought about what 
might happen if a common sense approach is applied in a more ambiguous situation. 
International standards support the classification of asbestos as a carcinogen, whose 
use should be eliminated. This made the interpretation of consumer preferences in EC 
– Asbestos fairly unambiguous. The controversial nature of the dispute also 
influenced the AB to include this consideration under Article III itself, rather than 
Article XX. The EC – Asbestos example clearly demonstrates that, in order to public 
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backlash, the AB was engaging in a type of balancing between two conflicting goals: 
achieving trade liberalization, and protecting public health.  
On the importance of sustainable production of biofuels, however, targeted 
international standards are not so well established. For this reason, a common sense 
interpretation would likely conclude that sustainability is less fundamental than, for 
example, preservation of human health. An implicit hierarchy of concerns would 
likely be in operation, which reflected the extent to which the regulations in question 
reflected broad-based societal norms. If the AB affirmed, for example, that consumers 
would ‘very likely’ prefer sustainable to conventional biofuels, and that these 
preferences would impact upon the marketplace, this argument might prompt more 
criticism than it did in the EC – Asbestos decision.  
If the dispute settlement bodies wanted to affirm the legitimacy of 
sustainability regulations under Article III, and be logically consistent, they would 
probably need to adopt an ‘alternative comparator,’ so that the relevant criteria for 
evaluating product ‘likeness’ consisted of environmental or social impact. 
Alternatively, they could explicitly reinstitute the ‘aim-and-effect’ test.  
Of course, there is no way of knowing what the dispute settlement bodies 
would decide. However, if consumer preferences were to be considered relevant to 
the dispute, and these preferences were interpreted, rather than measured, this 
interpretation would grant a large degree of discretionary power to the dispute 
settlement bodies. To resolve this problem, as the conclusion further discusses, it is 




As well as biofuels sustainability criteria, the passage of climate change-related 
regulations with potential to violate WTO rules provides a fresh opportunity to 
establish how, precisely, the influence of consumer preferences should be 
incorporated, particularly in public policy disputes. The issue is important, in the 
context of the argument that consumer preferences can be used to distinguish between 
products that would otherwise be seen as ‘like’, for example, sustainable versus 
unsustainable, or carbon-intensive versus low-carbon, goods.75  
                                                
75 Vranes, above n. 7. 
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Due to the importance of the values they pursue, disputes about public policy 
regulations, such as climate change measures, are relevant to consumers in a crucial 
way. This chapter argues that they can become more difficult to capture in these very 
circumstances. In EC – Asbestos, consumer preferences were not measured, in part 
because the supply chain of the product in the complaining country, and the import 
ban in the responding country, made gathering data in both places difficult. Yet, they 
were undeniably relevant. Perhaps because of this conundrum, the AB introduced 
consumer preference even though it required a contradictory approach. In fact, the AB 
seemed to employ the same ‘subjective’ approach to consumers that it had so clearly 
rejected both in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II, and EC – Asbestos itself. This 
temptation, to use consumer preferences as a stand-in for discretionary action, may 
recur in disputes that concern public policy regulations.  
In such disputes, rather than actual consumers, the interpretation of consumer 
preferences perhaps should be re-framed: it reflects more about societal norms. 
Specifically, the more risky and controversial the public threat being forestalled by a 
tax or regulation is seen to be, the larger the temptation to deal with it under the NTP, 
rather than Article XX/TBT 2.2, and, in the absence of data, to interpret consumer 
preferences. In EC – Asbestos, the AB argued that they were evaluating consumer 
preferences based upon competitiveness impacts. However, it is probably more 
accurate to conclude that norms about protecting human health were universal enough 
to intrude upon the primary, market-based purpose of the NTP. This suggests 
elements of the Article XX necessity test, and its evaluation of the importance of the 
value at stake. This clarification is a step toward a more rational approach. 
Unavoidably, in a dispute such as EC – Asbestos, rather than consumers, the 
discussion concerns the less market-based concept of ‘the public’.  
The difficulty with measuring consumer preferences, as documented in EC – 
Asbestos, could be seen as a methodological failure. Canada and the EC could have 
made their approach to consumers more ‘objective’ simply by undertaking studies. 
They might have administered surveys that questioned consumers about their views: 
did they see asbestos as a serious health threat, even if it was installed using safer 
procedures? To improve methodologies for capturing consumer preferences, more 
techniques could be applied, perhaps drawn from other areas, such as Competition 
Law, which has already developed an arguably more sophisticated approach to 
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measuring consumer preferences.76 With evidence to work with, the AB might have 
used an interpretative strategy as objective as that employed in Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II.  
Certainly, better methodologies would aid the AB in coming to a more 
democratic interpretation of consumer preferences. However, one important question 
remains. Presumably these responses would differ in both countries, based upon the 
presence, or absence, of a ban. Whose views would be ‘objective’? In GATT Japan – 
Alcoholic Beverages, the Panel affirmed that a tax should not crystallize consumer 
preferences. Utilizing the same rationale, the Panel in WTO Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages II rejected data Japan had gathered about consumer preferences under the 
conditions of the taxation policy in dispute. The underlying assumption, that 
government regulation should not influence consumer preferences, is not surprising, 
given the free market basis of the WTO. When applied to a public policy tax or 
regulation, however, the extension of this logic has radical implications. It would 
mean, for example, that consumer views in France, the country with the ban, would 
not be considered relevant. It would also follow that governments should only 
establish regulations whose source is measured consumer preferences. This 
invalidates the argument that governments should influence consumer preferences in 
support of public policy goals. It also suggests that it is the responsibility of 
consumers, rather than government, to be informed of public health threats such as 
asbestos.  
Despite the lack of homogeneity in the views of consumers, governments 
routinely make normative regulations. The GATT Panel’s insistence that the tax in 
Japan – Alcoholic Beverages should not ‘crystallize’ consumer preferences is 
anathema to the fact that, in some instances, government regulation does affect 
consumer preferences. Through setting regulation, such as sustainability criteria, the 
state influences consumers to adapt to shifting or emerging norms. Regulatory 
decisions reflect national priorities, and there is certainly no guarantee that they 
benefit the public. Nor are states impartial guards of the global public good. Their 
regulatory preferences likely reflect their economic priorities, one factor that makes 
the dispute settlement bodies’ task so difficult. Nevertheless, it is important that the 
WTO system not act as a braking mechanism for more progressive regulations that 
                                                
76 Choi, above n. 1, at 17.  
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support emerging norms, such as, for example, regulations that support environmental 
sustainability, or climate change mitigation.  
This is particularly relevant in supply chains such as biofuels, where 
consumers do not select explicitly between products. This is an important subset of 
regulations to isolate. The elimination of consumer agency means that preferences are 
necessarily mediated through whoever creates the regulations that govern the 
production of the product. The issue thus becomes into a broader discussion of 
environmental norms and values, and their international channels of influence. 
Clearly, national policies shape norms, and buying sustainable biofuels helps the 
market for sustainable biofuels.  
A greater recognition of the authority of governments to influence consumer 
preferences seems to call into question the fundamental ideological premise of the 
WTO: the free market. On the other hand, if we think about the effect on legal 
reasoning, it can be argued that this recognition does not need to have such a radical 
impact. There would be factual and legal implications for the Panel and AB, 
respectively. Factually, the Panel would evaluate evidence obtained within the context 
of a regulatory regime in dispute. If the hypothesis of government influence on 
consumer preferences is correct, this would have the impact of providing more WTO 
legitimacy for these regulations.  
Legally, there might be a systematic approach for identifying progressive 
public policy regulations that merit the allowance of more government discretion. 
Presumably the first step would be to establish criteria that distinguish these 
regulations from other types. Given the discretionary range of the AB, there would 
certainly be room for this within the existing Article III, and it might even clear up 
inconsistencies between approaches to consumer preferences. The process of 
establishing criteria, however, could be difficult. For example, a government might 
present its policy of mandating the purchase only of domestic products as an public 
policy regulation, though it is anathema to Article III. An attempt to create general 
criteria which successfully addressed these and other problems might be crushed 
under the weight of its own complexity.  
This is particularly true as there is a better established way of approaching 
essentially the same problem. This is to question whether the NTP should 
accommodate an aim and effect or ‘alternative comparator’ approach that would 
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allow a larger set of concerns to contribute to the ‘like’ products determination, or 
whether it should maintain its market-based orthodoxy. It may be that EC – Asbestos 
represents a unique departure on the part of the AB, which was prompted by an 
extraordinary set of circumstances: the lack of ambiguity in the public policy value at 
stake (human health), and public pressure to avoid appearing insensitive to such 
concerns. These factors forced the AB to incorporate non-competitiveness criteria into 
the ‘like’ products determination.  
On the other hand, shunting such concerns to the category of ‘exceptions’ 
under Article XX also might prompt controversy in other situations. If the dispute 
settlement bodies wanted to adjust their norms, concluding that sustainably-produced 
and conventional biofuels were not, in fact, ‘like’, for example, they would need to 
depart from the approach of Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II and EC – Asbestos. 
These disputes take as their foundation the notion that ‘like’ products are competitive 
products. When product ‘likeness’ is measured through competitiveness, it 
undermines the ability of the dispute settlement bodies to recognize extra-market 
considerations as a legitimate basis for distinguishing products under Article III, or to 
allow Member States to do so. If the dispute settlement bodies considered whether 
sustainability standards for biofuels formed a violation of Article III, an approach 
which considered only the competitiveness between conventional and sustainably-
produced biofuels would likely fail to justify such regulation. If, however, an 
‘alternative comparator’ approach were applied, biofuels could be differentiated 
because of their differing environmental impact. This determination would not rest on 
an illogical, discretionary interpretation of consumer preferences. Thus, it is a better, 
more straightforward approach to incorporating non-trade societal norms in the NTP. 
Alternatively, as suggested in the conclusion of the last chapter, the AB might simply 
take into account evidence obtained in the context of a regulation in dispute, thus 
deferring to a government’s ability to influence consumer preference. This approach 
would not rely on any implicit or explicit balancing exercise, but instead would apply 
across the board to all disputes. This change would necessitate that the AB modify the 
argument expressed in some disputes that the impacts of the measure in dispute on the 







Whether biofuels are sustainable is a central controversy accompanying the expansion 
in their global production and trade. They have presented a public policy challenge: 
how to utilize a product that may help prevent climate change but has equal (or even 
greater) potential to harm. The EU has attempted to respond to this challenge through 
formulating sustainability criteria to accompany biofuels use targets. These criteria 
are uniquely well positioned to raise important questions about the relationship 
between WTO law and national sustainable development policies.   
The WTO Secretariat describes sustainable development as a central WTO 
principle, and it is an objective of the current Doha Development Agenda.1 Yet the 
WTO is primarily a trade organization, which circumscribes its contribution. 
Therefore, an important aspect of the WTO’s institutional support for sustainable 
development is simply non-interference in relevant national policies. For this reason, 
the WTO-legality of the EU criteria, unprecedented binding ‘sustainability’ 
legislation, is a significant question.2 
While there has been no dispute, this thesis has demonstrated that some of the 
elements of existing and proposed criteria seem likely not to be in compliance with 
WTO law, particularly the National Treatment Principle of GATT Article III (‘Article 
III’)/TBT Article 2.1 (‘TBT 2.1’) and GATT Article XX (‘Article XX’)/TBT Article 
2.2 (‘TBT 2.2’), the provisions that formed the main focus of this thesis. WTO texts 
and statements by the Secretariat, as well as relevant international law treaties, have 
repeatedly affirmed sustainable development’s mutual supportiveness with trade 
liberalization. Yet the EU criteria suggest that sustainable development is far from 
effortless side-effect of trade liberalization; on the contrary, sustainability regulation 
poses particularly steep challenges of WTO law.  
                                                
1 See Chapter 2. 
2 See Chapter 2.  
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When evaluating the WTO-compatibility of the criteria, a fundamental 
challenge is to determine if they were crafted in order to protect EU domestic biofuels 
producers. Legislation to mandate and incentivize renewable energy production may 
have as its true purpose the protection of domestic biofuels producers. However, the 
purpose of sustainability criteria themselves does not appear to be protectionism, as 
argued in this thesis. Instead, these criteria respond to widespread criticism that 
biofuels are doing more harm than good due to the quantity of agricultural land 
required for the ‘first generation’ biofuels currently being produced. As well as 
displacing food crops and resulting in biodiversity loss, some biofuels produce more 
emissions than fossil fuels, particularly when land conversion is taken into account. 
Thus putting in place support mechanisms to encourage biofuels production as an 
environmental solution without attempting to mitigate these environmental harms 
would have prompted tremendous backlash both from within EU bodies and civil 
society.3  
If the criteria are not protectionist in intent, this raises an important question: 
why do they risk violating WTO law? It is clearly not sufficient for the EU simply to 
proclaim that trade-restrictive regulation aims to achieve sustainability rather than 
protect domestic producers; the dispute settlement bodies have developed 
mechanisms for reviewing this claim. This thesis argues that these mechanisms are 
not failsafe. In identifying hidden protectionism, they risk also capturing measures 
that pursue legitimate environmental goals. Further, regulations with particular 
characteristics are more likely to give rise to this problem; EU criteria exemplify 
some of these characteristics.  
The first part of this conclusion provides a brief, non-comprehensive review of 
a few of the regulatory characteristics of biofuels sustainability criteria: breadth, 
process-orientation, extra-territorial impacts, complexity and emergence and supply-
chain features. It highlights specific mechanism of WTO law that pose challenges 
with respect to these regulatory characteristics. This analysis focuses on 
recommendations for how the AB might adopt a more deferent approach to these 
issues. 
If EU biofuels sustainability criteria are not in conformity because of their 
regulatory characteristics, this suggests that the WTO has overstepped its role as an 
                                                
3 See Chapter 1. 
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organization to prevent trade protectionism. The second part of the conclusion briefly 
reflects upon two issues that are particularly significant in this regard. The first is the 
emphasis on international standards and attempted multilateral solutions, a topic 
which formed a focus of the first part of the thesis. The second is the use of the free 
market as the baseline for evaluating product competitiveness, a topic considered in 
the second part of the thesis. In both cases, it is not the WTO provision, but rather its 
interpretation, that poses a risk of overstepping the WTO’s intended role. Finally, the 
conclusion discusses the important influence of the values that the EU criteria pursue.  
 
2. Key regulatory characteristics of EU biofuels sustainability criteria  
 
A. Breadth 
One of the main critiques of sustainable development, both among WTO Members 
and more widely, is its conceptual breadth and vagueness.4 EU biofuels sustainability 
criteria demonstrate this characteristic in that they contain several different 
regulations grouped under the unifying concept of ‘sustainability’. This breadth 
translates into specific challenges with respect to dispute settlement.5 In the context of 
the ‘necessity’ test of GATT Article XX and TBT 2.2, the AB must assess the 
contribution of a particular measure to the achievement of the regulatory aim at stake. 
This suggests it would be possible to discard the concept of ‘sustainability’ and 
simply present more narrowly defined regulatory objectives. However, the fact that 
the regulations pursue sustainability should have some independent influence in this 
context, as ‘sustainable development’ is a WTO treaty term. Its legal weight, and 
whether this may justify trade-restrictive regulation, is not precisely defined. This is 
an example of a gray area in the interpretation of WTO law. Sustainable 
development’s inclusion in the Preamble of the WTO’s founding agreement forms an 
important aspect of its legal influence in dispute settlement. However, the AB would 
likely have some flexibility with respect to the amount of weight that they awarded to 
the WTO Preamble.  
Another gray area has to do with the role of social welfare in the WTO’s 
interpretation of sustainable development. The WTO has emphasized economic 
                                                
4 See Chapter 2. 
5 See Chapter 3. 
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development and environmental conservation. 6  Sustainable development’s social 
welfare dimension might strengthen existing WTO provisions, such as Article XX 
subparagraphs, that have the potential to apply to national social welfare policies.  
Social welfare problems such as higher food prices from biofuels production 
and corporate ‘land grabs’ displacing local people have been arguably the most 
controversial aspect of increased biofuels production. One reason that such impacts 
were not addressed in the sustainability criteria is likely due to their sheer complexity 
and the difficulty of addressing them on a producer- by producer- basis. However, the 
EC also cited WTO law as one reason not to include stronger sustainability criteria.7 
Thus recognition in the WTO that social welfare is an inherent part of the definition 
of sustainable development would be useful.  
 
B. Process orientation 
Another gray area in the interpretation of WTO law is the role of regulatory 
distinctions based upon how products are produced, so-called process and production 
methods (‘PPMs’), in the WTO provisions considered in this thesis. Questions 
regarding PPMs are one of the most significant aspects of the EU’s regulation. In 
particular, proposed indirect land use change (‘ILUC’) criteria demonstrate an 
extremely deep-reaching form of process-orientation. They do not even respond to the 
production conditions of biofuels being produced for EU markets, but rather the 
indirect impact of these biofuels on general production patterns, and resulting land-
use change.  
EU biofuels sustainability criteria are predicated on the hypothesis that non-
product-related (‘NPR’) PPM-based regulations do not inherently violate WTO law. 
This demonstrates an evolution in the EU’s stance since 2001.8 Thus a dispute on 
biofuels sustainability criteria, and particularly ILUC criteria, would provide an 
important test of the role of NPR PPMs in WTO law. 
Process-orientation is also fundamental to the concept of sustainable 
development. Environmental and social welfare regulations that fall under the 
umbrella of ‘sustainable development’ are likely to regulate products differently 
                                                
6 See Chapter 3. 
7 Ibid. 
8 See G De Búrca and J Scott, ‘The Impact of the WTO on EU Decision-making’, in G De Búrca and J 
Scott (eds), The EU and the WTO: Legal and Constitutional Issues (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2001), 6 
– 11.  
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based upon how they are produced, rather than their physical differences. In a 
spectrum of interpretation, acceptance of NPR PPMs as a valid basis for regulatory 
distinctions would describe the more deferential end. 
 
C. Extra-territorial impacts 
The EU has been criticized for setting regulations such as biofuels sustainability 
criteria which encourage international producers to conform to EU values and 
standards. Through their criteria, the EU plays a role in shaping global climate change 
governance. Indeed, their influence on establishing international norms, particularly 
with respect to social and environmental values, has been the subject of much scrutiny 
and critique.9  
Particularly among developing countries, concern about such extra-territorial 
trade-restrictive measures and their potential to impinge upon national sovereignty is 
a major source of controversy. Questions arise about what right the EU has to dictate 
how other countries utilize their natural resources and produce their goods. This is 
conceptually related to the issue of NPR PPMs: resistance to such process-based 
regulations results in part from the perception that they intrude excessively into the 
sovereignty of exporting states. Assessment of compliance with such invisible 
requirements also necessitates monitoring and overseeing of foreign production on the 
part of EU Member States. 
While biofuels sustainability criteria have extra-territorial impacts, they do not 
directly impose EU law in other countries; instead they are linked to exports. A 
country may choose not to export its biofuels to EU Member States if they find that 
these countries’ application of the sustainability criteria is too cumbersome.  
Thus, arguments about sovereignty work in both directions. On the one hand, 
an exporting country has the right to produce products as it wishes; on the other, an 
importing country has the right to assert its preferences about the goods it imports and 
                                                
9 See, eg, J Scott and L Rajamani, ‘EU Climate Change Unilateralism’ (2012) 23(2) European Journal 
of International Law, 469 – 494; KA Nicolaidis and R Howse, ‘This is my EUtopia: Narrative as 
Power’ (2002) 40(4) Journal of Common Market Studies, 767 – 792; I Manners, ‘Normative Power 
Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’ (2002) 40(2) Journal of Common Market Studies, 235 – 258. 
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consumes domestically. 10 If the EU cannot exclude products produced in a way that it 
condemns, this also violates its sovereignty.11  
Whether measures that shape extra-territorial production processes are WTO-
compatible also constitutes a gray area that the AB has avoided addressing directly. In 
general terms, a stricter prohibition on measures with extra-territorial impacts would 
favour trade liberalization by empowering exporters and pursuing market integration, 
while allowing such measures in principle would provide more deference to national 
environmental policies such as EU criteria.  
 
D. Complexity and emergence 
Perhaps the most timely and challenging regulatory characteristic of biofuels 
sustainability criteria is their complexity, and the fact that they pursue emerging 
norms. To a greater or lesser extent, complexity and emergence are features of 
sustainability, biodiversity conservation and climate change; biofuels sustainability 
criteria pursue all three simultaneously. These regulatory characteristics are 
particularly notable with respect to the criteria that the EU has proposed for 
responding to ILUC. 
Difficulties result from the fact that ILUC is an emerging and controversial 
problem lacking established scientific credibility and clear international standards. 
The EU’s calculation methodology for determining ILUC emissions may be contested 
on these grounds. As a result, it would be easier for a country to argue that the 
methodologies were crafted in order to single out certain (foreign) biofuels for less 
favourable treatment. Methodological uncertainties may also pose problems in the 
context of GATT Article XX/TBT 2.2. Uncertainties in the science may cast doubt on 
the extent to which this approach contributes to the EU’s regulatory objective of 
reducing ILUC-related emissions.  
This is significant with respect to climate change and other progressive 
environmental regulation. At the risk of oversimplifying the complex task of 
identifying hidden protectionism, in the most general terms, one recommendation 
would be to focus on the intent and impact of the regulation rather than necessitating 
                                                
10 See, eg, E Vranes, Trade and the Environment: Fundamental Issues in International Law, WTO Law, 
and Legal Theory (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009, 109. 
11 R Howse and D Regan, ‘The Product/Process Distinction – An Illusory Basis for Disciplining 
‘Unilateralism’ in Trade Policy’ (2000) 11(2) European Journal of International Law, 275.  
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that it is based upon international norms or multilateral agreements. If a regulation 
also has a negative impact on domestic producers, for example, this offers an 
evidence-based argument that its intent is not protectionist. When evaluating the 
importance of a regulation, scientific evidence plays an indirect role, particularly in 
TBT Article 2.2; the nature of this influence is not well defined and seems open to 
interpretation. Therefore it would be possible to adopt an approach to scientific 
evidence that was informed by a precautionary approach.  
 
E. Integrated supply chain 
Biofuels sustainability criteria walk the line between voluntary and mandatory, 
containing elements of both. While the EU has been careful to affirm that the criteria 
themselves are non-binding, biofuels must fulfil the criteria to count toward 
renewable energy targets that are binding; thus Member States may feel compelled to 
apply the criteria in order to meet this requirement. The criteria themselves contain 
some flexibilities regarding how they are fulfilled; however, the EU will also 
undertake conformity assessment of alternative approaches. 
 The EU’s emphasis on the criteria’s voluntary nature (as demonstrated by their 
position that the TBT Agreement does not apply to the criteria for this reason) reflects 
the fact that voluntary criteria are more likely to conform to WTO law. From a WTO 
perspective, the least problematic means for regulating biofuels would be through no 
government intervention whatsoever, relying solely upon consumer choice. Disputes 
such as Korea – Beef and US – Tuna II have clarified this; the Panel in US – Tuna II 
stated that the WTO deals with ‘governmental intervention that affects the conditions 
under which like goods, domestic and imported, compete in the market’.12  
However, it would be difficult or impossible for consumers to choose between 
‘sustainable’ and ‘conventional’ biofuels at the pump, as they choose between organic 
and conventional apples. Biofuels are delivered through unified infrastructure, and 
often blended with petrol. These supply chain constraints mean that consumers will 
likely not make the ultimate choice of which biofuels they would prefer to purchase. 
It is important to view the EU’s regulatory strategy in the light of these limitations. 
Inherent constraints shaped by the supply chain may make the regulation less likely to 
comply with WTO law. 
                                                
12 Ibid. 
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Conceptually, this example reveals why, in some sectors in particular, national 
regulation may be the most appropriate response to a particular environmental 
problem. These constraints should also be relevant when evaluating the reasonable 
availability of other regulatory options in the context of the ‘necessity’ test of Article 
XX and TBT 2.2. The AB should clearly note the fact that less trade restrictive 
voluntary regulation is not reasonably available.  
 
3. Establishing the limits of WTO obligations 
 
The interpretation of WTO provisions should reflect the fact that the WTO is a 
negative integration instrument whose function is limited to preventing Members 
from using domestic policies to erect undue trade barriers, rather than a positive 
integration instrument that harmonizes national policies. Dispute outcomes repeatedly 
affirm that WTO obligations maintain a high level of deference to individual national 
sovereignty; for example in EC – Asbestos the AB stated that Member States have an 
‘indisputed’ right to ‘set the level of protection they wish to achieve’.13 However, 
some WTO dispute settlement resolution mechanisms shape national policies so that 
they conform more closely with international market integration objectives. This 
section identifies two areas of interpretation that pose a particular risk in this regard.  
  
A. International standards and multilateral harmonization 
The first area is the role of the WTO in encouraging international and multilateral 
regulation. The TBT Agreement is particularly important in this respect. The TBT 
Agreement’s Preamble recognizes ‘the important contribution that international 
standards and conformity assessment systems can make [to furthering the objectives 
of GATT 1994] by improving efficiency of production and facilitating the conduct of 
international trade. . . .”14 Thus, the Agreement contains a number of provisions that 
encourage Member States to harmonize their regulation with international standards 
                                                
13 WTO Panel Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-
Containing Products (EC – Asbestos), WT/DS135/R, adopted 18 September 2000; and Appellate Body 
Report, WT/DS135/AB/R, adopted 12 March 2001, para. 168.  
14 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (‘TBT Agreement’),14 April 1994, GATT Secretariat, 
The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the Legal Texts (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994) 122. 
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and with one another. 15 The importance of the TBT Agreement’s emphasis on 
international standards in contributing to the WTO’s positive integration function has 
been noted, for example, by Ortino16 and Scott.17 Due to constraints of space and time, 
a full investigation of all of these provisions and biofuels sustainability criteria must 
remain a topic for future research. 
This thesis focused on elements of this emphasis on international standards in 
Article XX and TBT 2.2.  To review briefly, in the ‘necessity’ test of these provisions 
the dispute settlement bodies must establish the causal connection between measure 
and regulatory goal; in the GATT dispute Thailand – Cigarettes the Panel cited a 
resolution of the World Health Organization to demonstrate that Thailand’s ban on 
cigarette advertising was linked to its goal of reducing smoking.18 Similarly, in EC – 
Asbestos the Panel cited WHO statements about the carcinogenicity of asbestos to 
affirm the connection between France’s ban and its objective of protecting human 
health.19 Another component of the ‘necessity’ test under Article XX is an assessment 
of the importance of the value at stake. In Brazil – Tyres, the AB called upon relevant 
international agreements and international standards to prove the importance of 
Brazil’s public health objectives.20  
One justification for this emphasis on international standards is to avoid 
unilateral measures. The concern is that enabling such measures would lead to the 
failure of the international trade system, as national governments would simply 
proliferate measures that conditioned access to their markets upon particular 
regulatory requirements.21 In this context, the AB has also emphasized the importance 
                                                
15 See, eg, TBT Articles 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.9, 5.4, 5.5, 5.6, 6.1, 9.1, 12.4, 12.5, 12.6; Ibid. 
16 F Ortino, Basic Legal Instruments for the Liberalisation of Trade: A Comparative Analysis of EC 
and WTO law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2004) 26. 
17 J Scott, International Trade and Environmental Governance: Relating Rules (and Standards) in the 
EU and the WTO (2004) 15(2) European Journal of International Law 307, 328 – 330.   
18 GATT Panel Report on Thailand – Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes 
(Thailand – Cigarettes), DS10/R – 37S/200, adopted 7 November 1990, para. 78. 
19 EC – Asbestos, Panel Report, above n. 11, at para. 8.188. 
20 WTO Appellate Body Report on Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres (Brazil – 
Tyres), WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted 3 December 2007, paras. 21, 121.  
21 See, eg, US – Shrimp: …if an interpretation of the chapeau of Article XX were to be followed which 
would allow a Member to adopt measures conditioning access to its market for a given product upon 
the adoption by the exporting Members of certain policies, including conservation policies, GATT 1994 
and the WTO Agreement could no longer serve as a multilateral framework for trade among Members 
as security and predictability of trade relations under those agreements would be threatened…market 
access for goods could become subject to an increasing number of conflicting policy requirements for 
the same product and this would rapidly lead to the end of the WTO multilateral trading system. WTO 
Appellate Body Report on United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products 
(US – Shrimp), WT/DS58/AB/R, adopted 15 June 2001. 
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of attempting negotiation and providing regulatory flexibility to account for the 
diverse circumstances of trade partners. In US – Shrimp, the AB’s finding that the 
measure violated Article XX had to do with its unilateral nature. This ruling is 
significant as the AB not only stipulated the need for more multilateral coordination, 
but also suggested the introduction of particular procedural elements that should be 
incorporated into the regulatory processes. 22  
The implication is that EU biofuels sustainability criteria are most likely to be 
considered in compliance if they refer to internationally recognized sustainability 
standards that have been established in consultation with trade partners and/or based 
in multilaterial agreements, and if the process of their formulation exhibits 
inclusiveness and procedural fairness.23 Thus, one likely influence of WTO law on the 
EU regulation was to encourage the utilization of international standards as 
benchmarks. The criteria tie EU requirements to international standards as they are 
relevant, for example, when defining areas of high biodiversity.24 They also state the 
EU’s openness to negotiated solutions with trade partners.  
These requirements enable governments to ground sustainability-based trade 
restrictions in international norms, which are transparent, legitimate and objective. 
Yet focusing on international standards, multilateralism and negotiation may have 
negative side-effects. The legitimacy of emerging standards and agreements is 
uncertain, while existing, more general agreements might be too broad to apply. This 
emphasis also exerts pressure not to go beyond international benchmarks. 
International consensus is a force for weaker and more general standards. Thus, even 
though they appear to be as impartial as possible, these requirements risk being a 
braking mechanism on progressive regulation. Emerging environmental problems 
might require a national regulatory response that runs ahead of the timeline of the 
multilateral response which may be slow and inadequate. Thus, there is a double-
edged sword for emerging environmental regulations. While the international system 
                                                
22 In his analysis of this dispute, Ortino characterized the AB’s ruling as demonstrating a positive 
normative function, as the AB explained where the regulation had failed and how the failure should be 
remedied. He stated, ‘it is the clear attempt to put forward certain normative criteria and standards 
which Members must and can follow in regulating their markets that characterizes the AB Report….’ 
Ortino, above n. 13, at 238; see also De Búrca and Scott, above n. 9, at 20. 
23 R Howse, et al., ‘WTO Disciplines and Biofuels: Opportunities and Constraints in the Creation of a 
Global Marketplace’ (2006) IPC Discussion Paper, International Food and Agricultural Trade Policy 
Council, 13. 
24 See Chapters 3 and 4. 
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has not formulated a response (or may not formulate an adequate response), unilateral 
national regulation may be disciplined by the WTO.  
 
B. The role of evidence  
The AB has rejected sole reliance on market evidence when establishing the existence 
and nature of the competitive relationship between products in dispute. In the context 
of the ‘like’ products test of the National Treatment Principle, one of the main 
arguments is that the measure in dispute may distort the competitive relationship 
between products by changing the relationship between consumers and the products.  
The argument for dismissing an evidence-based approach was initially applied 
in disputes regarding the impact of tax measures on the price and availability of 
imported alcoholic beverages.25 However, extending this rationale to include public 
policy regulations allows a deeper examination of the underlying premise that 
government regulation distorts competitive relationships. Under this approach, if 
biofuels sustainability criteria led EU consumers to develop a preference for 
sustainable biofuels, to the extent that conventional biofuels were no longer 
competitive in EU markets, this would not be a valid basis for determining that the 
products were not ‘like’. Instead, the AB would only take into consideration 
consumers whose market preferences had not been so distorted.  
This prompts thought on the complexity of the relationship between 
government policy and the free market, particularly with respect to public policy 
regulation. Specifically, it may be appropriate in some cases for government 
regulation to play a role in determining the competitive relationships between 
products in the marketplace. In this instance, dismissing this influence as distorting 
intrudes too much into government sovereignty. Indeed, in the broadest terms, this 
may be a question about which is more legitimate in shaping product competitiveness, 
government regulation or the free market.  
This issue also has pragmatic significance with respect to regulations that 
respond to emerging problems. It may be in part the responsibility of governments to 
encourage consumers to adopt new behaviours such as purchasing sustainable 
biofuels. Thus dismissing such views exhibits an excessive bias toward the free 
                                                
25 WTO Panel Report on Korea – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (Korea – Alcoholic Beverages), 
WT/DS75/R; WT/DS84/R, adopted 17 September 1998, and Appellate Body Report, WT/DS75/AB/R; 
WT/DS84/AB/R, adopted 18 January 1999.  
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market. The obvious recommendation would be to take into consideration evidence 
collected in the context of a regulation in dispute, which enables a more balanced 
approach.  
 
4. Influencing the spectrum of interpretation:  
The importance of the value at stake 
 
AB decisions do not happen in a textual vacuum; they reflect larger political issues. In 
the event of a WTO dispute, the importance of the values that this regulation pursues 
would be significant with respect to the legitimacy of the AB’s ruling. For this reason, 
it may be difficult to separate the legal and political issues that this case study raises. 
As noted, one political issue of central importance has to do with the relationship 
between developing and developed countries with respect to both agricultural market 
protectionism and environmental regulation. In both cases, biofuels sustainability 
criteria may be controversial based upon the perception that the EU is protecting its 
markets and imposing its sovereign values.  
This helps explain why international standards are useful. If an international 
regulatory response has been imposed, this provides a baseline against which to 
measure divisive differing national regulatory responses. Yet EU biofuels 
sustainability criteria aim to achieve goals whose relative importance is uncertain both 
in the WTO context and also in international law more broadly. This uncertainty is a 
dynamic factor; it adds to uncertainty about the criteria’s WTO-compatibility. The 
AB’s ruling in a hypothetical ‘EU – Biofuels’ dispute would reveal something about 
the pervasiveness of the norms they attempt to achieve. 
The importance of the value at stake plays a formal role in adjudicating WTO 
disputes; for example, the AB considers this importance when determining the 
necessity of a measure under Article XX or TBT 2.2. Yet examples throughout this 
thesis also suggest the policy goals at stake may play a role in determining the 
outcome of disputes in broader more implicit ways. This is a controversial conclusion. 
In theory Member States can pursue whatever goal they wish to achieve, and the AB 
does not make pure tradeoffs between trade liberalization versus other values. When 
assessing compliance with the NTP the AB does not consider the weight of the policy 
objective that a Member State pursues; instead it focuses on determining whether a 
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measure is discriminatory based upon its structure and application. Even when 
evaluating the importance of the value at stake in the context of Article XX/TBT 2.2 
necessity test, the AB avoids judging the merit of the goal but instead assesses the 
appropriateness of the means/ends relationship between the goal and the measure.  
This thesis has argued that pure balancing may have played a role in past 
disputes under the NTP. For example, in EC – Asbestos, the AB used competitiveness 
impacts as a proxy for their sense that human health was of paramount importance to 
the ‘likeness’ of the products. This constituted a ‘finding of fact’ on the part of the 
AB, as none of the parties in dispute had submitted any evidence about consumer 
preference. Thus the ruling suggests an element of balancing between trade 
obligations and the importance of the value at stake.  
The AB report from the TBT dispute US – Clove Cigarettes affirmed the AB’s 
interpretation of this issue in EC – Asbestos. In a carefully worded statement, they 
concluded that underlying regulatory concerns might play a role in the determination 
of likeness if they are relevant to the ‘likeness’ criteria and reflected in the 
competitive relationship between products in dispute.  
It is significant that in both of these decisions, the value at stake was public 
health. As the AB in Brazil – Retreaded Tyres affirmed, human health is of utmost 
importance. 26 The gravity of the regulatory goal that a measure in dispute pursues, 
and the level of controversy that may result from a ruling that it is not in compliance, 
may guide the AB in this context.  
 Further, in some disputes, the AB has considered simply whether there is a 
negative impact upon conditions of competition to the detriment of imported 
products; if so the measure in dispute is not in conformity. In others, they have 
introduced an additional step of considering if this detrimental impact may be 
explained by factors other than the foreign origin of the product (Article III) or 
‘legitimate regulatory distinctions’ (TBT Agreement). The latter approach is more 
deferent, as a measure may have negative impacts upon imported products and still be 
in conformity.  
Yet they have not specified the criteria that determine the approach. In 
general, disputes in which they adopted this more deferential approach have had to do 
with public policy regulations that may raise controversy if the AB rules that they do 
                                                
26 Brazil – Tyres, above n. 17, at para. 144.  
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not conform to the NTP (ie EC – Asbestos, US – Clove Cigarettes, US – Tuna II). 
This suggests the possibility that the importance of the value at stake has some 
implicit influence. For example, public health measures are of primary importance; 
taxation measures that distinguish between alcoholic beverages are not so important.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The regulatory characteristics of EU biofuels sustainability criteria exemplify the 
issues that they attempt to regulate. The criteria’s breadth, complexity and process-
orientation, their extra-territorial nature, as well as the fact that they respond to 
emerging problems, mirror the relevant global environmental challenges. Thus the 
relationship between these ambitious criteria and WTO law helps illustrate more 
broadly the challenges such regulations may pose in the WTO context.  
 The WTO AB is not the primary instrument of competence with regard to the 
environment, nor should it be responsible for evaluating the legitimacy or importance 
of environmental regulation. Yet WTO law should provide appropriate deference to 
national regulation. If regulations are disciplined because they exhibit particular 
characteristics, rather than as a response to their protectionist nature, the WTO will 
have overstepped its bounds as a negative integration instrument. Some mechanisms 
to identify hidden protectionism have in some instances played a larger function: 
multilateral harmonization of regulation to enable trade liberalization.  
The text of WTO covered Agreements is not sufficient to make self-evident 
whether a measure is in compliance. The discretionary element is of key importance. 
Many of the same interpretive strategies that have the potential to overstep the WTO’s 
negative integration mandate fall into a gray area of WTO law. Declaring the EU 
criteria to be WTO-compatible would necessitate an interpretation of these gray areas 
that is maximally deferent to the EU. A more deferential approach seems appropriate 
with respect to the WTO’s scope and function.  
Yet AB decisions must also be viewed in the context of larger WTO debates 
and the political force of public opinion. The values that the criteria pursue have 
indeterminate legal weight and attempts to forge international solutions are beset by 
controversy. Thus, the WTO dispute settlement system may be playing a role in 
balancing not only national policy objectives against WTO commitments, but also the 
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importance of innovative regulation against international consensus. The EU criteria 
reveal some of the tensions that lead to the relevant gray areas in WTO law, and the 
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